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SUMMARY 
 
The main question that this research attempts to tackle is whether the Turkish 
accession to the EU will threaten or not the cohesion of the EU. This question is 
answered in the framework of: 1) The evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, 
especially through the relevant EU decisions and the Turkish political, economic, 
social, military and institutional reality. 2) The various theories of International 
Relations (Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism, Neo-Functionalism). What I 
try to do is examine the structural changes which could occur as a result of the 
Turkish accession to the EU.  
 
 
Therefore, my aim is to analyse the EU -Turkey relations in the context of the EU 
Enlargement taking into consideration the policy of the US, which is the dominant 
actor of the international system in the current era. This study attempts to investigate 
and identify the factors influencing the policy of the EU on the Turkish accession to 
the European Union and vice versa. These factors constitute, in fact, variables upon 
which a model of EU cohesion can be based in order to find out whether the 
European system -as defined on legal, institutional, economic, military and social 
level- can be threatened or not by Turkey or even other new member states.        
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 General Introduction 
 
Euro-Turkish relations constitute one of the main issues prevailing on the European 
political landscape, classified at the top of the European agenda. Turkish accession 
to the European Union (hereafter EU) is a complicated matter, closely connected to 
the coming Enlargements of the EU and to their resulting implications. In this context, 
a chain of questions are tabled, questions which hold much significance for the 
potential role of Turkey within the EU. One of the most important questions is 
whether or not the EU is capable of absorbing new member states, especially a state 
such as Turkey, whose population numbers the second largest in Europe after 
Germany (Muenz 2006). Even more relevant is the question of what impact the 
inclusion of Turkey would have on the EU. In this regard, it is instructive to focus on 
the 'German question,' (Bertram 1990) which was re-raised in particular just after the 
collapse of the Soviet Block; will we have a European Germany or a German 
Europe1 (Ifestos 1999, pp. 203-204; Spanger 1992, pp. 67-78)?  Similarly, the 
question on the Turkish membership is whether we will have a European Turkey or a 
Turkish Europe.  
 
 
In light of these, the central question which this study will address is the following: will 
Turkish accession to the EU threaten the cohesion of the EU? This question is to be 
answered in the context of various theories of International Relations (such as 
Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism) with particular 
reference to Gilpin’s theoretical approach. According to this approach changes 
occurring in the international system bring about the rise or decline of the 
international system and may lead even to conflict and war (Gilpin 1981).  
                                               
1
 The 'German question' results from the German imperialistic policy which cost humanity, and 
especially Europe, two bloody wars. The division of Germany was decided for security reasons. The 
allies, in other words the victorious power of the Second World War, considered that a divided Germany 
was less dangerous for itself and for Europe. Whether or not democracy would be consolidated in 
Germany was the big bet. A democratic Germany would reduce the risk of the outburst of a new 
catastrophic war.  Finally, Germany won the bet. There is no doubt that in the current era, Germany is a 
democratic country and one of the leading EU member-states. 
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The aim, therefore, of this study is to analyse relations between the European Union 
and Turkey in the framework of International Relations and the Enlargement of the 
EU, taking into consideration the policy of the US as the dominant actor in the 
international system in the current post-Cold War era. This study attempts to 
investigate the potential causes of problems for the accession process and to identify 
the factors influencing both the policy of the EU on Turkish accession and the policy 
of Turkey regarding the accession process. Having these in mind, I will investigate 
the cohesion of the EU in relation to Euro-Turkish relations. The aim is to establish a 
'model of cohesion'  and to determine, in relation to this model, whether the 
European system - legal, institutional, economic and social - will be threatened by the 
accession of new member states or not. At the same time, this investigation will 
constitute a self-evident ratification or rejection of Gilpin’s theory and other theories of 
International Relations (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992, pp.167-168).    
 
  
     
1.2 Working Position and Project Rationale  
 
Since 2004, I have been the main consultant to and director of the office of the MEP 
Mr. Yiannakis Matsis. More precisely, I am responsible for the smooth functioning of 
three political offices, based in Brussels, Strasbourg and Nicosia. Euro-Turkish 
relations are one of the main areas of interest of the office.  
 
 
In the context of my position, I am in charge of the following issues: 
1) I coordinate the political efforts of Mr. Matsis’ office inside and outside the 
European Parliament.   
2) I attend all the meetings in the European Parliament, especially those of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee.  In 
short, I attend the meetings in which the Members of the European Parliament 
present reports, exchange views and arguments and shape the policy of the EU in 
co-operation with officials and technocrats from the European Commission and the 
European Council. 
3) I accompany Mr. Matsis to official meetings as well as on official or unofficial 
missions organised by the European Parliament in Turkey and elsewhere.          
4) I shape, in conjunction with Mr. Matsis, the political positions he expresses, orally 
or in writing, at the European Parliament and in the context of Cyprus political life. I 
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also help shape the strategy that informs his political goals. Acting within this 
framework, we take political decisions within the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee.  
 
 
In addition to the above- mentioned tasks, my duties also include:  
a) Reading all the documents tabled at the Committees of the European Parliament 
by the MEPs and by the European Commission and the European Council.   
b) Closely following the Press and the mass media in general, in Cyprus, Greece, 
Turkey, Europe and elsewhere.   
c) Collecting relevant data and information within the framework of an established 
collection network.  
d) Maintaining contact with European technocrats and diplomats in order to remain 
informed about events both on and behind the political scene.  
 
 
It is obvious that my interest in this project results from my daily office tasks. Being 
involved in political, economic and social affairs related to Turkish accession to the 
EU, I realised that by definition, I had a personal and professional interest in more 
deeply investigating the phenomenon of Turkish accession to the EU.  Such interest 
does not reflect my personal interest alone, but also reflects the interest of my 
employer and the office of Mr, Matsis in the context of taking concrete political 
decisions.  
 
 
 
1.3 Importance of the project  
 
Turkish accession to the EU is a matter upon which an extensive discussion has 
erupted, not only within the EU but within Turkey as well. Turkish accession to the 
EU is related to:  
• The structural changes which must be carried out within Turkey if this country 
wishes to join the EU2 (European Council 1993, Commission of the European 
Communities 2005).  
                                               
2
 According to the official website of the European Union, any country seeking EU membership must 
conform to the conditions set out by Article 49 and the principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty 
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• The future EU Enlargements. These Enlargements are connected to the new 
EU budget, which will be adopted in 2014 (Council of the European Union 
2005). At the same time, these Enlargements are also related to the political, 
institutional, social and economic orientation of the EU (Council of the 
European Union 2004). EU policies in these sectors should be continuously 
reformed and adapted with a view to achieving regional integration. Will 
changes in these areas be directed towards the deepening of the EU or 
towards consolidating integration? Having these questions in mind, 
institutional reforms are at the top of the European agenda. These institutional 
reforms constitute a precondition for the functionality of the EU, comprised of 
27 or 30 member states (Informal European Council 2007). 
 
 
Turkish accession to the EU is, by definition, an issue coherent to the next 
Enlargements and to the ‘absorption capacity'3 of the EU, as well as to the cohesion 
of the EU and the relations between the EU and the US. This study aspires to 
address problems that both the EU and Turkey encounter on a daily basis and in the 
long term. In fact, it aims to examine whether Turkish accession to the EU will 
threaten or not the cohesion of the EU. The more research is undertaken about 
Turkish accession to the EU, the more reliable the decisions taken within the EU and 
Turkey will be. After all, research provides methodological tools for the shaping of 
policies, especially on issues as sensitive and complicated as the case of Turkish 
accession to the EU.                              
In light of the above, the main subject of this study is to:  
                                                                                                                                       
on European Union. Relevant criteria (Copenhagen criteria) were established by the Copenhagen 
European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995.  
To join the EU, a new member state must meet three criteria: 
 political: stability of Institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities;  
 economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
 acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.  
For the European Council to decide to open negotiations, the political criteria must be satisfied. 
Any country that wishes to join the Union must meet the accession criteria. The pre-accession strategy 
and accession negotiations provide the necessary framework and instruments (Europa Glossary). 
3
 By 'absorption capacity', we mean the ability of the EU to smoothly integrate new member-states. In 
this project, a short definition is given in Chapter 2.3.6 by the Commissioner of Enlargement, Olli Rehn. 
'Absorption capacity' also means the capacity of a member-state to absorb Structural Funds programs.  
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• Present research on an issue which dominates and will dominate European 
affairs for the coming years. This issue is closely connected to the policy of 
the US in Europe and the global role which the EU wishes to play in the 
new era under the spectrum of globalisation.  
• Assist politicians and civil society to understand and successfully face the 
political, legal, economic, cultural and social phenomenon of Turkish 
accession to the EU. 
• Contribute to the designing of policies which rely on rational approaches 
and not on sentimental motives.   
• Contribute to the existing dialogue on Turkish accession to the EU. Such a 
dialogue  has developed on various levels as follows:  
  a) Within the European Commission and its yearly reports   
  evaluating Turkish accession to the EU.  
b) Within the European Parliament, which issues reports on Turkish 
accession to the EU and which comments or sends political messages 
both to the European Commission and the European Council.  
c) Within the European Council, which takes political decisions that 
are legally binding both for the EU and Turkey. 
  d) Within civil society and the context of public opinion, both 
  in Turkey and in the member states of the EU.  
  e) Within the realm of scientific society.             
  
 
The main intention is to contribute catalytically to the scientific and political 
discourse4 on Turkish accession to the EU by establishing a model of EU cohesion. 
This model will incorporate factors and variables related to the cohesion and the 
‘absorption capacity' of the EU. This model can be employed on the one hand as a 
methodological tool for politicians dealing with Turkish accession to the EU and on 
the other hand as a model for academic society. It will facilitate examination of the 
concept of Enlargement and more precisely of Turkish accession to the EU.   
 
 
                                               
4
 By 'scientific discourse', I mean the discussion on and examination of the question on whether theories 
of International Relations can be justified in practice -or not through Turkish accession to the EU and 
whether such accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not. Furthermore, the main relevant 
question is whether the EU moves -in the course of its structural changes- towards regional integration 
(theories of Functionalism) or whether it remains bound on the theories of Realism (see Chapter 2 and 
scenarios of Chapter 6). Such structural changes may be affected by the Turkish accession to the EU. 
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1.4 Themes and Problems under Investigation   
 
As stated, the purpose of this research is to examine whether Turkish accession to 
the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not. Thus, the priority is to examine the 
meaning of cohesion and to investigate the impact of structural changes on EU 
cohesion.  
 
 
In light of this focus, I examine:  
1) Whether there is confusion between the definition and the content of the cohesion 
policy of the EU on the one hand and the cohesion of the EU on the other.   
2) The abovementioned issues (cohesion policy and cohesion of the EU) in the 
context of the Structural Funds and the relevant task of levelling disparities between 
the regions.  
3) The cohesion of the EU by taking into account economic, political, social and 
institutional aspects, as well as the issue of the 'EU absorption capacity5.' 
 
 
However, we can not obtain scientific results unless we couple theory with practice. 
The theoretical context I will work within is, on the one hand, Realism and Structural 
Realism, and, on the other hand, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism (Pentland 
1960; De Vree 1972; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992, pp. 162-169; Deutsch, 1978). 
These theories provide a foundation upon which I build my main question as to 
whether the Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not). 
There is a huge debate within the field of political science on theories of Realism and 
Functionalism, and this debate is reflected as well in the EU and in efforts towards 
European integration. Moreover, in the framework of the current discussion, 
Enlargement and EU 'absorption capacity' are closely related to theories of 
International Relations, and so must be assessed within this context.                        
 
 
To achieve this goal, some issues relevant to Turkish accession to the EU must be 
classified.  Following is a supplementary list of themes and problems related to 
Turkish accession to the EU: 
                                               
5
 For a definition of EU Cohesion, see Chapter 2.4; Chapter 4.7, footnote 40. For 'absorption capacity", 
see Footnote 3 -Chapter 1.3, p. 11 and Chapter 2.3.6, pp.27-28.  
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• Relations between the US, EU and Turkey.  
• The next EU Enlargements within the spectrum of 'absorption capacity' 
and cohesion policy.     
• The main obstacles to Turkish accession to the EU.  
• The role of the Turkish political system, the army and the Turkish 
economy in the contemporary international environment.  
• The structural changes to be made within Turkey in the context of 
reforms required by the EU, and the structural changes which should 
be enacted within the EU as a result of Turkish accession to the EU.  
•  The 'political games' (if there are such games), developed within the 
EU in relation to Turkish accession to the EU.    
• The role the EU wishes to play within the regional and global system. 
This role is connected to future Enlargements, and is fundamental to 
the question of whether there should be a move towards the deepening 
or the consolidation of the EU (Lagendijk, 2007). 
 
 
 
1.5 An Appropriate Project 
 
This project reflects my professional, personal and political concerns and interests. It 
is a subject closely related to my job and professional aspirations, and one which 
offers the opportunity to become more politically mature within the field of Euro-
Turkish relations.  
 
 
By undertaking this project, I hope to effectively assist my office in making reliable 
decisions and in assuming a serious political stance, one reflected in votes at the 
level of both the Committees and the Plenary of the European Parliament. Certainly, 
this project will help me in the future, at any post in which I may serve, in analysing 
international affaires and, especially, Turkish accession to the EU - an issue that 
dominates and will dominate European affairs in coming years.  Through the analysis 
of Turkish accession to the EU and European cohesion in the context of Enlargement 
I hope to offer a scientific and political instrument for European politicians and 
academics.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Terms of Reference/Aims/Objectives/ and Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of this study is to examine whether the Turkish accession to the EU can 
bring structural changes as well as changes on the balance of power within the EU, 
to what extent and whether such changes will threaten the cohesion of the EU.  My 
objective is to investigate and find out the factors-variables influencing and defining 
the EU cohesion in relation to the Turkish accession to the EU. 
 
 
The theoretical framework for my analysis is based on theories of International 
Relations, such as Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-
Functionalism, on the methodological instruments of surveys and interviews, on 
archival research and on the conceptions of key political players shaping policy in the 
context of the EU. In this respect, I seek to draw information and useful conclusions 
as to the way the EU operates within the context of Enlargement. In particular, I 
question whether Turkish accession to the EU threatens the political, institutional, 
economic, cultural and social cohesion of the EU. Such a focus requires, by 
definition, analysis and exploration of the nature of the Turkish political system. 
        
      
By elucidating the factors shaping Turkish accession to the EU, this study also 
endeavours to examine the way in which decisions are made and should be made in 
the concept of EU stability, 'absorption capacity', functionality and cohesion.           
 
  
  
2.2 Research Questions 
 
The questions below are embedded in the aims and objectives of this project: 
1) Which main factors affect the shaping of the EU’s policy on Turkish accession to 
the EU?  
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2) What is the role of the US on the matter, as a major actor of the international 
system, and to what extent does it influence the shaping of EU policy and decision-
making on Turkish accession to the EU? 
3) Are the decisions of the EU taken in accordance with the national interest of its 
member states or in accordance with common European interest? What is the role of 
the national interest in the EU decision-making process? 
4)  What is the Turkish political situation? 
5) What is the role of the Turkish army within the Turkish political system? 
6) Are Europeans afraid of Turkish accession to the EU? To what extent and why?  
7) Will Turkish accession to the EU bring about a redistribution of power? 
8) Will Turkish accession to the EU bring structural changes?  
9) Could such structural changes threaten the cohesion of the EU?    
 
 
These questions are answered through methodical research. The findings are of both 
theoretical and practical importance, as they form a political instrument useful for 
MEPs, governments and the decision makers of the EU.   
 
 
 
2.3 Literature Review and Theoretical Approach    
 
Euro-Turkish relations have been developing under the influence of various 
International Relations´ schools of thought. They have been developing, in particular, 
under the influence of two main theories: that of Classical and Structural Realism, on 
the one hand, and that of integration, encompassing Functionalism and Neo-
Functionalism, on the other (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992). These two theoretical 
streams of thought, Realism and Functionalism, are two sides of the same European 
coin. In this study, I deal with both the terminology and essence of theories of 
International Relations, as well as with EU cohesion policy, the cohesion of the EU, 
the EU absorption capacity, national interests, 'power games' and regional 
integration.  Definition of these terms is of great importance in order to follow the 
argument of this study. In particular, EU cohesion and absorption capacity are 
consistent with each other terms and have great significance within discussions of 
EU Enlargement and its successful outcome. At the same time, elucidation of the 
theoretical background of the project is necessary.  This chapter therefore, deals with 
the following issues:  
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• The EU: A ' Sui Generis Organisation'  
• Classical Realism, National Interest, and 'Power Games' 
• Functionalism, Neo- Functionalism, Integration and Common Interest  
• Structural Realism and Changes in the International system 
• Cohesion policy in the EU  
• Absorption Capacity   
• EU Cohesion       
 
 
 
2.3.1 The EU: A 'Sui Generis Organisation' 
 
The EU is a multinational organisation consisting of European sovereign states. 
According to the EU official website (www.europa.eu), the EU constitutes "a unique 
economic and political partnership between 27 democratic European countries". This 
is a short description of the EU, which has been established by the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993 upon the foundations of the pre-existing European Economic 
Community6. The EU is a 'sui generis' organisation. Its legal, political, economic and 
institutional construction constitutes a primary structural procedure. Theoretically, 
and to some extent practically, Europeans -politicians, theorists and states, as well 
as the bureaucratic machine in Brussels - focus their efforts on achieving regional 
integration and on the establishment, step by step, of a supranational government 
and authorities7. These efforts find fertile ground in terms of convergence of interest, 
and lead to decisions which rely on a minimum code of common interest8. Such 
efforts are based on theories of Functionalism and Neo- Functionalism (see Chapter 
2.3.3). On the other hand, these efforts also fall under the strong influence of 
                                               
6
 As the International Monetary Fund reports in its database (www.imf.org) on April 2008, the EU 
combined, generates an estimated 30% share of the world's nominal gross domestic product; that is US 
18.49 trillion in 2008 
7
 The Europeans rejected the idea of a federal Europe during the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. 
The problems of regional integration are evident in the French and Dutch 'no' during the ratification 
process of the Treaty in 2005, and then the Irish 'no' on the Treaty of Lisbon on June 13, 2008, among 
other examples. On the other hand, further positive steps have been taken, reflected in the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which provides for a President of the European Council and a High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Treaty of Lisbon 2008).     
8
 This minimum code of common interests is reflected, in practice, in the EU decisions on the budget for 
the period 2007-2013. Such a process is also followed in the drafting of European Parliament reports 
and opinions. Certainly, the minimum code of common interests is the combination of and compromise 
between conflicting national interests and the political, social and economic interests of political parties 
acting in the European Parliament and in other EU Institutions in general. Such parties include the 
European People's Party- European Democrats, the Socialist Group, the Group of the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Group of the Greens, Union for Europe of the Nations Group, 
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conflicting national interests, irrespectively of whether these occur within social, 
economic, security or foreign policy fields. In fact, European integration moves 
between theories of Realism and Structural Realism on the one hand, and 
Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism on the other. This is the crucial point 
influencing the political attitude of various governments of the member-states of the 
EU, political parties or/and groups acting within the EU. 
 
 
Realism as a theory assumes that national interests are the main instruments in the 
state struggle for power (Morgenthau 1978, pp.4-15). Taking into account the 
theories of Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, I will 
examine the functionality of the EU in relation to Euro-Turkish relations and within the 
context of the power games which develop between:  
1) the member-states of the EU; 
2) the member-states of the EU in conjunction with Turkey;  
3) the member-states of the EU in conjunction with Turkey and some key third parties 
and external actors within the international system, such as the US. 
 
 
Whether or not the EU achieves regional integration is a historical, political and 
economic bet. The effort to do so is closely connected to EU Enlargement. Turkey, 
as a candidate state, is part of this bet and this game (Council of the EU 2005d).   
 
 
 
2.3.2 Classical Realism, National Interest and Power Games 
 
Realism bases its theoretical content on power (strength), and in particular on the six 
principles9 defined by Hans Morgenthau in 'Politics among Nations: Struggle for 
                                                                                                                                       
Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left  and the Independence/ Democracy 
Group (Europa.eu). 
9
 Hans Morgenthau's principles of political Realism are the following: 
1. Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature which is 
unchanging: therefore it is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these objective laws. 
2. The main signpost of political Realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power which infuses rational 
order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. Political 
Realism stresses the rational, the objective and the unemotional.  
3. Realism assumes that interest, defined as power, is an objective category which is universally valid, but not with a 
meaning that is fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man. 
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Power' (1978). As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) maintain, traditional Realism is 
based on four axioms:  
1) Nation-states are the main component actors of the International system. 2) 
Domestic policy is separated from foreign policy. 3) International politics is struggle 
for power within an anarchic international environment. 4) There is a hierarchy in the 
abilities of the nation-states. This is why we have the big powers and smaller states 
within a decentralised international system of states, which enjoy legal equality or 
sovereignty (p.115). 
 
 
National interest is a major analytical tool for the explanation of various phenomena 
existing within the international system on the level of state relations and interactions. 
In his theoretical discussion, Hans Morgenthau (1978) stated that "as far as the world 
is divided to nations, the national interest has the last word in international politics" 
(p.13). Morgenthau (1978) defined the concept and practice of national interest as a 
state's struggle for power within an anarchic international system (pp. 9-14). Such a 
struggle for power is mostly defined by the concept that states act within the 
international system in order to enhance its strength. Classical Realism focuses on 
national interests in terms of security issues, which are closely related to the capacity 
of the state to exercise its foreign policy (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp. 115-
184).   As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) note  
it is said that strength is a multidimensional phenomenon with military and non-
military constituents and the theory of Realism had developed a framework for the 
classification of the elements of national strength (p. 116). 
 
 
That is, beyond military power, there are other constituents of strength, such as 
"technology, population size, natural resources, geographical factors, the type of 
governance, political leadership, strategy and ideology" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 
1992a, p. 116). In light of these factors, the question arises as to how a system can 
be maintained in stability. Realists support the position that the stability of the 
international system can be maintained if there is a balance of power, either on a 
regional or global level. As Morgenthau (1978) stated: 
                                                                                                                                       
4. Political Realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the tension between moral 
command and the requirements of successful political action. 
5. Political Realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the 
universe. It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from moral excess and political folly. 
6. The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere. He asks "how does this policy affect the power 
of the nation?" Political Realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human nature. A man who was nothing but 
"political man" would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. But, in order to develop an 
autonomous theory of political behavior, "political man" must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature 
(Morgenthau 1978, pp. 4-15). 
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Before the balance of power imposes its limitations on the aspirations of states for 
strength, through the mechanism of contradictory forces, competitive nations should 
firstly confine themselves by accepting the system of balance of power as a common 
framework of their efforts (pp. 226-227).   
 
In this context, International Relations and Turkish accession to the EU can be 
examined in terms of the struggle for power and the 'power game'.   
 
 
 
2.3.3 Structural Realism and Changes in the International System 
 
Structural Realism is a theory aiming at enriching classical Realism. As Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) stated "classical Realism accepts that the prospects for the 
fulfilment of dramatic or fundamental transformations in the International system are 
unfavourable" (pp. 115-116). In parallel, Structural Realism emerged in the field of 
International Relations in order to ascertain under which circumstances an 
international system can be subjected to structural changes. According to Kenneth 
Waltz (1979) -who studied the structure of the international system in depth - 
changes in the international system result from changes occurring within its 
component actors, such as states. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) observe:  
"The international system can be held in balance as long as its main actors are 
satisfied by the status quo they enjoy on territorial, political and economic levels" (p. 
167). The question that must be posed in this context is this: Does Turkish accession 
to the EU threaten the existing balance of power within the EU? 
 
 
As Gilpin (1981) stated, there are three types of changes in the international system:  
• The first is the 'systems change'. According to Gilpin:  
The character of the international system is identified by its most prominent 
entities: empires, nation states, or multinational corporations (see EU). The 
rise and decline of various types of entities and state system must of 
necessity be a fundamental concern of a comprehensive theory of 
international change (p. 41).  
 
            That is, the system changes itself. (Gilpin 1981, p.40) 
• The second is the 'systemic change.' This refers  to  
a change in the form of control or governance of a system.... It entails 
changes in the international redistribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige 
and the rules and rights embodied in the system although these changes 
seldom, if ever occur simultaneously. Thus, whereas the system change is 
the rise and decline of state systems, the focus system is the rise and the 
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decline of the dominant states or empires that govern particular the 
international system (p. 42).      
 
• The third type is the 'interaction change'. As Gilpin (1981) said:  "we mean 
modifications in the political, economic and other interactions or processes 
among the actors in an international system" (p. 43). At the same time he 
added that   
Interaction changes frequently do result from the efforts of states or other 
actors to accelerate or forestall more fundamental changes in an international 
system and may presage such changes (p. 43)      
 
 
 
Gilpin (1981) stated that structural changes are brought about on two levels: 
domestic and international (p. 67, 96). He based his analysis of structural changes 
occurring within the international system on various factors, including the military, 
economy, culture, technology, society and Institutions, and on systems of 
communication and transportation (pp. 27, 60, 85, 97). What Gilpin tried to examine 
is: 1) whether and how a dominant entity of the international system may decline, and 
2) when and how the high cost and the redistribution of power may lead to the worst 
case scenario, which may be synonymous with crisis and war. 
 
 
Taking into account what Gilpin and Structural Realism as well as Classical Realism 
uphold about the redistribution of power, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) state that 
"in the place of a dominant actor finally appears a new balance of power, which 
reflects the changed redistribution of power" (pp. 168-169). Such a redistribution of 
power and the new balance -or imbalance- of power, may result peacefully or 
violently. According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a), the declining power has 
the following options: 1) enhance its abilities in order to encounter the rising power; 
2) reduce its needs and "consent politely" to the new circumstances; 3) form 
coalitions with other powers in order to encounter the rising one; 4) retreat before the 
rising power (p. 169). 
 
 
As Gilpin (1981) stated, war is always a result of the redistribution of power, 
especially in the case of high and irrevocable cost. This is the worst case scenario 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 168). On this point, Gilpin also referred to the 
other side of the coin. As he added, "the primary means through which the problem 
of the imbalance of power was resolved was war. The result of war was redistribution 
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of power between the winners and losers" (cited in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, 
p. 230). 
 
 
Within this theoretical context, I examine whether and to what extent Turkish 
accession to the EU will bring structural changes in Turkey and the EU. Will there be 
a redistribution of power? On what level and to what extent? Will such changes 
threaten the cohesion of the EU? Such cohesion, or lack thereof, is linked to the 
decline of international actors and to conflicts. Can such a theoretical framework be 
justified in terms of Turkish accession to the EU?     
 
 
 
2.3.4 Functionalism, Neo- Functionalism, Integration and Common Interest           
 
In contrast to theories of Realism, theories of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism 
suggest a theoretical context upon which integration can be founded (Pentland 1960; 
De Vree 1972). This effort aims at bypassing the obstacle of conflicting national 
interests and creating, through a spirit of consent, a common ground in order to 
establish multinational and supranational Institutions (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992b, 
p.162; Deutsch 1978). Such a model can work in terms of input and output, as 
articulated by Haas in theories of spill-over (Haas 1964, p.48). According to Haas, an 
international organisation can go beyond national borders, and thus an international 
organisation can transform the international system. This procedure is based on 
previous common decisions which spill over new functional frameworks. These 
frameworks  
involve more and more persons and demand more and more bureaucratic support 
and cooperation, contact and consultations in order to face new problems resulting 
from previous compromised decisions. (Haas 1961, p. 372).  
 
 
According to Haas (cited in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992b) this is a procedure “in 
which states can upgrade their national interests within a wider framework of 
integration” (p. 169). Basing his work on Haas´ theory, Leon Lindberg (1971) 
provided the following definition of 'integration':  
Integration refers to the procedures with which the nations resign from their desires 
and abilities to exercise foreign and internal policies on basic issues, the one 
irrespectively of the other, pursuing common decisions or conferring the decision-
making procedure to new central Institutions (p.45). 
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Lindberg (1971) took a step further, stressing that the actors of the international 
system transfer "their expectations and political activities to a new centre...to a new 
collective system of decision-making among nations"(p. 46). In fact, regional 
integration - based on the theories of Functionalism or Neo-Functionalism - promises 
continuous structural changes within member states and EU candidate states. 
Through these structural changes, member states seek to harmonise their legislative, 
economic and political systems with common European decisions, in the context of 
efforts to build supranational Institutions. Through this methodology member states 
take brave steps towards regional integration. Therefore, the structural changes that 
occur within member states also change the structure of the European system10.  
 
 
In light of these, I come to the main question: Whether Turkish accession to the EU 
will bring about structural changes within the EU and whether these structural 
changes will affect the structural changes of the EU's political, economic and 
institutional system positively or negatively.   
 
 
Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism constitute a theoretical and practical attempt to 
move away from conflicting national interests and towards the common European 
interest. The question is whether this goal can be fulfilled in practice, or whether the 
international system is doomed to function within the framework of national interests, 
thereby limiting the role of common European interests. This is why, as far as the 
practical aspects of Realism and Functionalism and the role of national interest are 
concerned, one may find oneself in a vicious circle.      
 
 
 
2.3.5 Cohesion Policy in the EU  
 
Beyond the theories of International Relations, I focus on practical issues, terms and 
policies, which are closely connected to the cohesion of the EU. In particular, I 
                                               
10
 The EU Directives constitute, in fact, binding legal rules for member states, bringing structural 
changes within their political, economic, social and legal-institutional systems. Similarly, the EU Treaties 
define the structural changes occurring within member states and the EU as such. Therefore, we have 
structural changes on two levels: on the level of member states, which constitute component actors of 
the international system, and on the level of the EU, which constitutes a subsystem of the global 
international system. 
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concentrate on the EU’s cohesion policy and its absorption capacity. As a result of 
the peculiarities ensuing from the variety of economic and social realities existing 
within EU member states, the EU established a cohesion policy.  A definition of this 
cohesion policy can be given in the following way: cohesion policy aims at filling the 
gaps resulting from the disparities existing on national and pan-European levels. Not 
all regions and peripheries have the same economic growth and Gross Domestic 
Product (hereafter GDP). Some of them suffer from severe economic and social 
problems. These problems are coherent with phenomena of unemployment, poverty 
and demographic attenuation of the rural regions, matters relevant to urbanism 
(European Commission 2007a, p. 25-30, 46, 62-64). In this context, the EU examines 
the economic and social situation and problems not only of its member-states but 
also of its potential or candidate states. One of these states is Turkey (see relevant 
analysis in Chapter 4.7;4 .8.2.3). 
 
To explain cohesion policy in more detail one may note the following:  
Cohesion policy was enshrined in the Treaties with the adaptation of the Single 
European Act in 1986. This policy has been built on the assumption that 
redistribution between richer and poorer regions in Europe is needed in order to 
balance out the effects of further economic integration. Through three and soon 
four generations of Structural Funds programs, the Union has invested around 
€480 billion in the ‘less favoured’ regions since 1988. Before Enlargement, the 
main beneficiaries were Greece (42.6%), Portugal (35.2%), Ireland (26.7%), the 
new East German 'Länder' (18.9%), Italy (Mezzogiorno - 17.4%) and Spain 
(14.7%). (EurActiv.com 2004)   
 
During the budgetary period of 2000-2006 the EU allocated €129billion for the 
implementation of the cohesion policy, and during the current budgetary period it 
allocated the amount of €307.6 billion (EurActiv.com 2004; European Commission 
2007a, p. 98).  The final decision on the budgetary policy for the period 2007 -2013 
was made in the context of negotiations between the Institutions of the EU, the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council. On July 15, 2004 
the Commission proposed a legislative package on structural and cohesion funds, 
responding on the one hand to the cohesion policy of the EU and the reduction or 
even elimination of existing disparities, and on the other hand to the aims of Lisbon 
Strategy - innovation, growth and creation of new jobs- and to the Gothenburg 
strategy; a strategy of sustainable development (EurActiv.com 2004; European 
Commission 2007a, pp. 25- 27, 42, 58).  
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The issues that the Structural Funds11 are to address during the budgetary period 
2007-2013 are the following:     
• Convergence (formerly Objective 1): Regions whose per capita GDP is less 
than 75% of the EU average are eligible. However, due to the problems 
existing after the new Enlargements, and at the risk of making unfair 
arrangements regarding regions belonging to the 'old states', the EU laid 
down derogations. The problem was that the average EU GDP was reduced 
over 4% after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (Inforegio portal 2007). 
Therefore, temporary support, until 2013, could be given to regions whose 
GDP is above the threshold of 75%. The justification for this derogation and 
the eligibility of these regions was the following: if the average EU GDP was 
not reduced as a result of Enlargement, then the GDP of some regions would 
have been below the threshold of the 75%. (This is the so-called “statistical 
effect”). Convergence policy aims at supporting growth and job creation in the 
lagging member states and regions.  
• Competitiveness and employment (formerly Objective 2): Regions whose 
GDP is less than the threshold of 75% are eligible. This is a policy designed 
to assist and support even rich states in responding to the challenges and 
problems of the new era. Member states and regions should deal with the 
economic and social changes which occurred within the context of 
globalisation. Employment initiatives are to be based on the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) -adaptability of the workforce, job creation and 
accessibility to the labour market for vulnerable persons (European 
Commission portal 2007).12   
                                               
11
 Structural Funds constitute, in fact, those funds, which are employed by the EU and its member states 
in order to fill economic and social disparities and gaps existing within the EU and its region (European 
Commission 2007).   
12
 On the European Commission's website it is mentioned that: 
The Luxembourg Jobs Summit (November 1997) launched the European Employment Strategy (EES) on the 
basis of the new provisions in the Employment title of the Treaty (Development of EES). The ambition was to 
achieve decisive progress within five years. An extensive evaluation of the first five years carried out in 2002 
identified major challenges and issues for the future of the EES. It also emphasised the need to revamp the EES 
with a view to aligning it more closely to the Lisbon goal of sustained economic growth, more and better jobs 
and greater social cohesion by 2010 which occurred with new simpler guidelines in 2003 (European 
Commission portal 2007)  
 A new revision took place in early 2005. This revision was launched as a result of the Commission's 
proposal for a refocusing of the Lisbon strategy. The renewed EES includes three main pillars: a) The 
EES as a Key Component of the Lisbon Strategy. b) The Co-ordination of Employment Policies at the 
EU level.  c) The Added Value of an 'Open Method of Co-ordination'. (European Commission portal 
2007) 
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• Territorial co-operation: All member states and regions are eligible. This 
policy aims at stimulating and supporting cross-border co-operation in order 
to find joint solutions to problems such as urban, rural and coastal 
development, the development of economic relations, and the networking of 
SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) (EurActiv.com 2004; European 
Commission 2007a, pp. 95, 120-121).  
 
In terms of financial resources, on December 17, 2005 the European Council took a 
decision relevant to the structural funds. According to this decision the EU will 
allocate €307.6 billion to the cohesion policy for the budgetary period 2007-2013. 
81.7% of this amount serves Convergence regions, 15.8% is allocated to regions 
which are eligible under the Competitiveness priority, and 2.44% remains for 
European Territorial Cooperation13 (EurActiv.com 20004; European Commission 
2007a, p. 129). 
  
By definition, cohesion policy is related to the absorption capacity of the EU, i.e. its 
capacity to integrate new member states smoothly.  Therefore, the cohesion policy of 
the EU comprises the following aspects:  
• Economic  
• Social   
• Political  
• Institutional  
• Cultural    
• Territorial  
 
                                               
13
 A document issued by the European Commission, bearing the title "Growing regions, growing Europe, 
Fourth report on economic and social cohesion," (2007a) describes economic, social and territorial 
cohesion as following:  
Disparities in GDP per head between regions in the EU narrowed markedly over the past decade as 
growth in the least prosperous regions has outstripped that elsewhere.  This has meant at the same time a 
lessening of the division in terms of economic potential between the core and the periphery and a 
corresponding reduction in territorial imbalance. However, although convergence of levels of GDP per 
head across regions has been accompanied by a narrowing of disparities in rates of employment and 
unemployment, these remain wide between both different parts of the Union and different areas within 
regions so posing a threat in same places to social cohesion.     
 
The concern here is to document these developments and examine economic and demographic changes 
across the EU over the recent past at national  and regional level and assess their implications for 
cohesion, not only economic and social but also territorial, in the sense of the balance between and within 
regions and between different territories. Its primary focus is on the extent to which regional disparities in 
terms of GDP per head, employment and demographic territorial trends have changed since the mid-
1990’s (p.7).                 
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All these fields are closely connected to each other. They comprise a chain of 
cohesion policies which include respect for human rights (minority, women’s, 
religious, etc); the Copenhagen Criteria, the Lisbon Strategy (sustainable 
development, competitiveness, struggle against unemployment, social stability); new 
challenges (also included within the programs of the Structural Funds) concerning 
climate changes; institutional reforms reflecting the new Reform Treaty of Lisbon; 
social stability and mutual respect for the European multicultural character which 
provides the foundation for the European cultural identity.   
 
 
Question: What perspectives and expectations will emerge if Turkey joins the EU as 
full member-state? Will Turkey strengthen or threaten EU cohesion policy? This is 
the issue that Chapter 4.8 and 4.8.1 deals with.  
 
 
 
2.3.6 Absorption Capacity 
 
EU cohesion is pertinent to the following questions: Does the EU have the capacity to 
integrate new member states?  As the Commissioner for Enlargement Oli Rehn 
(2006) said, in a speech delivered at a conference organised by the European Policy 
Centre in Brussels: 
Absorption capacity is determined by two factors: The transformation of the 
applicants into worthy member states, and the development of the Union’s policies 
and Institutions. The capacity of would-be-members to accede is rigorously assessed 
by the Commission of strict conditionality. Absorption capacity is about whether the 
EU can take in while constituting to function effectively. It has economic, financial, 
institutional and democratic dimensions. 
 
 
In addition, the Commissioner (2006) states that in the context of preparing 
candidates or acceding states, the EU presents "successful examples of the large 
Enlargements". This means, as he explains, that:  
•  Trade-related agreements have been established with the view to 
stimulating economic developments and avoiding a trade shock once 
countries enter the EU. According to Commissioner Rehn (2006), this 
model of action "stimulates Turkey’s bold economy reforms resulting in 
economic dynamism". This is what has happened in the case of Turkey. 
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• The Association Agreement concluded with the Western Balkan countries 
and the Regional Free Trade Agreement paves the way for regional 
economic integration, as well as for stabilisation.  
         
 
Commissioner Rehn also asserted that:   
As for the budget and common policies, our absorption capacity was dealt with by the 
Commission’s agenda 2000 document (1997) which proposed reforms of structural 
funds and agriculture policy. It enabled a successful accession of the new 
Enlargement ‘of the ten new member states’ (Rehn 2006).  
 
 
On this point, I quote the Chairman of the Committee of Budgets of the European 
Parliament, Mr. Reimer Böge, who, during an interview for the purposes of this 
research stated that he supports the view that "the EU can take Turkey in after it 
reforms regulations concerning structural funds" (Böge 2007).   
 
 
Moreover, as Commissioner Rehn (2006) additionally stated: 
Concerning the institutional set – up, the Nice Treaty provides rules for up to 27 
members, i.e. up to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. The Constitutional 
Treaty is currently a Sleeping Beauty. To maintain the EU in functionality we need an 
institutional architecture for an efficient, transparent and democratic Europe. 
 
 
 
 
In fact, Commissioner Rehn notes the twofold meaning of the phrase 'absorption 
capacity'.  One the one hand, this capacity is closely related to the cohesion of the 
EU. On the other hand, it is related to the cohesion of the candidate and potential 
candidate states. The first meaning suggests that structural changes should be made 
within the EU so that Institutions will function adequately. The second meaning falls 
under the rubric of structural changes which should be enacted by the candidate and 
potential candidate states with the goal of  harmonising  with the ‘acquis 
Communautaire’.   This leads us to the main question of Chapter 4: Can the EU 
absorb Turkey?  
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2.4 Conclusions and EU Cohesion 
 
In concluding, one must distinguish between ´cohesion policy´ and the ´cohesion of 
the EU´. Cohesion policy is part of EU cohesion. EU cohesion depends upon, not 
only the cohesion policy of the EU and all its objectives (i.e. economic, social, 
political and territorial cohesion, to name but a few), but also upon issues of Realism, 
Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism as they relate to the 
international system, its stability, its cohesion and its decline. Some of the factors 
affecting the stability, cohesion and decline of the system are: a) common interests, 
b) conflicting national interests c) redistribution of power, d) share of power, e) 
threats to existing balances of power, f) the upsetting of the balance of power g) 
structural changes, h) culture i) military power, j) social factors, k) economy and l) 
governance and institutions. What this research seeks to investigate is whether the 
combination of all these factors can maintain a system in cohesion or whether it will 
lead it to decline, crisis or even collapse.  
 
 
The cohesion of the EU goes beyond the cohesion policy of the EU. In defining the 
former, one could say that it constitutes a system of factors -as those mentioned 
above- which aim at holding regions, societies, economies and EU Institutions 
together by filling the existing gaps and dealing with the problems that the EU faces 
throughout its process of integration. This set of factors - variables maintains the EU 
in cohesion and in case that some of these factors is disrupted, then, the EU 
cohesion may be placed under threat. A typical example is the current economic 
crisis, which negatively affects the economy of the EU as well as the economies and 
the social and political stability of its member states.   
 
 
For the purposes of this project, I must determine whether these abovementioned 
factors -or others- can be considered as variables affecting the cohesion of the EU in 
relation to Turkish accession to the EU. This research is to be conducted in the 
context of a methodology explained in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Research Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a detailed, in-depth description and justification of the 
methodological framework underlying the current thesis. The Chapter offers a 
methodological roadmap for addressing the research questions set forward to be 
examined by the current thesis. The roadmap follows the format outlined below:  
 
• Rationale of the Research Approach  
• Scope of the Project 
• Methodological Design and Research Procedures 
• Rationale for the Selection and Application 
of the Data Collection Techniques 
• Qualitative Approach  
• Secondary Sources 
• Quantitative Approach  
• Pre-testing the Survey Instrument 
• Pilot Study 
• Questionnaire Rating Scale 
• Population and Sampling Frame 
• Data Analysis 
• Ethical Considerations 
• My role as an Insider Researcher  
• Research Limitations 
 
 
All in all, the purpose of this chapter is twofold: 
a) Provide a detailed account and justification of the methodology and research 
procedures of the current thesis. 
b) Offer a sufficiently detailed description of the methodology in order to allow 
possible replication in the future.        
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3.2 Rationale for Research Approach     
 
The subject that is being investigated by the current thesis is an interlinked and 
multidimensional social, political, economic and even institutional and legal 
phenomenon (to reiterate, the Turkish accession to the EU and whether such an 
accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU).   At this point, it should be noted that 
research is always closely connected to a theoretical background, since most of the 
times, one completes the other. As pointed out by De Vaus (1991), social research 
usually attempts to answer two fundamental questions: First, What is going on? And 
second, Why?   
 
 
The current project takes as its cornerstone the assumption that a research project 
attempts to collect data, investigate and analyse an event or phenomenon in order to 
provide explanations and either suggest a new theory or justify, review, complete or 
reject an existing one. That is, research without theory constitutes a deficient 
enterprise, a simple project of data-collection. On the other hand, theory without 
research is only speculation.  In short, one can maintain that theory guides research 
and research justifies, tests and at the same time offers reliability and validity to a 
theory (Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Johns and Lee-Ross 1998; Finn et al 2000).         
 
 
Kerlinger (1973) provides an enlightening definition of theory. He maintains that: 
 A theory is a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions and proportions that 
present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, 
with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena (p.9).    
 
What is needed for the purposes of this thesis is a theory which can provide a basis 
for the analysis and interpretation of a particular phenomenon – in this case, Turkish 
accession to the EU and whether such an accession will threaten EU cohesion. On 
the other hand, theory is an indispensable methodological tool by which a research 
project reviews, modifies or even rules out a theory (Finn et al 2000). For exactly this 
reason, this thesis has provided a detailed, critical and thorough review and analysis 
of various theories of International Relations (see Chapters 2.3; 2.3.2; 2.3.3; 2.3.4). 
At the same time, having in mind the complicated nature of the research questions of 
this thesis, a methodological design has been formulated so as to facilitate the 
process for identifying variables that would allow the empirical examination of the 
research hypotheses of this study. The utilisation of existing theories of International 
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Relations, the empirical identification of variables, as well as the integration and 
cross-examination of conceptual and empirical models has eventually led to the 
formulation of a 'theory' compatible to what Kerlinger (1973) had defined. 
  
  
The aim of this research is to examine Turkish accession to the EU and investigate 
whether such an accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU.  To achieve this 
goal, the 'case study' methodology was adopted by utilising the 'triangulation' 
approach (Yin 1974; Denzin 1978). Besides, case study is considered as 
'triangulated research strategy' (Tellis 1997). Therefore, the case study under 
investigation is the Turkish accession to the EU and whether this accession will 
threaten the cohesion of the EU.  The hypothesis of this case study is based on 
Gilpin´s (1981) theory that: if structural changes occur in the component actors of the 
international system and result to redistribution of power, then the international 
system or sub-systems may be led to decline or even to conflict (see Chapter 2.3.3).  
 
 
This hypothesis was tested vis-à-vis the case study of the Turkish accession to the 
EU. Therefore, by evaluating Turkish accession to the EU, I attempted to examine 
whether such an accession will threaten EU cohesion.  To attain this goal, I draw, 
through the evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, factors-variables affecting 
Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion. The validity of these variables was 
crosschecked by using methodological triangulation (see chapter 3.3). To achieve 
the aims and objectives of this thesis, and at the same time to maintain 
methodological and conceptual clarity, I employed both quantitative and qualitative 
approach. In the context of qualitative approach:  
a) Secondary sources (documents, books, journals, archival material, polls) and 
primary sources (interviews) were identified and used.  
b) I presented and evaluated the Turkish political system and Turkish accession to 
the EU by employing official documents from the Turkish government and the EU 
(archives, books, journals, polls as well as interviews).  Through this evaluation, I 
defined a list of variables affecting Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion 
(see Chapter 4).  
 
 
Following the completion of the qualitative examination, I proceeded to the 
quantitative approach by employing a 'survey' methodology via the design, 
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development and testing of a survey instrument (questionnaire).  I also employed 
data from recent international developments, which are related to 'Survey' questions 
as well as data from Chapter 4, in an effort to compare whether the answers of the 
questionnaire comply with real facts and current trends. The questionnaire was 
based on the research questions and on the findings of the qualitative approach (see 
Chapter 4) taking also into account the theories of International Relations (Realism, 
Structural Realism etc). By analysing the findings of the survey, I have identified a list 
of factors – variables affecting Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion (see 
Chapter 5). Through this methodological process I tested whether the variables, 
which resulted from the quantitative approach, are justified.   
 
 
At the last stage of the project (Chapter 6), I defined the final list of variables which 
derive from the findings of Chapter 4 (qualitative approach) and Chapter 5 
(quantitative approach) and affect Turkish accession to the EU and EU cohesion. 
The critical analysis and synthesis of these variables led to the formulation and 
development of a model on EU cohesion. In practice, due to the nature of the 
variables of this model which constantly adapt to new circumstances, it will be 
possible for someone to monitor Turkey's progressive course to the EU and evaluate 
whether such a process -and under which circumstances- will lead to the threatening 
of EU cohesion. By employing this model (see Chapter 6), various scenarios were 
elaborated through which I examined and tested not only whether the Turkish 
accession to the EU is to threaten EU cohesion but also whether the main hypothesis 
of this project is justified or rejected.14 This is the same methodological approach 
through which I investigate when and how, theories of International Relations and 
especially, structural realism can be coupled in practice through Turkish accession to 
the EU (by practice we mean the evaluation of Turkish accession to the EU) (see 
Chapters 6.4.1-6.4.9).                      
 
                                               
14
 In Chapter 6, I present the 'worst case scenario' which responds to theories of Realism and Structural 
Realism. Furthermore, it is examined and analysed how and why Turkish accession to the EU will 
threaten the cohesion of the EU on the basis of Realism and Structural Realism. It is also explained that 
this is the dominant scenario as it results from this project, justifying, at the same time, the main 
hypothesis of this project; whether structural changes and redistribution of power may lead to the 
decline of the system. In other words, I explain how and under what circumstances and structural 
changes, the system of the EU will be under threat.  In order to be objective, I had to take into 
consideration and present, theories that criticise Realism and Structural Realism. These theories are 
Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, which they also approach international system under the concept 
of structural changes. However, the latter theories focus on the efforts of common instead of conflicting 
interests in the context of regional integration. The EU is deemed to be function between Realism and 
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I employ case study with 'triangulation' method for the following reasons:  
1) The current project is quite a complicated one and as such, it required a multi 
method design.  
2) The study had to ensure that its empirical findings would be characterised by face 
and content validity. For this reason, I have employed, in the context of triangulation, 
both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches. As far as the 
quantitative methodological approach is concerned, I have utilised the Survey 
technique, taking as my population sample the members of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament (for more details see Chapter 3.4.3.4). 
Regarding the qualitative methodological approach, I have utilised primary and 
secondary sources such as documents, archives, journals, polls and interviews (see 
Chapter 3.4.1; 3.4.2 and Chapter 4).  
 
 
The case study approach is a common and frequently used method for conducting 
social science research (Yin 2002). It was deemed as the most suitable approach for 
this research project for the following reasons:  
1) The case study is an ideal methodology to use when a holistic, in-depth 
investigation is needed in order to examine an event or a case to test a hypothesis. 
(Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg 1991). According to Stake (1995) and Yin (2002) there are 
six sources of evidence in case studies. These include: 
• documents15  
• archival records16  
• interviews17  
• direct observation18 
• participant-observation19  
                                                                                                                                       
Structural Realism on the one hand and Functionalism and Neo- Functionalism on the other (see 
Chapters 2.2.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4).           
15
 Documents can be letters, memoranda, agendas, administrative documents, newspaper articles, or 
any other document germane to the investigation. 
16
 Archival documents can be service records, organisational records, lists of names, survey data and 
other such records. 
17
 Interviews can be open-ended, focused or structured. They can also be conducted through a survey. 
18
 This can be as simple as casual data collection activities, or it can involve more formal protocols to 
measure and record behaviours. This technique is useful for providing additional information about the 
topic being studied. 
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• physical artifacts20  
Four of these sources have been employed in the course  of this project (see 
Chapters 3.4.1 and 3.4.2) 'Direct observation' and 'physical artifacts' were not used 
as sources of information as they were deemed unsuitable to the nature of this 
research. These two sources of evidence are mainly employed in other kinds of 
research projects, such as those dealing with medicine or physics (to name but two), 
and they do not apply to this specific project. 
 
2) The case study approach is a methodology falling under a triangulated research 
strategy (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg 1991; see Chapter 3.5).   
 
 
 
3.2.1 Scope of the Project 
 
The main purpose of this research is to examine:  
1) Whether theories of International Relations, especially Structural Realism, can 
serve as valid theoretical framework  for actual events, (in this case the process of 
Turkish accession to the EU) and whether the Turkish accession will threaten or not 
the cohesion of the EU. Taking into account theories of International Relations and 
what Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg (1991) argued, one can observe that the EU member 
states constitute the main component actors of the EU and international system. The 
EU, as such, constitutes a subsystem of the international system (see chapter 2.3.1).  
At the same time, Turkey constitutes an actor of the international system and is 
connected to the EU through the status of candidate state. Therefore, what is aimed 
is to observe the actors´ actions and reactions within the EU in relation to the Turkish 
accession to the EU.  
 
2) What factors-variables can bring structural changes and affect the cohesion of the 
EU in the context of Turkish accession to the EU? As a researcher, I assigned these 
factors the status of variables21 (Van Evera 2001, pp. 26-28). 
                                                                                                                                       
19
 Participant-observation makes the researcher into an active participant in the events being studied. In 
this case, the researcher attended and followed closely European Parliament meetings, which are 
relevant to the topic of Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore, he had the opportunity to participate and 
observe the whole process. The researcher also notes that the Turkish accession to the EU is not only 
discussed on the level of the European Parliament but also on the level of other EU Institutions. 
20
 Physical artifacts can be tools, instruments or other kinds of physical evidence that may be collected 
during the study as part of a field visit (for all six sources see Stake 1995). 
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In the context of 'triangulation', I could not rely only on the findings obtained through 
the qualitative methodological approach. For this reason findings were obtained 
through a quantitative methodological approach, the 'survey' technique. Therefore, 
this research employs a combination of a qualitative and quantitative approach in the 
framework of a ‘case study’ methodology. The survey questionnaire used in this 
project was formulated by taking into account the research questions and the findings 
of the document analysis of Chapter 4. The aim was to:  
1) Fill in gaps from literature and Chapter 4.  
2) Cross-examine the findings of the literature and Chapter 4 with those obtained 
through the survey. This cross-examination makes possible the formulation of a list of 
variables affecting EU cohesion.  
3) Examine whether theory can be justified in practice.  
 
 
To conclude, this project attempts to establish a model through which to examine 
whether Turkish accession could threaten the cohesion of the EU. At the same time, 
the model and methodological approach developed for the purposes of this study 
would be easily replicated for examining the accession of other countries in the EU 
and the possible impact on the cohesion of E.U. To achieve this goal, the main 
factors affecting structural changes within the EU must be identified and 
subsequently justified, both conceptually and empirically.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
21
 Taking into consideration the literature findings (see Chapter 2.4; 4.11), the variables,  which mainly 
affect the structural changes of an international system and the EU include social, political, economic 
and other factors,  such as the concept of  'power game', national interests, redistribution of power, 
balance and imbalance of power, , human rights, and democracy.  At this point, it should be pointed out 
that, for the purposes of this research, I consider as variables all factors upon which the EU is based 
and which maintain the EU in cohesion. The cohesion of the EU is the dependent variable of this 
research, and this variable is affected by and depends on other independent or intermediate factors-
variables. For example, democracy is an independent factor, indispensable for the cohesion of the EU. 
That is, the cohesion of the EU depends on the variable of democracy. Other factors on which the 
cohesion of the EU depends include economy, balance of power, society and political stability (Van 
Evera 2001, pp. 26).  Intermediate variables are those which act between the dependent and 
independent variables. For example, in practice, the imbalance of power is affected by the independent 
variable of redistribution of power. Therefore, concerning the relation between the variables of 
contribution of power, imbalance of power and cohesion of the EU we note the following: The 
contribution of power is the independent variable and the imbalance of power is the intermediate 
variable in relation to the dependent variable, that of EU cohesion. The intermediate variable results 
from an independent variable and affects the dependent variable. Moreover, the relation between 
contribution of power and imbalance of power is the following: The variable of contribution of power 
plays the role of the dependent variable and the imbalance of power plays the role of the independent 
variable (Van Evera 2001, pp. 26-27). 
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3.3 Methodological Design and Research Procedures 
 
As already stated, the subject and focus of this thesis, namely, Turkish accession to 
the EU, constitutes a complicated issue. A single methodological approach is 
incapable of providing adequate explanations for analysing such a phenomenon.  In 
light of these facts, the method of triangulation has been chosen in order to achieve 
more reliable and valid results (Tellis 1997). This is a methodological approach which 
can safeguard the validity of the findings. Therefore, for the purpose of this research 
a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches has 
been adopted.  
 
 
According to Nachmias and Nachmias (1992), the combination of these two 
approaches can provide a reliable basis for the development and implementation of a 
research design. Ultimately, such combination will allow the adaptation of a 
'triangulation approach' (Campbell and Fiske 1959; Pelto and Pelto 1978; LeBlanc III 
2002). As Philip (2000 cited in Finn et al) stated:  
Researchers should think beyond the myopic quantitative – qualitative divide when it 
comes to devising a suitable methodology for their research, and select methods – 
qualitative, quantitative or a combination of the two – that best satisfy the needs of 
specific research projects (p.12). 
 
In addition, as Dreher and Hayes (1993, p. 217) have stated: "triangulation is not just 
a combination of methods but a back and forth movement between the quantitative 
and qualitative components throughout the research process".  
 
 
In literature, five basic types of triangulation can be identified:  
a. Data triangulation, involving time, space and persons. 
b.  Investigator triangulation (multiple rather than single observers). 
c. Theory triangulation (in which more than one theory is used). 
d. Multiple triangulations (in which a researcher combines multiple theoretical 
perspectives, sources of data and methodologies in one investigation).   
e. Methodological triangulation (in which a researcher uses more than one 
method or chooses between method strategies) (Denzin 1978).           
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It is obvious that for the purposes of this research more than one theory is used 
(Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism). Similarly, 
several methods and techniques for data collection have been used in order to 
analyse both, theoretically and empirically, the very complicated phenomenon of 
Turkish accession to the EU and to assess whether or not such an accession 
threatens the cohesion of the EU. As Dreher and Hayes (1993) have stated, by using 
a combination of methods, theories and investigators, triangulations increase the 
researcher’s confidence in the findings. 
 
  
Therefore, the adoption of multiple triangulation design in the context of the current 
study is justified on the following grounds:   
• The political scenario of the Turkish accession to the EU. Whether such an 
accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not is a thorny question. 
To answer it, I draw on the classic theories of International Relations, 
theories which also influence European affairs, such as Realism, Structural 
Realism, Liberalism and Neo-liberalism (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp. 
166-168; 1992b, pp. 160 - 178). 
• The collection of data from primary and secondary sources. These modes of 
data collection fall into the context of multiple triangulation. An example of 
multiple triangulation in literature is 'The Police Peasant in Europe and 
America' by Thomas and Znanieck's (2000, cited in Eberhardt 2007). Their 
investigation uses triangulated data, theories and methods.  
• The employment of multiple methods. For instance, qualitative and 
quantitative methods and techniques may be combined. Within the 
framework of this research, triangulation is employed as follows:   
a) Qualitative methods (interviews, archives, documents and 
diaries). 
b) Quantitative methods (survey and data analysis).  
 
 
In short, by applying 'triangulation', an efficient and effective analytical framework is 
established, which in turn will allow rigorous analysis that will eventually lead to valid 
and reliable results.  In brief, triangulation is a traditional methodological framework in 
behavioural and social sciences, one which uses multiple methods to study a single 
phenomenon (Chong 1996). 
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3.4 Rationale for Selection and Application of Data Collection Techniques 
 
Due to the nature of the subject, one single method or technique is not adequate to 
provide reliable results.  In the context of triangulation, a combination of approaches, 
techniques and methods are used in order to increase confidence in the results 
(Morgan 1998; Morse 1991; Tschudi 1989). 
 
 
In light of these facts, both qualitative and quantitative primary sources of data will be 
employed. At the same time, secondary sources will be also used. These will include 
archival materials, official documents, bibliographical materials and polls (Benjamin 
2003; UM Libraries). 
 
 
 
3.4.1. Qualitative approach  
 
In-depth interviewing was one of my techniques of qualitative data collection.  
Interviews were conducted with experts on the issue of Turkish accession to the EU.   
The sample consisted of experts who satisfied the following criteria: 
1) Respondents who have dealt with the Turkish accession process as well as 
International Relations and European studies.   
2) Politicians, scientists or technocrats involved in European affairs who also 
deal with issues related to the European defence system, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO)22 and the European and Turkish economies.     
3) Respondents with extensive experience in Euro-Turkish relations or in other 
areas relevant to this research study. 
 
 
For the purpose of this project, semi-structured interviews were also used. When 
employing semi-structured interviews, a researcher has a list of questions on specific 
topics. Answers to these questions may fill in gaps which exist on the core issues of 
the research project, or may fill in gaps arising from the literature review. Other 
questions, not included on the list, were raised in accordance with the answers given 
by the interviewees (Lupton 1996; Beardsworth and Keil 1992, pp.261-262). As 
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Leidner stated, "the interviews also allow room to pursue topics of particular interest 
to the workers (i.e. the researcher)" (Leidner 1993, p. 238).     
 
 
In this respect, MEP Joost Lagendijk was chosen as one of my main interviewees. Mr 
Lagendijk fulfils all criteria described above. First, he is the Chairman of the EU -
Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee since 2002. This Committee, along with the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs have the competence of monitoring and evaluating the 
progress of Turkish accession to the EU. As a Chairman, Mr Lagendijk has close co-
operation and takes active part in negotiations with technocrats and officials of the 
European Commission and the Council dealing with Turkish accession to the EU. 2) 
Mr Lagendijk visits Turkey frequently for meetings with Turkish politicians, 
technocrats, academics, local authorities and NGOs. Therefore, he knows first hand 
and in detail, what really happens with Turkish accession to the EU, which are the 
problems it faces, why and how these can be resolved. He has long experience and 
knowledge on European issues as he is a Member of the European Parliament since 
199923.  The interview was conducted in October 23, 2007 in Strasbourg (where the 
official seat of the European Parliament is founded) at the office of Mr Lagendijk.     
 
 
Additional interviews were taken from the Chairman of the Committee on Budgets of 
the European Parliament, Reimer Böge and two Turkish academics of Istanbul Bilgi 
University (specialising on economic and political issues), Professor Yunus Emre 
Gönen and Professor Erol Katircioglu, as well as from a military attaché in Brussels, 
expert in security and defence policies of the EU24. The underlying aim behind taking 
these interviews was:  
1) To focus my attention on some specific issues which are important for the project, 
such as the structural funds and the financial perspectives of the EU. Through the 
expertise and knowledge of the interviewees, I clarified technical issues with which I 
was not very familiar (this is why, for example, I have chosen Reimer Böge, 
Chairman of the Committee on Budgets). 2) To investigate the position of Turkish 
experts on Turkish accession to the EU.  In particular, I opted to examine their 
opinion about economy, reforms and the structural changes that Turkey should 
                                                                                                                                       
22
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe, 
committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949 (www.nato.int)  
23
 The interview of Joost Lagendijk is annexed at the end of the project as Appendix 1.  
24
 Extracts of their interviews have been used throughout this work  and especially in Chapters 4 and 5 
(see for example Chapters 4.6.3 and 5.5) 
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undertake in its accession to the EU as well as other political issues related to the 
Turkish accession to the EU.                   
 
 
Extracts from these interviews, especially from the interview of MEP Lagendijk, are 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 with a view to analyse the findings of the survey and 
to compare them with the findings of Chapter 4. This methodological process aims at 
enhancing the validity of the findings and the final results of this project25.            
 
 
The preparation of qualitative interviews is an important matter. As Lofland (1995, p. 
78) suggests, in preparing a qualitative interview a researcher should ask himself the 
following question: "Just what about this thing is puzzling me?" Additionally, a 
researcher should have identified what he/she needs to know in order to answer 
each of the research questions of interest. In preparing the interviews for this project, 
I therefore took into account the following guidelines:   
• Ordering of topics.  
• Formulation of interview questions or topics in a way that help 
answer the research questions.  Such topics included the role of the 
US in European affairs, the role of the Turkish army in the national 
system, and the questions of whether Turkish accession to the EU 
will bring about a redistribution of power and whether it will threaten 
the cohesion of the EU.    
• Use of language that is understandable for the interviewees. 
• Avoidance of leading questions unless this is necessary in order to 
draw out straight answers on core issues. Such issues may be raised 
from public debates, from literature or from any other source.  For 
example, the interviewees had to answer a question on whether or 
not Turkey will constitute a 'Fifth Phalanx' within the EU on behalf of 
US national interests (Kalin & Gerras 2005, p.17).  
• Careful record-keeping of general 'fact sheet' information (position, 
number of years at the work etc) (Zikmund 1994). 
 
 
                                               
25
 The interview of MEP Reimer Böge was conducted in October 30, 2007 in his office at the European 
Parliament in Brussels. The other two interviews with Professors Yunus Emre Gönen and Erol 
Katircioglu were conducted in their offices at Bilgi University in Istanbul (see also footnote 26). 
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Through 'semi-structured' and 'face to face interviews', I had the advantage, as a 
researcher, to:  
1) Clarify in depth a topic by posing supplementary questions to the interviewee.  
2) Obtain as much qualitative data as possible. 
3) Exhaustively investigate the selected topics.     
4) Realise the importance of issues that I had possibly underestimated before the 
interview, such as the significance of structural changes not only in Turkey but also in 
the EU. 
5) Cross-check information from literature and other sources with data resulting from 
the interview.  
 
 
On the other hand, the ´semi-structured´ and ´face to face' interview technique has 
certain disadvantages: 
1) As a researcher, I run the risk of losing control over the discussion and thereby, 
missing the aim of the interview. However, taking into consideration the rigid and well 
defined theoretical context of this thesis, this danger was minimised. 
2) An exhaustive investigation may lead to a long interview. As a result, I would need 
more time to get to the essence of the answers and to achieve the aims of the 
interview in the context of the research goals.  
3) As a researcher, I need to maintain a certain discipline, knowing in advance what I 
will ask and how.  This is why is of great importance to put the topics in order. 
Furthermore, the topics: a) should correlate with the research questions and b) 
should stem from data and information obtained from literature, official documents, 
archives and other sources. This data and information should be cross-checked 
through the answers received during the interview. 
 
 
In addition, there is another principle that I had to have in mind during the interview 
process, related to the issue of ‘ethical sensitiveness’. The researcher should respect 
the interviewee. In this context, I note what Kvale (1966) asserted: 
An ethical sensitive interviewer will not want to place undue pressure on the person 
he or she is talking to and will need to be prepared to cut short that line of question if 
it is clearly a source of concern (p.319).    
 
As a back-up measure, in addition to tape- recording the interview, written notes 
were also kept. Notes can generate a substantial list of the main points raised during 
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the interview, and therefore provide a safe alternative to the tape recorder (Rafaeli et 
al 1997).   
 
 
The open question constitutes a fertile way of drawing out qualitative and useful 
information on the research topic (Weisberg, Krosnick & Bowen 1996; Brenner, 
Brown & Canter 1985; Kvale 1996). In addition to face to face interviews, telephone 
interviews were also planned so as to facilitate the data collection process both for 
the researcher and the interviewee; however there was ultimately no need to employ 
this technique.26 The main goal of the interviews was to collect data and responses 
on issues raised from bibliography.  Due to the special needs of my research, I found 
it necessary to interview people who wished to remain anonymous, due to their 
profession and/or role (for example, diplomats and military attachés). These 
interviews were not recorded, but were documented in written notes alone. The 
anonymous interviewees allowed me to use information and even refer to their 
interviews without any personal reference to them (i.e. the interviewees). (On the 
issue of interviews conducted without taping the interviewee, see Rafaeli et al 
(1997)). As Rafaeli stated, a participant may refuse to be taped, but for interviews not 
taped, detailed notes should be taken. In following these methodological principles, 
which at the same time involve fundamental ethical issues that had to be endorsed 
by the researcher, I was able to assure that the responses of the interviewees would 
remain confidential and anonymous. At the same time, however, I was not limited 
only to the information given to me, but I was able to double-check this data through 
further investigation (for more information about morality and ethical considerations 
of the research, see Chapter 3.6).     
 
 
The interviews brought to light important issues which were ultimately included within 
the questionnaire of this study, justifying in this way the need to adopt a triangulation 
design. At the same time, the interviews allowed me to fill in gaps existing in literature 
or other sources of data as well. A peculiarity of the current project is the fact that it 
focuses on a phenomenon that has not ended. It is an ongoing economic, political, 
social, cultural and economic process. Therefore, the current project is characterised 
by potentiality. For this reason, it was decided to implement the following combination 
                                               
26
 Telephone interviewing was an option chosen due to geographical limitations and practical reasons, 
when for example, an interviewee was in another country. The initial plan, for example, was to have 
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of research methods in the context of triangulation: 1) to conduct interviews; 2) to use 
their results to partially formulate the questionnaire, and 3) to conduct an additional 
number of interviews with experts on the subject with the aim of comparing the 
answers received from the questionnaire with the answers given during the 
interviews. This meant that the interview questions had to be the same or similar to 
those included within the quantitative questionnaire. Subsequently, answers given or 
points made during the interviews were compared with answers given on the survey.  
Through this approach I was able to verify and cross-check the information and data 
obtained through my research27     
 
 
 
3.4.2 Secondary Sources   
 
Quite apart from interviews and the survey, and in the context of the qualitative 
approach, secondary sources were also used. According to Howel and Prevenier 
(2001), 
an example of a secondary source is the biography of a historical figure in which the 
author constructs a narrative out of a variety of primary source documents, such as 
letters, diaries, newspaper accounts, photographs, and official records. A scholarly 
secondary source is familiar with the existing secondary literature and seeks to 
engage it in terms of arguments and evidence. Most, but not all, secondary sources 
utilize extensive citation (book, article, web page). Scholarly secondary sources are 
peer-reviewed by scholars before publication in book or article form, and books are 
reviewed and evaluated in the scholarly journals (p.79). 
 
 
For the purposes of this research, the secondary sources used were the following: 
1) EU polls, namely ´Eurobarometer´, on the issues concerning the Turkish 
accession to the EU. Useful qualitative information was drawn about public opinion 
on Turkish accession to the EU and the reasons why some Europeans support 
Turkish accession to the EU and some others do not.  
2) Archives and official documents of the EU Institutions such as the European 
Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council.  
3) Books and essays on the topic, newspapers, academic and professional analyses, 
government documents, and statements from statesmen and key politicians. 
                                                                                                                                       
telephone interviews with Turkish academics of Istanbul Bilgi University. Finally, I had the chance to 
travel to Turkey and interview them face to face.  
27
 The main interview of MEP Joost Lagendijk is included in Appendix 1. The other two interviews are 
saved on a disk. 
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3.4.3 Quantitative Approach  
  
Within the context of the quantitative approach, survey instrumentation was 
employed as one of my methodological tools for obtaining data and drawing 
conclusions from a defined population. The survey technique is used when a 
researcher wants to collect data on a phenomenon that cannot be observed directly. 
One way of accomplishing this is by gathering data on the opinions and attitudes of a 
specified population on the subject (Kinnear & Taylor 1996). As Busha and Harter 
(1980) stated: "a population is any set of group of persons or objects that possesses 
at least one common characteristic" (p. 98). These persons are, in the context of a 
research project, specialists on the investigated subject. In this context, I designed, 
developed and tested a questionnaire whose questions are based on the extant 
literature and other sources of data. The results obtained from the questionnaire 
have provided insight into to critical aspects of my research. 
 
 
For the purposes of this research, the 'survey' was employed both as a 
methodological approach and data collection technique. According to Doyle (n.d.) 
surveys can be a powerful and useful tool for collecting data on human 
characteristics, attitudes, thoughts, and behaviour. And, sometimes, conducting a 
survey is the only available option for acquiring the data necessary to answer an 
important research question. 
 
The 'survey' technique was employed in order to measure and determine the 
opinions and political stance of the population sample. In this case, the population 
sample used was the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European 
Parliament (see Chapter 3.4.3.4). The advantages of the 'survey' method are as 
follows: 
1) Specific answers are collected for specific research questions allowing in this way 
the researcher to obtain and I am thereby able to obtain the necessary information to 
proceed with the goals of the research project (in this case, I formulate a list of 
variables affecting the cohesion of the EU). 
2) I avoid the risk of deviating from research aims (Doyle n.d.; Fowler 1995). 
 
 
On the other hand, this approach has certain limitations: 
1) Each question of the questionnaire relies on self-reported data. Some of the 
participants may answer truthfully and accurately, however, some others may not feel 
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comfortable revealing their true beliefs (Doyle n.d.). To avoid such a situation, I 
reassured the participants of the confidentiality of the survey, and allowed them to 
keep their anonymity if requested. 
2) A survey can accurately present the opinions, judgements, evaluations and 
attitudes of its participants.  However, this does not mean that these opinions are 
correct (Yin 2002).    
 
 
In order to deal with this limitation and in the context of this thesis, I combined the 
'survey' technique with the 'interview' technique and document analysis. Case 
studies, interviews and document analysis can offer in-depth analysis, thereby 
limiting the possibility of using incorrect findings obtained through a survey. This is in 
fact the essence of cross-checking. 
The questionnaire of the 'survey' was conceptualised, designed and developed on 
the basis of the following criteria:  
• Inclusion of research questions.  
The questionnaire should respond to, and even include, the main questions 
upon which the researcher intends to build his/her research. The questions I 
attempted to include in the questionnaire address the main topics of this 
research. For example, questions included the following: What is the role of 
the army in the Turkish political system? Will the Turkish accession to the 
EU bring a redistribution of power or not? 
• Inclusion of questions emerging from the literature review and other 
documents or interviews. For example: whether Turkey constitutes a big 
market for the EU (Question 13 of Survey instrument, Appendix 2; Chapter 
4.4); whether the historically negative stereotypes of Turkey underlie the 
stance of those Europeans who do not wish to see Turkey in the EU (see 
Question 11 of Survey instrument, Appendix 2).  
• Use of an understandable language.  I tried to formulate the questions in a 
simple, clear language, in order to facilitate responses and avoid the 
possibility of misunderstanding and confusion. To make sure that this would 
in fact be the case, the questionnaire was proofread and piloted by my 
colleagues, and their comments and corrections were taken into account. 
• Attractive and professional design. The quality of the questions implicitly 
reflects the professionalism of the survey. To achieve a high standard of 
professionalism, I sent the questionnaire to academics who deal with issues 
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of International Relations and EU- Turkey relations, asking for their 
feedback. 
• Avoidance of leading questions. By keeping in mind the need to avoid 
leading questions, I sought to ensure a lack of bias. 
• Rational order of the questions or classification of specific topics28. For 
instance, questions with similar content were placed together in the survey 
in a rational order (Babbie 1973; Busha & Harter 1980). For the purposes of 
this project, I formulated the questionnaire in accordance with the following 
topics, which are also related to the Research Questions:  
1) EU -US relations. 
2) Negative and positive European conceptions regarding Turkish 
accession to the EU. 
3) Human rights, corruption, role of the army in the Turkish political 
system. 
4) The role of national interest in the EU decision-making process. 
5) The possibility of Turkey itself terminating its accession process.  
6) Redistribution of power and structural changes following Turkish 
accession to the EU. 
7) Impact of Turkish accession on EU cohesion29. 
 
 
In this context, the sequence of questions moved from the general to the specific.  
The main task was to draw out as specific answers and results as possible (Babbie 
1973; Busha & Harter 1980; Newsted, Huff & Munro 1998; see also Survey 
instrument, Appendix 2).  
 
 
 
3.4.3.1 Pre - Testing the Survey Instrument  
 
The pre-testing stage is an important stage of the survey procedure. This process 
aims at ensuring that the respondents understand the questions and their purposes, 
and that they can respond to them.  According to Finn et al. (2000) "the results of 
                                               
28
 See for example Questions 11 and 13. Here, one can find all relevant questions on the reasons why 
Europeans favour or oppose Turkish accession to the EU.  
29
 A similar structure was used for the interviews in order to more easily compare the collected data. 
Certainly, with regard to the interviews, I had the chance to make a more detailed and qualitative 
investigation by posing questions and eliciting more data on topics where things were not clear. 
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pre-testing can be annoying, but can make the difference between an instrument 
yielding data or not, or meaningful or useless data" (p.102). The main goal is to 
obtain feedback from expert respondents in order to modify the questionnaire before 
the pilot study. Boyd and Westfall (1989) stated that the number of the pre-test 
interviews should be around 2030. However, Parasuraman (1986) held that the 
essence of the pre-testing instrument is not quantitative but qualitative. He 
maintained that it is better to pre-test the questionnaire systematically by using 
relatively small samples of respondents than to pre-test it with a larger sample by 
only asking the respondents to fill out the questionnaire. For the purposes of this 
project, Parasuraman's suggestions were adopted. I worked with a short list of 
professors, exchanging views and getting feedback on the structure of the 
questionnaire. The main 'backbone' of the questionnaire was designed pursuant to 
literature review, to data collection, and partially to interviews.       
 
 
The main goal of this pre-testing process was to improve the quality and the structure 
of the questionnaire. Certainly, even before going to the pilot stage I had 
implemented some changes to the questionnaire. These changes resulted from 
issues identified in literature, as well as from data and information which I had 
gathered.  The piloting process resulted in the identification of new questions, which 
in turn required the reviewing and rephrasing of the questionnaire in order to fill in 
gaps and also aimed at getting more specific answers. At the same time, I discussed 
these changes with my supervisory team as well as with other academics. Their 
experience on methodological matters was of great importance for the conclusion of 
my project, and their comments and advice have been very useful in the process of 
formulating a valid and reliable research instrument. 
    
 
First, the questionnaire was sent to my supervisors, asking them for comments. For 
example, I asked for input on how to avoid biased or leading questions, or on the 
most suitable way of placing a question in order to avoid common or even grave 
mistakes, ensuring in this way that the questionnaire adhered to the criteria of 
reliability and to the purposes of the research.    
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Second, each time I was coming across in the literature with something that I 
considered important for my research and that would possibly need to be 
investigated further, I included it within the questionnaire. I did this because I believe 
that the more precise the questionnaire is, the more reliable the answers and the 
results will be.  My main concern was to fill in all gaps resulting from my review of the 
literature and other documents, and from the interviews.  
 
 
In the course of discussions with my supervisory team and other scholars, I used the 
methodological technique of the open-ended question. As Kotler (1997) observed, 
the application of open-ended questions is considered advisable in the context of the 
explanatory state. The key open- ended questions which were used were the 
following:  
1) 'Are there any other factors - variables which, according to your opinion, are 
important for my research and are not included in the questionnaire? Please 
mention.'                 
2) 'Are there any other reasons, not included in the questionnaire as to whey 
Europeans might or might not wish to see Turkey as a full member state of the EU?'  
   
 
Through this procedure, I had the opportunity to re-evaluate the questionnaire, fill any 
existing gaps, and therefore design and develop the questionnaire in the best 
possible way. Explanations, comments and other reactions from the respondents 
were essential in order to enrich the list of factors - variables of the EU cohesion 
model that I aimed to establish. This enrichment included the following factors: 
a)  Factors/variables related to the democratic principles affecting the EU, including 
women’s rights, religious rights, minority rights and corruption.  
b) Factors-variables connected to the concept of power, including cultural, diplomatic, 
economic, military and the institutional spheres of power.       
 
 
Regarding the second question, I received the following input:  
a) Reasons for which Turkey can not join the EU: negative historical stereotypes and 
geographical reasons.  
b) Reasons why Turkey can join the EU as full member state: cultural enrichment of 
the EU, Turkish cheap labour.        
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The aforementioned comments and suggestions were incorporated into the survey 
tool in order to fill any gaps and improve the quality of the questionnaire.             
 
 
 
3.4.3.2 Pilot Study 
 
Taking into consideration the conclusions and observations derived from the 
procedures described above, a pilot version of the questionnaire was designed. The 
next step was to send the pilot questionnaire to chosen MEPs for feedback. Their 
comments were important in examining whether the criteria of the questionnaire 
structure had been met or whether further improvement was necessary. The main 
goal was to deliver a questionnaire that would be understandable and easily 
answered. The pilot study also served as advance warning on whether a question 
might run the risk of failing (Baker 1994). Bell (1993) postulated that the identification 
of bugs in the questions and their correction would help make sure that the subjects 
of the main study would experience no difficulties in completing it. At the same time, 
pre-testing allowed me to carry out a preliminary analysis of the survey results and to 
conclude whether the wording and format of the questions will present any difficulties 
when the main results are analysed (p. 49). 
 
 
After completing the pre-testing stage and the formulation of the questionnaire, I 
proceeded to the pilot stage. The letter and the spirit of a pilot have been described 
by De Vaus (1993) in his succinct advice: "Do not take the risk. Pilot test first" (p.54).       
In this context, 10 MEPs were chosen who were familiar with the subject under 
investigation. The goal of this procedure was to draw useful conclusions from the 
analysis of the pilot study and to find out whether anything had to be reviewed and 
corrected. I explained to the MEPs the need for feedback as to whether the questions 
were understandable, how long it took them to answer them, whether the 
questionnaire included biased or leading questions, and any other useful comments.  
The feedback was largely positive. Some comments were made on the order of the 
questions and the possibility of confusion on the way they should be answered. After 
receiving the feedback, a serious consideration of the issues raised took place with 
my supervisory team. As a result, these corrective measures were initiated:  
a) I partially reordered some of the questions so as to facilitate the interviewees’ 
answering of the questionnaire. In addition, I restructured some of the 
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questions so that they would appear more straightforward and easily 
answerable. Furthermore, I included some new questions in an effort to fill in 
some newly identified gaps in the literature. 
b) I had some doubts as to whether some questions were biased or leading. 
After discussing this with my supervisory team, I concluded that there was not 
a simple solution to this issue. These questions result from essential issues 
raised from literature and constitute core issues of the current research. 
These questions had to be included in order to examine and measure 
reactions and the opinions of the defined population on the issues at hand.  
One of the most important issues was the following: Whether or not Turkey 
would become a 'Fifth Phalanx' of US national interests (Kalin & Gerras 2005, 
p.17). This is one of the arguments dominating the political debate on Turkish 
accession to the EU, and it would be a great omission if I did not include it 
within the questionnaire (see Question 11 of the Survey instrument in 
Appendix 2).  
    
         
The next and last step of piloting the questionnaire was to double-check the final 
details so that the questionnaire would be as professional as possible. At this point, 
special attention and emphasis were paid to the borderlines, the formatting and the 
design in general.      
 
  
 
3.4.3.3 Questionnaire Rating Scale 
 
The rating scale adopted for the evaluation of the attitude and opinions of the 
sampling frame quality was a 5-point Likert scale. A Likert scale "is a measure of 
attitudes designed to allow respondents to rate how strongly they agree or disagree 
with carefully constructed statements" (Zikmund 1996, p. 348). It consists of a series 
of evaluative statements concerning an attitude object (Parasuraman 1986). The 
Likert scale is one of the most widely used attitude-scaling techniques in marketing 
research (Churchill 1996). 
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Respondents were invited to indicate the extent of their feeling towards each of the 
statements in the questionnaire. The responding scale ranges from 'to a large extent' 
to 'very little' by using a 5-point Likert-type scale, which also included the 'No answer' 
option. It was decided to offer verbal tags between the two extreme anchors of the 
scale to avoid problems of misinterpretation. The verbal labels for the scale points 1 
through 5 are indicated as follows: 
1 = To a large extent 
2 = To some extent 
3 = Little  
4 = Very Little 
5 = Do not know 
6 = No answer 
 
 
There are several reasons why the Likert scale was chosen for the purposes of this 
study. First, the scale was constructed to measure interval data (Madsen 1989). 
Second, in the literature, the Likert scale is almost always treated as interval scales 
(Kohli 1989). Third, interval scales typically provide the best measurements for most 
behavioural related social research (Aaker et al 1998). 
 
 
In addition to the above reasons, sensitivity is another consideration in the adoption 
of Likert rating scale. Zikmund (1996) maintains that the sensitivity of a scale is an 
important measurement concept, particularly when changes in attitudes or other 
hypothetical constructs are under investigation. Sensitivity refers to "an instrument's 
ability to accurately measure variability in stimuli or responses" (Zikmund 1996, p. 
338). That is, sensitivity of an attitude scale is the extent to which it is capable of 
discriminating between respondents with different attitudes. A dichotomous response 
category such as 'yes' or 'no' does not reflect subtle attitude changes. A more 
sensitive measure with numerous categories on the scale may be needed. Because 
the Likert scale can offer more choices for respondents to express their attitudes, it is 
considered to have higher sensitivity.  
 
 
However, there is still no agreement on the optimal number of scale points. One 
study (Devlin, Dong & Brown 1993) showed that the 5-point Likert scale appears to 
capture more information than its 4-point counterpart; it was not demonstrated 
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whether the 5-point is superior to the 7-point scale. Taking into consideration the 
particularities of the current research project, a 5-point scale was deemed to be the 
most suitable.  
 
 
The option of 'no answer' was included in the questionnaire to avoid forced answer 
bias. Researchers have suggested reasons for the inclusion of this option. For 
example, Hughes (cited by Smith 1995) argued that bias was introduced when forced 
choice scales were compared with unforced ones. Hawkins and Coney (1981) found 
that the inclusion of a 'don't know' option appeared to have no effects on 
questionnaire response rate for factual questions, but their examination of fictitious 
issues revealed that this would appear to reduce uninformed responses. Thus, a 
forced choice scale may offer potential for the misinterpretation of responses. 
 
 
 
3.4.3.4 Population and Sampling Frame 
 
In the context of triangulation –which, as stated earlier, constitutes a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches - a target population was 
identified for the purposes of the survey.  
 
 
The target population consisted of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the European Parliament. The role of this Committee is, in fact, to monitor the 
Turkish accession to the EU. At the same time it closely cooperates with the 
Directorate General of Enlargement of the European Commission, the Subcommittee 
of Security and Defence of the European Parliament as well as the European 
Council. 
 
 
The Committee on Foreign Affairs is composed (as of September 2008) of 172 
permanent and substitute members out of the 785 members of the European 
Parliament. The members of this Committee represent various European political 
parties and streams, especially those concerning views on Turkish accession to the 
EU. They are directly elected by the European citizenry. For reasons mentioned 
above, the total population of the members of this Committee was chosen to be used 
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as a proxy sample, whose generalisation of views and opinions would reflect the 
views and opinions of the European electorate who voted for them in the 2004 
elections of the European Parliament. This method of proxy sampling is widely used 
in national surveys by statistical bureaus and offices (see for example US Statistical 
Office, UK Office of National Statistics), and it aims to simulate research findings 
originating from a smaller population to reflect the views/opinions and attitudes of 
wider populations.  It is strongly believed that the results of the questionnaires can 
generally reflect the political views and concepts in Europe. This sample was used in 
the context of the quantitative approach of my survey (Labossiere 1995). 
 
 
The survey instrument was distributed to the total population of 172 MEPs. Following 
completion of the fieldwork process, 65 questionnaires were returned (37.79 
response rate). Considering the sensitive nature of the research topic, as well as the 
difficulties of contacting the MEPs and securing their cooperation, the achieved 
response rate is deemed as satisfactory. However, I recognise that this represents a 
limited response, and for this reason I exercised special care in interpreting and 
generalising the results and extrapolating the findings. It has to be stated that in the 
literature, there is an ongoing debate regarding the issue of sample 
representativeness and extrapolation of findings. On the basis of this ongoing 
debate, I strongly believe that I have managed to collect a reliable dataset which 
eventually led to reliable conclusions. 
 
 
In addition, it must be acknowledged that sample error can not be estimated for the 
purposes of this research, since judgemental, non-probability sampling has been 
employed (De Vaus 1991; Nachmias & Nachmias 1992). 
 
 
 
3.5 Data Analysis  
 
Data analysis is dependent on the nature of the data collected. In the case of this 
project, data analysis took into account whether the data was obtained through 
interviews, documents, diaries, archives, notes, or surveys. Similarly, data was 
categorised according to whether it was qualitative or quantitative. Regarding the 
interviews for instance, the results were categorised according to what subject the 
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data focused on. For example, one issue was the role and the influence of the US on 
European affairs. A second issue was the role of the army within the Turkish political 
system and how it might affect Turkey's accession to the EU.  A third issue was 
whether Turkish accession to the EU will threaten -or not- the cohesion of the EU 
cohesion and why. In fact, this is the core question of this research and the answers 
received were vital and have contributed catalytically to the qualitative findings as 
well as to the conclusion of this research31.   
 
 
The same technique was followed in the case of the answers I received from the 
questionnaire. In any case, the questions included in the interview questionnaire 
were the same or similar to those of the survey questionnaire. Therefore, one of the 
core questions of the questionnaire was whether Turkish accession to the EU will 
contribute positively or negatively to the economic, political, cultural, military and 
diplomatic policies of the EU32. Through analysis of data obtained from both 
qualitative and quantitative sources, I tried to elicit the variables upon which to build 
the model of this research. By analysing and comparing the collected data, I 
attempted to ensure the highest possible validity for the results of this research.  
 
 
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
In a work - based research some ethical issues can arise. As a result, I had to take a 
clear position in advance by informing the potential participants of the research about 
the reasons for, and the nature, duration and aims of the undertaken research. 
Furthermore, I had to respect the confidentiality and anonymity of the research 
participants, especially with regard to the survey.  Such respect is closely related to 
respect for the spiritual and political identity of the interviewees, and in the case of 
personal interviews, especially is essential to establish.   
Moreover, as researcher, I was committed to:  
1) Avoid any misrepresentation and misinterpretation of evidence, findings                               
or data.  
                                               
31
 The validity of the answers from the interviews is directly correlated with the quality of the 
interviewees. By 'quality', I mean the criteria that I defined in Chapter 3.4.1 as requirements that had to 
be met by the experts in order to be selected for an interview for the purposes of the research. In 
Chapter 3.4.3, one can find more details on the structure of the survey questionnaire in relation to the 
topics responding among others to the Research Questions.  
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2)  Follow a transparent procedure by allowing other researchers to examine, 
understand and interpret the results. Certainly, such commitment is connected to the 
reliability and objectivity of the research.  
 
 
In addition, I explained to the research participants (politicians, academicians and 
other experts) the nature, purpose, aims and the duration of the research project. I 
had also respected the confidentiality and anonymity of the research participants and 
the information they provided. For the purposes of this research, I conducted 
interviews with people who wished to speak off the record. During the discussion with 
these particular interviewees, notes were taken, allowing me to preserve the 
anonymity of these interviewees and maintain ethical confidentiality.  
  
 
Last but not least, the requirements of ethical considerations are related to the 
credibility, the variability and the validity of the researcher and of the University of 
Middlesex.  
 
 
 
3.7 My Role as a Worker/ Insider Researcher 
 
Although my research is a project related to political affairs, I have not felt any 
external negative influence from any politicians or even my employer in performing 
my work or concluding my research. On the contrary, while discussing the subject of 
this research with politicians and especially with several MEPs, I saw that they 
considered it an interesting and important topic. Indeed, both Turkish accession to 
the EU and the cohesion of the EU are sensitive issues of wide concern across the 
European political scene.  
 
 
At the same time, I had to undertake the role of an insider researcher. I was aware of 
the risks of this role, and I tried to foresee and eliminate any possible conflicts of 
interest that could result from this dual role. On the one hand, my role as a worker 
complements my role as a researcher, and vice versa. On the other hand, it does 
                                                                                                                                       
32
 For the Questionnaire, see Appendix 2 
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present potential conflicts of interest. As the main consultant of an MEP, I participate 
in shaping decision-making. Thus, objectivity is a challenge, due to the fact that I am 
part of the whole. It was difficult to keep myself at a distance, and I always ran the 
risk of losing my impartiality (Hockey 1993; Senge 1998). Therefore, I needed self 
discipline. A discipline that I gradually but satisfactorily acquired throughout my years 
of working as journalist. As a journalist I was trained to avoid subjectivity, and to 
become, instead, as objective as possible. I faced the same risks as the insider 
researcher. 'I was part of the game,' and as a result I had to make sure not to report 
my personal beliefs and emotions at the cost of objectivity. As a researcher, I face 
the same tasks of viewing information from the stance of an impartial observer - or at 
least, of trying to do so. According to Bell, objectivity is an "impossible goal" (Bell 
1993); however, the researcher must nonetheless strive to obtain it.  
 
 
 
3.8 Research Limitations  
 
In the context of implementing the methodological framework of the current project, I 
have faced some difficulties resulting from the peculiar character of the project. 
These difficulties were especially related to the interviews and the survey. Regarding 
the interviews, some interviewees, due to their status diplomats and military attachés, 
only accepted to be interviewed 'off-the-record'.  With regard to the survey, the 
population chosen belongs to a very politically sensitive and close society - the 172 
MEPs who comprise the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament.  
It should be noted that a number of MEPs were unwilling to fill out the questionnaire 
although they found it challenging, interesting and important. Turkish accession to 
the EU is a very complicated and delicate issue, and a number of MEPs were worried 
about freely expressing their views and opinions on this subject. Two facts 
encouraged the reluctant MEPs to answer the questionnaire. First, the 
questionnaires would be anonymous. Second, filling in the 'personal data' part of the 
questionnaire was not compulsory.         
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CHAPTER 4 
Evaluation of the Turkish political system  
and the Turkish accession to the EU   
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this chapter is to describe and evaluate the Turkish political system and 
Turkish accession to the EU through official documents, interviews, polls, archives, 
political statements and positions and thereby to determine independent, dependent 
and intermediate variables affecting the cohesion of the EU (Van Evera 2001, pp. 26-
27; Chapter 3.2.1, footnote 21, p. 36) An understanding of these factors and 
variables is indispensable to the construction of a model of EU cohesion in the 
context of Turkish accession to the EU.  For the purpose of this research, Turkey is, 
by definition, a point of reference.  The problems of the Turkish political system 
compel the EU to set out requirements and obligations that Turkey should implement 
in order to join the EU. Otherwise, the EU will face severe problems of cohesion at 
Turkey’s accession. Such requirements are not set out for Turkey only. It is the 
normal, technical, legal and political procedure that the EU adopts with candidate 
states in order to assure their smooth and without any serious problem integration. 
Certainly, the accession procedure is formed and developed by taking into account 
the peculiarities of each candidate state. For this reason, EU evaluation of Turkish 
accession must be considered in relation to the existing situation in Turkey. In 
particular, I examine the economic, social, political and cultural problems Turkey 
faces within the framework of its existing political system. It is a political system 
based on the six principles of Kemalism (see Chapter 4.5).   
 
 
Through the examination of the Turkish political system, my main aim is to find out: 
1) factors - variables, which affect and maintain the Turkish political system in 
cohesion and those, which may create structural economic, social, political and 
institutional problems; 2) which of these factors -variables can threaten the cohesion 
of the EU and why.  
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The evaluation of the Turkish political system is carried out on the basis of the 
European Commission's monthly and yearly reports on Turkey's progress towards 
the EU as well as through other books, surveys and essays.  By examining this data, 
I can identify variables, which affect both Turkish accession to the EU and EU 
cohesion.  As it has been already explained in Chapter 3, what I am trying to do is 
identify a list of variables upon which a model of EU cohesion can be established. 
The first stage of this methodological procedure is Chapter 2, in which theories of 
International Relations are analysed and various terms related to EU cohesion are 
defined. Chapter 4 is the second stage. In this Chapter, there is a presentation of 
data in rational order, responding to the arguments of the research in an effort to 
draw a first set of variables through a qualitative methodological approach. Each 
section of Chapter 4 is related, for example, to the political, social, economic, 
institutional and military aspect of Turkey's accession to the EU in relation to EU 
cohesion. The third stage is Chapter 5 in which the findings of the survey are 
analysed and the last stage is Chapter 6. In the framework of Chapter 6, I define and 
present a list of variables stemming from Chapters 4 and 5, upon which a model of 
EU cohesion can be based.               
 
 
In determining these variables, I address the following issues:  
• Euro-Turkish relations 
• The various European streams of  political thought 
• The stance of European citizens  
• The Turkish Republic and the principles of Ataturk  
• The Turkish political system and the EU  
• The Turkish  economic background 
• The EU evaluation of Turkish candidacy 
• Black holes 
• Cohesion policy, Turkey and the EU 
•  Lion’s share  
• The Turkish Army  
• The role of the army in the economic system  
• The black box, the army and the AKP  
• The Delphic sword 
• The beacon of modern Islam  
• Risks and human rights  
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• Turkey in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)33 
• Traditional power  
• US, NATO and ESDP  
• The institutional power of Turkey in the EU 
• Conclusions    
 
 
 
4.2 Euro – Turkish Relations   
 
Euro-Turkish relations date back to July 1959, shortly after the Europeans set the 
foundation stone of the European Economic Community (EEC) by signing the Treaty 
of Rome. In July 1959, Turkey submitted its first application to join the EU.  The EEC, 
responding to the Turkish request, proposed the establishment of an association with 
Turkey until such time as the maturation of Turkey’s political context would permit 
Turkish accession to the EU. After a turbulent Turkish course towards the EU, at the 
Helsinki Summit on the December 10, 1999 the European Union recognised Turkey 
as a candidate state (Council of the European Union 1999; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey 2007). 
 
 
The Turkish policy of seeking EU accession continued, and on October 3, 2005 the 
EU took the historical decision to give the green light to Turkish aspirations (Council 
of the European Union 2005d). In conjunction with other relevant decisions, the 
European Council decided to open Turkish accession negotiations with the European 
Union. It also enacted other decisions defining the legal and political context of 
Turkish accession to the EU, such as the 'Negotiating Framework' (Council of the 
European Union 2005c) and the 'Accession Partnership' (Commission of the 
European Communities 2005). The EU also enacted further decisions outlining the 
                                               
33
  The European Union's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) includes the eventual framing 
of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. Established in 1999 at the 
Cologne European Council, the ESDP aims to allow the Union to develop its civilian and military 
capacities for crisis management and conflict prevention at international level thus helping to maintain 
peace and international security, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.  
(http://dictionary/babylon.com/esdp) (see also: www.consilium.europa.eu) 
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legal and political procedure Turkey should follow in order to comply with the criteria 
set out by the EU on its path toward becoming a full-member state of the EU. In 
particular, the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States of 
September 21, 2005 defines some obligations for Turkey concerning the Cyprus 
issue:  
• Turkey should lift the embargo it imposes on vessels and aircrafts that bear 
the flag of the Republic of Cyprus, and/ or that have sailed from ports or taken 
off from airports which are under the control of the Republic of Cyprus.  
• Turkey should normalise its relations with all member states of the EU.  
• In this context, Turkey should recognise the Republic of Cyprus.  In this 
regard, the Declaration makes clear that the EU "recognises only the 
Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law" (Council of the European 
Union 2005a, p.2 ; Brok 2005, pp.4-5; see also Appendix 4 :Declaration of 
21st of September) 
 
 
Furthermore, every step of the Turkish accession process is subjected to EU 
evaluation and is scrutinized in the reports issued by the European Commission and 
the European Parliament (Commission of the European Communities 2004; Eurlings 
2004; Brok 2006). 
 
 
The decisions of the EU on October 3, 2005 regarding the opening of the accession 
negotiations with Turkey created strong EU political and legal commitments. 
However, the Turkish candidacy is, by definition, a big challenge. In fact, it falls under 
the umbrella of wider strategic, political and economic issues concerning the process 
of the shaping and functioning of European identity. That is, it is related to the future 
of the EU.  At the same time, the peculiarity of the Turkish candidacy, resulting from 
its Muslim religious identity, its large size, the role of its army within the political 
system, and its economic, social and institutional problems, all generate great 
concern in the EU. These problems are of high importance because they are 
connected to the way the Institutions of the EU will function in the future within an 
enlarged EU.   
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Turkish accession to the EU is causally related to the capacity of the EU to absorb 
new member states. Internal economic and social problems within the EU, as well as 
enhanced competitiveness in the context of globalisation, have obliged member 
states and the EU as such to think twice about Enlargements. The political position 
formulated within EU Institutions is the following:  Europe should take concrete steps 
towards regional integration by avoiding wrong decisions.  
 
 
 
4.3 European Streams of Thought 
 
Turkish accession to the EU attracts the interest of European citizens and politicians. 
Various political positions have been already formulated and reflected in the political 
wording of political groups acting within the EU and its member-states.  These 
various opinions have been delivered on the level of the European Council and the 
European Parliament by various political groups, thereby designing a political map of 
Turkish accession to the EU. At the same time, similar statements have been made 
on a national level. Three main streams of thought prevail on the European political 
scene.   
 
 
The first stream of thought is put forward by the Socialists, the Liberals and the 
Greens. All three parties articulate that if Turkey meets all criteria set out by the EU 
at the end of the negotiations, then Turkey must join the EU as full member- state34.  
MEP Wiersma, Vice-Chairman of the Socialist Group, delivering a speech at the 
Plenary Session of the European parliament on behalf of his political group, 
described the political stance of the Socialists on Turkish accession to the EU in the 
following way: 
Turkey’s integration in Europe will be a crucial step and a symbolic one. In this 
respect, the EU should not, in principle, behave like a closed club, but should open 
itself up to a country that is guided by European standards.... 
                                               
34
 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Debate on Brok´s report on the 'Commission's 2005 Enlargement 
strategy paper', 28 November 2005. There was a huge discussion on Brok´s report where the Socialists, 
the Liberals and the Greens alleged that there was a paragraph within the report clearly supporting the 
possibility of a privileged regime for Turkey instead of full membership. Therefore, they called for a 
compromise amendment in order to change the vocabulary of the disputable article otherwise, they 
would vote against the Report as a whole. This problem led to the postponement of the voting on the 
level of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for more than one month, until the parties agreed to a 
compromise formula (Brok 2005, Paragraph 10, p.2). 
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 In the past, our group has emphasised four aspects. First of all, the negotiations are 
about EU membership. We reject any other formula that has a different goal in mind. 
Secondly – and everyone should realise this – the negotiations will be protracted. 
Thirdly, given that the negotiations will take such a long time and so much needs to 
be done, the opening of the negotiations does not, of course, guarantee a successful 
outcome from the outset. Actual accession will eventually depend on the progress of 
the reforms and the developments in Turkey itself (Wiersma 2004).  
 
 
The second stream of thought is expressed by the 'Union for Europe of Nations' 
Group of the European Parliament and other politicians from various political parties, 
who state that there is no place for Turkey in the EU. The arguments provided by the 
supporters of this position are based on the following parameters: 1) Geography 2) 
Culture 3) Religion 4) Economic cost 5) System of values. The Vice-Chairman of the 
‘Union for Europe of Nations’ Group, MEP Mogens Camre, stated officially during the 
European Parliament Plenary Session:  
Mr President, the citizens of Europe do not welcome Turkey to the EU. If this 
Parliament votes for the opening of the negotiations, it will be acting against the 
wishes of the citizens who voted us into this House. The citizens of the EU do not 
want to see a non-European country and a non-European culture in the EU. Our 
citizens do not want the Koran to have any influence on European democracy. They 
do not want to pay for the development of Turkey.  
The politicians who would like Turkey to enter say that Turkey must take on all of our 
values. They do not know what they are asking for. You cannot take the culture out of 
a people. We believe our culture is unique. We are building the EU upon it. But the 
Turks think their culture is the best and they demand space for it in Europe. They tried 
that for a thousand years. We rejected it, but now some politicians will open the door 
that can destroy the EU. They underestimate Islam; they underestimate the 
demographic and economic effect of a country in which the religion is not only a 
religion, but also decides the politics (Camre 2005) 
 
The third stream of thought is mainly expressed by Christian Democrats – the 
European People's Party (EPP) and European Democrats (ED). The vast majority of 
its members, both in the European Parliament and at the level of national 
governments, maintain that the maximum that Turkey can achieve at the end of its 
negotiations with the EU is the status of 'privileged partnership,' not of full 
membership (Toubon, Tannock, Posselt 2004)35.  This political attitude upholds the 
view that even if Turkey meets the criteria set out by the EU, it should not join as a 
full member state.  Besides, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council 
                                               
35
 The EPP-ED preparatory meeting took place on 4/12/2004 before the voting of the Report at the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 30, 2004, when key politicians of the EPP group, such as 
Mr. Toubon, Mr. Tannock, and Mr .Posselt, strongly resisted the Turkish accession to the EU. The 
majority of the EPP-ED party does not support Turkey's full membership to the EU, but rather supports 
the status of 'privileged partnership.' 
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meeting, held on December 16-17, 2004, opened the door to a 'third road', by which 
Turkey could get a 'privileged partnership' instead of becoming full member. In 
paragraph 23 of the conclusions, the following is stated:  
These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be 
guaranteed beforehand. While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the 
candidate State is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership 
it must be ensured that the candidate State concerned is fully anchored in the 
European structures through the  strongest possible bond (Council of the European 
Union 2004, p. 7). 
 
 
An indicative sample of what the EPP-ED believes regarding Turkish accession to 
the EU is reflected in the following statement by the President of the European 
Parliament, Hans Gert Poettering. In February 2006, when Mr Poettering was the 
leader of the EPP-ED group, he stated:  
Now Europe faces a crucial decision: Do we want not just an economic Union, or a 
Union enlarged merely for reasons of security, but a political Union with its own 
European Constitution? If so, we must weigh up these issues when considering 
further Enlargements. If, for example, Turkey were to join the EU, not only would the 
character of the Union change fundamentally, it would also soon be geographically, 
politically, culturally and financially overburdened. The borders of the Community 
would shift and other applications for membership would follow.  
In particular, Turkish accession would “over-stretch" the Community, and might mean 
losing the common factors which unite Europeans, the power which creates identity. 
 
Turkey and other – European – countries might be offered a ‘privileged partnership’ 
as an alternative to membership, to promote their democratic stability and economic 
development. This assumes that the Union has a real capability to give financial and 
technical assistance to ensure internal security and the modernisation of the whole 
continent. For example, in the common interest, we must promote the major transport 
and energy networks and work together to combat terrorism, crime and illegal 
immigration (Poettering in Group of the EPP-ED 2006, pp.14-15).   
 
 
Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President, has already put his own stamp on this 
political discourse by making clear, during the electoral campaign of 2007, that he is 
against Turkish accession to the EU as full member-state.  According to his position, 
there is no place for Turkey in the EU as full member-state because, geographically, 
it does not belong to Europe. In June 18, 2007 just before the European Council of 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the French Foreign Minister, François Fillon, stated 
that in the Intergovernmental Conference to be held on June 26, 2007 Turkey should 
open only two instead of three accession chapters. The French political position can 
be summarized as the following: We can not give the green light to Chapter 17 on the 
Single European Currency (SEC), because should we accept the opening of this 
chapter, we run the risk of prejudging the final outcome of the Turkish negotiations 
with the EU and of Turkey becoming full member. Nicolas Sarkozy openly supported 
the position that Turkey should only receive the status of a 'privileged partnership'. 
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The French government also grounded its political attitude on the decision of 
December 16, 2004 issued by the Council of the EU. This decision provided that 
negotiations with Turkey are open ended, and that if the outcome is not positive, then 
the EU must find other ways to anchor Turkey to the EU (Council of the European 
Union 2004, p.7).   
 
 
Sarkozy was punctual in his rendezvous. On June 26, 2007 the Intergovernmental 
Conference approved only two of the three chapters proposed by the European 
Commission. The French government had the full support of Germany and of 
Chancellor Angela Merkel.  At the same time, Sarkozy offered full support to 
Chancellor Merkel on the issue of the Reform Treaty (Council of the EU 2007). 
Moreover, it was considered a matter of common sense within Turkey that neither 
Sarkozy nor Merkel had any intention of offering Turkey full EU membership (Birand 
2008). From this perspective, Turkish accession to the EU seemed to fall victim to 
the leading EU countries´ national interest.  
 
 
 However, Turkish accession to the EU could also fail for other reasons: a) If Turkey 
does not complete required reforms and Ankara does not comply with its obligations 
by fully implementing the acquis communautaire, b) if Turkey falls victim to internal 
political power games between Kemalists and Islamists or c) if Turkey encounters 
unpredictable developments  which might negatively affect its process of accession 
to the EU before it concludes the reforms and complies with its legal, political, social 
and economic obligations.  
 
 
While EPP-ED´s political position does not, in fact, fully correspond to the opinion 
that there is no place for Turkey in the EU, one may allege that it implies it. This 
position also describes the existing problems of Turkish accession to the EU and the 
issue concerning EU cohesion within the context of power struggle  and the future 
cultural, political and economic identity of Europe (Morgenthau 1978). In short, the 
cohesion of the EU is not restricted by the framework of the EU Cohesion policy, 
which aims at reducing economic and social disparities and the gap between the 
development levels of the various regions of the member states of the EU (Crozet & 
Koenig 2004; Cuadrado et all 2004).  By definition, Euro-Turkish relations come 
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under the procedure of EU Enlargement and are also closely related to the cohesion 
of the EU and its capacity to absorb new member states. 
 
 
 
4.4 The Stance of European Citizens 
 
Beyond the position of European political parties and politicians, one must also take 
into account the political beliefs of European citizens, as reflected in various 
'Eurobarometers'. It is interesting to see how these positions are revealed through 
the Eurobarometer of 2006 (European Commission) with questions such as the 
following: 1) Are you in favour of or against Turkish accession to the EU? 2) Once 
Turkey has met the Copenhagen criteria, would you like to see it in the EU or not?  
 
 
According to the results of the Special Eurobarometer 255 (European Commission 
2006): 
• In the EU of 15 member-states, 38% were in favour of and 49% against 
Turkish accession to the EU. 
• In the EU of 25 member-states, 39% were in favour of and 48% against 
Turkish accession to the EU. 
• In the EU of 27 member -states, 39, 9% were in favour of and 46, 1% against 
Turkish accession to the EU. 
 
 
The analysis of the above data mentions that:  
The Turkish Cypriot Community (67%) is most in favour of Turkey’s joining the EU, 
even more than Turkey itself (54%). The strongest opposition of the accession of 
Turkey can be observed in Austria (81%), Germany (69%) and in Luxemburg (69%).  
Cyprus (68%) and Greece (67%) are also fairly against Turkey’s membership in the 
European Union, even though they support the accession of countries in general 
(European Commission 2006 p. 71).  
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Figure 1 
 
 
(Barysch 2007, p. 2) 
In the above graph, one can observe the progression of European citizen attitudes to Turkish 
accession to the EU over a period of years.  
 
 
Figure 2 
 
(Barysch 2007, p.3)  
The above graph demonstrates the percentage of the EU-25 and EU-15 who are opposed to 
Turkish accession to the EU.  
 
 
 
Regarding this point, I note that the aforementioned countries are not randomly 
opposed to Turkish accession to the EU. Greek Cypriots have been under Turkish 
military occupation since 1974; Greece has an open dispute with Turkey over the 
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Aegean; and Austrians carry the historical burden of the ‘syndrome of Vienna’36 
(Barysch 2007, p.4). In addition, Germany faces the problem of about 2.1 million 
Turkish immigrants (Flam 2004, p.179). On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots by 
definition would like to see Turkey in the EU. Of course, Turkish Cypriot accession to 
the EU in the framework of a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus issue could be 
achieved earlier than that of Turkey.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
36
 Some Austrians still refer to the historical memory of Ottoman Armies laying siege to Vienna; 
however, most seem to have more contemporary concerns. Certainly, beyond the psychological 
resentment the Austrians have against Turkey, other reasons exist to encourage them not to support 
Turkey's succession to the EU: such as cultural differences and the difficulty of integrating 200.000  
Turkish immigrants into Austrian society (Barysch 2007, p. 4). 
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Table 1 
 
 
(European Commission 2006a, p. 71) 
This table demonstrates the positions of the member states and candidate states of the EU 
on Turkish accession to the EU.  
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Figure 3 
 
(Barysch 2007, p. 7) 
The above graph is important in showing what European citizens believe about Turkish 
accession to the EU as full member-state, in the event that Turkey implements the reforms 
package. One can observe that the citizens of a group of leading countries, such as Germany, 
France and Italy, do not support the full membership of Turkey to the EU even if it concludes 
and implements the reforms required by the EU. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion 
 
70                                                                                         Ioannis Charalambides    
Figure 4 
 
(European Commission 2006, pg. 69) 
The above graph illustrates what European citizens believe about Turkish accession to the 
EU, and more precisely who they believe will benefit most from it. 52% of the European 
citizens consider that Turkish accession to the EU will primarily be in the interest of Turkey. 
20% believe that Turkish accession to the EU will be in the interest of both the EU and 
Turkey. 7% consider that Turkish accession to the EU will primarily favour the interests of the 
EU. 3% of the interviewees replied that accession will be in the interest of its own country. 3% 
believe that Turkey's accession will be in the interest of other international players such as the 
US, Russia or/and China. 4% believe it will be in no one's interest.  
 
 
Katinka Barysch (2007) and other researchers and journalists explain in detail the 
reasons why European citizens oppose Turkey's accession to the EU:  
1) Lack of positive political leadership in support of Turkish accession to the EU 
(Barysch 2007, p.1). MEP Lagendijk (2007) also supported the idea that European 
politicians and the media should convince the majority of the European people "that 
the Turkish accession to the EU is a good thing".  
 
2) Negative stereotypes of and prejudice against Turkey. As Paul Taylor, Reuters 
European Affairs Editor, maintains:  
 On television, Turkey means minarets, headscarves and the Bosporus bridge... in the 
newspaper, a secular state with a predominantly Muslim population, gets edited down 
to a Muslim country (Barysch 2007, p. 1). 
 
Similarly, the Chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Joost 
Lagendijk (2007) stated the following:  
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Most people believe that Muslims are fundamentalists. So when terrorists attack in 
Iraq, people think that these people are Muslims.  People in Turkey are also Muslims 
and (thereby) we have to get them out or keep them out (from the European Union). It 
is an impression that being Muslim is a problem. And because we have already 18 
million Muslims in the EU, this is indeed, a problem.  It is an irrational fear based on 
culture and religion. But that is the way it is (Appendix 2). 
 
 
3) Perceived connections between Turkish accession and social and economic 
problems, such as loss of jobs, threats of terrorism, weakening of national culture 
(Barysch 2007, p. 2). Turkey is a Muslim country, and its accession to the EU raises 
issues related to European cultural identity and value systems.  The question posed 
is whether Turkey will adapt to the European system of values, or whether 
Europeans will accept Turkey's cultural differentiation. Can the Muslim cultural and 
religious value system coexist with Christianity and the other western systems of 
values which dominate the existing European identity? By definition, if Turkey joins 
the EU as full member state, then we will not only have a new Turkey, but also a new 
Europe (Quaisser & Wood, 2004 p.1).  As Joost Lagendijk (2007) stated: 
In my country and I think in many European countries, the European citizens are 
afraid of Turkey because it is a Muslim country. Can we fit them in? The Europeans 
have their doubts. There are many negative things in their minds. They consider that 
Islam in Turkey is something like the Islam in Saudi Arabia, in Iran or in Northern 
Africa. This is a matter that we should discuss because if you do not make a 
difference between the Islam in Turkey and the Islam in other countries you are into 
problems.  
 
4) The potential of a huge wave of Turkish immigrants to other EU states, upon 
achievement of full-member status. (Lenski in Group of the EPP-ED 2004, p.3; Flam 
2004, pp.179-186).  The high growth of population in Turkey does not correspond to 
the creation of new jobs. The estimate is that an initial wave of about 4 million 
Turkish immigrants will flow towards Europe shortly after accession. By definition, the 
phenomenon of emigration is closely related to social, cultural and economic 
problems (Quaisser and Wood 2004, p.29).  According to Joost Lagendijk (2007):  
There is the fear that after accession, millions of Turks will come to the Netherlands 
and Germany to get a job. Nobody can predict what will happen, we are talking about 
2025 or after, but still some people have fears about that. I still think that within the 
EU more than 25% of the people and also of the politicians who are against 
immigration, Islam and for other reasons, 25% who is in favour and 50% who is in 
between. When they are optimists as it happened in 2004 they say let’s do it. When 
they are sceptical, they say do not do it. The proportion of 50% is open to arguments 
and sometimes say yes sometimes say no. But Islam and immigration are fears that 
will be with us for long - long time. These are the basic things they are afraid of. 
 
5) The risk of upsetting the balance of power in an enlarged Union with Turkey as a 
full member-state. As Nicolas Véron (cited in Barysch 2007) supports the balance of 
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power and cultural differences are important issues related to Turkish accession to 
the EU. As he maintains:  
Many French people already worry that their country’s central role in the EU has been 
weakened by successive Enlargements. For them, Turkey is a step too far. By the 
time Turkey is ready for EU membership, it could be the biggest country in Europe, 
with 80-90 million people. French politicians ask whether Turkey as an EU member 
would behave more like Germany (indebted to the European cause and instinctively 
pro-integrationist) or the UK (often eurosceptic and fiercely protective of its national 
sovereignty). Of course, France itself is a large country with an ambiguous stance to 
pooling sovereignty. But it would not want another large eurosceptic country in the EU 
(p.4) 
 
This position may be encompassed in the following statement: Some of the leading 
European countries are not ready to share their power with Turkey.  
 
6) The unresolved Cyprus issue. The importance of this issue is shown in the 
decision of December 14-15, 2006, when the European Council froze eight 
accession chapters relevant to the Turkish obligations towards Cyprus. These 
obligations stem from the Additional Protocol and the EU Declaration of the 21st 
September 2005 (Council of the European Union 2007). 
 
7) The belief that Turkey has no place within the EU because it is a state a) with no 
European identity and which b) does not geographically belong to Europe.  As MEPs 
Tannock and Toubon stated during the EPP-ED preparatory meeting of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on December 9, 2004, if the EU accepts Turkey as a 
full member state, how can it exclude Morocco, for example, or other African or Asian 
countries, such as Kazakhstan or even Russia, from becoming full member-states? 
In other words, where is the red line separating those countries eligible for candidacy 
to the EU from those who are ineligible?  Is the geographical position of a state one 
of the criteria for full membership (Poettering cited in Group of EPP-ED 2006, pp. 9-
16; Tannock 2006, Toubon 2006)?  
 
8) The fear that Turkey may play the role of a "Trojan horse" on behalf of the US 
within the EU, creating problems in the EU Institutions. In this context, it seems that 
some European leaders and public opinion leaders are not ready to share their 
European power -whatever this power means- with Turkey (Laçiner, Őzcan & Bal 
2005, p. 71, Kalin 2005, p. 17).            
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Of course, every coin has two sides. There is also another perspective on Turkish 
accession to the EU. Those who favour accession provide the following rationales for 
Turkey’s inclusion in the EU: 
1) Turkey's important geo-strategic position (Kalin & Gerras 2005, pp. 5-6). Turkey is 
a country situated in the heart of Eurasia, and its location points toward its crucial 
role within the context of a contemporary oil route. Turkey wishes to reveal itself as 
key player by restoring the historical silk-route (Aras 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Turkey 2008d). 
2) Turkey’s importance to a stronger EU foreign policy. Turkey is a member of NATO 
and has the second largest army in the North Atlantic Alliance. As such it would play 
a key role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the most complicated pillar of 
European integration (Kalin & Gerras 2005; Barysch 2007). 
3) Energy and security sectors are causally related to the geo-strategic Turkish 
importance, and Ankara’s desired role as a regional power (Kalin & Gerras 2005, pp. 
6-9, Barysch 2007a, Aras 2002, pp.7-15).   
4) Turkey’s ability to contribute a new, young labour force to an EU suffering from 
population ageing (Kalin & Gerras 2005 pp. 9-11; Barysch 2007, p. 2). 
 
 
Table 2 
Labour market statistics (in thousand) 
 
October 
2006 
September 
2007 
October 
2007 
Population 72,879 73,719 73,792 
Population aged 15 and above 51,922 52,709 52,796 
Labour force 25,148 25,766 25,208 
Employed 22,805 23,361 22,750 
Unemployed 2,343 2,405 2,458 
Participation in workforce 48.4% 48.9% 47.7% 
Unemployment rate 9.3% 9.3% 9.8% 
Employment rate 43.9% 44.3% 43.1% 
Youth unemployment 18.8% 19.0% 19.8% 
Women participation rate 25.3% 25.7% 24.4% 
(Turkstat in European Commission 2008, p. 35) 
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Turkstat37 as cited in European Commission's, 'Turkey Monthly Pre-Accession 
Report` (2008, p. 35):  
... The population of Turkey is 70,586,256 as of December 31, 2007. This figure is 
only 2.8 million higher than the latest population figure recorded in 2000 census 
(67,803,927). The male population is 35,376,533 and the female population is 
35,209,723.  70.5% of the people are living in cities (in provincial and district centres). 
The number of people living in Istanbul is 12.6 million (17.8% of total). The other most 
populated provinces are Ankara with 4.5 million (6.3%), Izmir with 3.7 million (5.3%), 
Bursa with 2.4 million (3.5%) and Adana with 2 million (2.8%), respectively. The 
median age of the population in Turkey is 28.3, i.e. half of the population is below age 
28.3. Turkey’s population density is 92 persons per square kilometre. Istanbul has the 
highest population density (2,420 persons/km2), while Tunceli has the lowest density 
(11 persons/km2).  
 
5) The fact that the EU is not a Christian Club, which implies that Turkey should have 
the same opportunity as other states to acquire the place it merits in the EU (Erdogan 
cited in EurActiv 2006, Lagendijk 2007). 
6) Long-term future economic benefits for the EU (Kalin & Gerras 2005, p. 8). Turkey, 
because of its size, is considered both a large goods market for the EU and a cheap 
labour market, one which offers investors the possibility of establishing new 
enterprises in a location where costs can be minimized and benefits maximized 
(Flam 2004, pp.190-206).   
 
 
At this point, it would be interesting to examine relations and perspectives between 
the EU and Turkey on the level of trade balance. Analysing the official statistical data 
issued by the Directorate General TRADE of the European Commission (2006b) for 
the years 2002 to 2006 I note that in real numbers, the average of Turkey’s exports 
to the EU in the period 2002-2006 totalled 27.374 million euros per year.  On the 
other hand, the average of the EU’s exports to Turkey for the same period totalled 
36.248 million euros per year. Taking into account the sizes of the two economies I 
note that:  
• Within these five years Turkey exported to the EU an average of 53, 6% of 
its total exports (see Figures 6 - Turkey, Trade with the EU). 
• Within these five years, the EU exported to Turkey an average of 3, 6% of 
its total exports (see Figures 5 - EU Trade with Turkey). 
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Figures 5 
 
(EUROSTAT in European Commission 2007e, p. 1) 
 
 
At the same time, in real numbers, Turkey’s imports from the EU during the period 
2002 - 2006 totaled an average of 34.86 million euros per year. This amount 
corresponds to 45.3% of the total Turkish imports from the EU. Moreover, Turkish 
global imports for this period averaged 78.36 million euros per year. Therefore, 
Turkish imports from the EU correspond to an average of 44.4% of the total Turkish 
import from the world.  
 
 
On the other hand, in real numbers the average of EU’s imports from Turkey is 30. 
51 million euros per year. This amount corresponds to 2.78% of total EU imports 
from Turkey per year.  The average EU trade with the world for this period totals 
1.089.481 billion euros per year. Therefore, the average of EU imports from Turkey 
corresponds to an average of 2. 8% of total EU imports from the world.  
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Within the period 2002-2006, the average of the trade balance of Turkey in relation to 
the EU was –7.495 million euros per year. In contrast, the average of the trade 
balance of the EU was 5.740 million euros per year.  Taking into account the fact that 
in real numbers, within these five years Turkey’s exports to the EU averaged 27.374 
million euros per year while EU exports to Turkey averaged 36.247 million euros per 
year, we may conclude that the EU is the main importer of Turkish products. This fact 
cannot, however, lead to the conclusion that Turkey is the main market for EU 
interests. Rather, the main market for EU interests is that of the US. Indeed, in 2006 
the EU exported to the US 23% of total European exports. In real numbers, this 
equals 267.895 million euros.  
 
 
At the same time, taking into account data issued by the European Commission, I 
note that:  
• The main market for Turkey's interests (exports) is that of the EU. In 2006, 
Turkey's exports to the EU arrived at 51.7%.  In real numbers, that means 
34.865 million euros. The EU is also Turkey's major trade partner. In 2006, 
Turkey's trade exports to the EU reached 44.4% of the global Turkish trade 
exports- in real numbers, 77.647 million euros. On the other hand, in 2006, 
Turkey was the seventh market for EU interests.  EU exports to Turkey 
were 2.9% -in real numbers, 38.538 million euros. In 2006, the EU trade 
exports to Turkey totalled 3.4%. Or, in real numbers, 84.995 million euros.  
• The Turkish economy depends on exports to the EU. Indeed, during the 
period 2002-2006 an average of 53.6% of total Turkish trade exports were 
absorbed by the EU per year.  That is, a large part of the Turkish economy 
survives due to its exports to the EU.  
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Tables 3 
(European Commission 2007e, p. 3) 
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Tables 4 
 
(European Commission 2007e, p. 4) 
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Figures 6 
 
(IMF in European Commission 2007e, p. 2) 
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4.5 Turkish Republic and the Principles of Ataturk  
 
European opinion on the Turkish accession to the EU has been already analysed in 
Chapter 4 (see Chapters 4.3 and 4.4). For the purposes of this project it is also 
important to look at Turkey, and, more precisely at its political system and roots. No 
reference can be made to Turkey unless its political system and its institutional, 
economic and cultural identity are investigated. Such an investigation offers a 
methodological tool to ascertain what problems the country faces, what reforms must 
be completed and what structural changes must occur within Turkey so that it will be 
able to successfully conclude its accession negotiations with the EU.  
 
 
The establishment of the new Turkish state in 1923, as a result of the victorious war 
against the Greeks in Minor Asia relied on the political ideology of Kemalism (Ahmad 
1993, pp. 52-53). This political ideology was constitutionally reflected in the political 
system of Kemalism, a system geared toward the modernisation and westernisation 
of Turkey. Throughout the years Kemalism has been politically consolidated as the 
dominant practical model of Turkish governance. Its legal foundation is based on 
article 2 of the Turkish Constitution, which states: ‘The Turkish state is Republican, 
Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist and Revolutionary – Reformist’ (Ahmad 1993, 
p. 63).  
 
 
The six principles of the Kemalist political system are the following:  
1) Secularism: Although the principle of secularism did not advocate 
atheism, the state’s civil forces distanced themselves from the various 
religious doctrines still existing in Turkey. Secularism stood as an 
anticlerical principle relying on rationalism and nationalism. It could not 
be turned against an enlightened Islam. However, it was opposed to 
an Islam based on extreme interpretation of the Koran-an Islam which 
holds the Turkish society down and renders it hostage to the past 
(Tocci 2001; Giallouridis 1997, pp. 56-62).  
 
2) Republicanism: Kemalist reforms constitute in fact a political and 
ideological revolution upon which the new Turkish state can be based. 
These structural changes transformed the multinational Ottoman 
Empire into a 'Turkish nation state'. This political process aimed at 
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creating a strong national consciousness and identity within the 
context of a modern Turkish state. In other words, Kemalism 
recognises a Republican political system able to incarnate the wishes 
and the destiny of the Turkish nation (Maynor 2003; Giallouridis 1997, 
pp. 56-62). 
 
3) Populism: Kemalism represents itself as a revolution incorporating 
multiple dimensions. Since Kemalism aimed at bringing about 
profound and well-founded structural changes, these reforms were 
expected to spark social revolution. This aspect of Kemalist revolution 
developed from top to bottom. It was a revolution led by the elite, 
influenced and inspired by western societies. Its reforms focused on 
the integration of women in society and on the role they could play in 
the new Turkish political system. The cornerstone of these reforms 
was 1934 Legislation based on articles incorporated from the Swiss 
Civil Code, granting women the right to vote38 (Ahmad 1993, p.65; 
Giallouridis 1997, pp. 56-62). 
 
4) Reformism: Kemalism promoted a related principle, which fell under 
the same framework of Ataturk's effort to establish a new political 
system and state: that of reformism.  In the context of this emphasis 
on reform, Ataturk attempted to install new Institutions corresponding 
to the new political philosophy and practice of the state: the state 
whose duty was to maintain itself, tightly bound by modernisation (Killi, 
1980, pp. 381-404, Sarris 1992, p. 63). In implementing his political 
intentions, for instance, Kemal Ataturk obliged Turkish males to 
remove the traditional fez and wear European headgear. Such a 
reform symbolised the new western political character of Turkey. 
Since then, Turkey has gradually taken further steps reaffirming its 
course towards Europe. Such steps are reflected in its adherence to 
NATO and its will to join the political Institutions, initially of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and afterwards of the 
                                               
38
 The explanation and the spirit of this principle were described by its founding father, Moustafa Kemal, 
who flatly stated that populism constitutes a principle against class privileges and class distinctions. At 
the same time, populism recognised no individual, no family, no class and no organisation as being 
above others. This conception falls under the political efforts to create a common national 
consciousness. Such a national consciousness was reflected in the supreme value of Turkish 
citizenship. It was, in fact, a methodological way to escape from a multinational Ottoman Empire to the 
model of Kemalism, which will be sealed by the Turkish national identity and citizenship.   
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European Union (EU).  This Turkish political approach brought about 
some reforms. However, these have not been sufficient to integrate 
Turkey into the club of European states. If they had been, there would 
be no need for Turkey to implement or abide by the legal, political and 
economic reformations required by the EU in order to successfully 
conclude its accession process towards the EU (Giallouridis 1997, pp. 
56-62). 
 
5) Nationalism: This indispensable principle of Kemalism aimed at 
maintaining the cohesion of the new Turkish state despite its multi-
religious and multinational character. Ataturk attempted to present his 
nationalism as a mode of anti-imperialism which relied on the 
independence of the Turkish state. Nationalism was not only anti-
imperialistic, it was also opposed to dynastic or class rule over Turkish 
society. Kemalist nationalism promotes the political and legal position 
that the Turkish state is indivisible. This indivisible character of the 
Turkish state focuses in particular on territory and population (Gellner 
1983). The advocators of Kemalism asserted that Turkish nationalism 
was not turned against other religious, national groups or minorities 
living within the territory of the Turkish Republic. However, even if this 
was the genuine intention of Ataturk, in the current period this 
nationalism is used as methodological tool for discrimination against 
other national and religious minorities living in Turkey. A simple 
example may be found in article 301 of the Turkish penal code 
providing for penalties against those who insult Turkishness 
(Giallouridis 1997, pp. 56-62). 
 
6) Statism: Kemal Ataturk wished to enhance the role of the state in the 
new political system. With this in mind, he supported the principle of 
statism (étatisme). Through this principle, he aimed at state regulation 
and control of the Turkish economy (Hamilton 1995; Giallouridis 1997, 
pp. 56-62). This principle functions upon the following levels: 
a) The state controls economic activity and is responsible for 
a healthy national economy.  
b) The state is involved in those areas of the private sector in 
which private enterprise is not active or in which it has been 
proven inadequate.  
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c) The state may be involved in the private sector, should 
such an action be required by national interest.       
 
Therefore, 'statism' revealed the state as the owner of private industry 
and as the safeguarder of the economic national system (Sarris 1992, 
pp. 166-167; Ugur in Ugur & Canefe 2004, pp. 76-77).      
 
 
Since the political system of Kemalism is presented as a model of stability and 
cohesion for the Turkish state, the question is whether the reforms required by the 
EU will bring changes leading to the decline or to the reinforcement of the system. 
That is, it is unclear whether the europeanisation' of the Turkish political system will 
lead towards a new 'velvet revolution', one which will re - orientate the principles 
upon which a moderate Turkish political system can be based. 
 
 
 
4.6 Turkish Political System and the European Union 
 
I have already elaborated the principles upon which the Turkish political system is 
based. Kemalism was a system that brought structural changes to Turkish policy, 
society, culture and Institutions, while keeping a multi-national country in cohesion 
throughout the last eight decades (Sarris 1992, p. 58). However, whether this system 
can respond to the requirements of globalisation and the EU is an open question. 
Therefore, one must observe the existing political, economic, social and institutional 
situation in Turkey, in conjunction with the existing situation in the EU, in order to 
determine the problems of the Turkish system and to ascertain its potential impact on 
EU cohesion.  
 
 
 
4.6.1 Turkish Economic Background 
  
Since 1930, the Turkish political system has been based on ‘étatisme’ (devletçilik). 
The leaders of the state maintain control over the Turkish economy as they try to 
forge the Kemalist character of the Turkish political system. In this respect, they 
deploy national resources in the service of the main governmental aim, that of the 
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consolidation of the nation state. The phenomenon of ‘étatisme’ constituted part of a 
national policy aiming at the restoration of the then-new Turkish state. At the same 
time, state leaders had the political will to follow a European course (Ugur in Ugur & 
Canefe 2004, p. 77).  
 
 
The phenomenon of ‘étatisme’ brought about three main consequences:   
1) The leaders of the state controlled national resources. In particular, the 
Turkish establishment used the political and economic mechanism of 
'étatisme' in order to obtain the highest electoral support for their efforts to 
impose a concrete Kemalist regime.  
2) The phenomenon of 'rent seeking' flourished in Turkey. This phenomenon 
results from the need of the economic private sector to make a profit through 
participation in state’s development. The army guides the government in 
legislating rules, laws and regulations which help individuals, organisations, or 
firms to make money by manipulating the economic environment, rather than 
by making a profit through trade and the production of wealth (Tullock 2005). 
Certainly, this phenomenon is causally connected to corruption (Ugur in Ugur 
& Canefe 2004, pp. 77-79). 
 
 
After Turkey signed the additional protocol with the European Economic Community 
in 1970, the philosophy, practice, and mode of functioning of the Turkish economy 
was expected to change. Turkey was intended to harmonise its economy with the 
Western European economies while the Cold War was still at its peak. However, the 
inflexibility of the Turkish political system caused problems to the Turkish economy. 
In particular, the phenomenon of galloping inflation obliged the government to take 
measures to save the economy. Therefore, the Turkish government took the two 
following measures: 
1) devaluation of the Turkish lira  
2) liberalisation of the economy. 
 
 
These two measures led to the removal of the ceilings on interest rates and on the 
price of the goods within the public sector. Both of these measures proved important: 
they gave the Turkish economy an outlet from the crisis by stimulating foreign 
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demand for Turkish product and by boosting Turkish exports. At the same time, they 
facilitated the growth of the Turkish economy.  
 
 
However, these reforms were insufficient for long-term economic stability. Should 
Turkey wish to avoid new crises and continue its course towards Europe it must 
undertake more comprehensive reforms (Ugur in Ugur & Canefe 2004, pp. 77-79). 
The measures taken during the crisis of 1970 were not part of a long-term strategy, 
and so they did not provide long-term resolution of the severe structural problems of 
the Turkish economy. Even now, 'statism' remains an economic and political practice, 
since the army is involved in the economic and commercial affairs of the state and 
controls the system both politically and economically. The army is shareholder in 
various companies and uses these in its dealings with political actors, as well as to 
influence public opinion. Through these dealings, the army attempts to maintain and 
protect the existing political system (see Chapter 4.8.1).  
 
 
This situation still prevails within the Turkish political system, and is reflected in the 
various economic crises that have afflicted Turkey since the crisis of 1970.  The 
crises that followed in 1981, in November 2000 and then in February 2002 did not 
erupt without reason. They appeared on the Turkish political and economic scene as 
the result of the ‘structural problems’ that the Turkish political system suffers from. 
These ‘structural problems’ include that of the banking system (European 
Commission 2007b). The Turkish lira depreciated almost by 50% overnight, just after 
the onset of the crisis and almost by 65% by October 2001. At the same time, the 
country encountered a severe problem of unemployment. The International Monetary 
Fund intervened by promoting an economic package, one which not only included  
16 billion dollars in financial aid, but also provided for reformations within the private 
sector and the banking and monetary system.   
 
 
As a result of these crises, the huge fiscal costs of bank restructuring and the deep 
recession: 
a) public debt rose from 57% of GDP in 2000 to 95% of GDP in 2001.  
b) unemployment rose to 7.7% in 1999 and to 10.3% in 2002 (Quaisser & Wood 
2004, p.29).      
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4.6.2 The Evaluation of the EU  
On October 3, 2005 Turkey was given the green light by the EU to open accession 
negotiations with Brussels. Turkey is under continuous evaluation by the European 
Commission. According to the Commission’s 2007 progress report (2007b, p.26) the 
current account deficit of Turkey increased from 6.1/3% of GDP in 2005 to 8% of 
GDP in 2006. In the first half of 2006, however, strong export activity contributed to a 
slight deficit reduction, to approximately 7% of GDP.  
 
According to the 2006 Progress Report, in spite of high growth, few new jobs have 
been created in Turkey. Unemployment rates range between 8% and 10.3%. The 
skill mismatch between labour demand and supply and some labour market rigidities 
continue to hamper job creation. Unemployment is much higher among young people 
(around 18%) and is of a long-term nature for more than half of job-seekers. The 
employment rate fell slightly to 43% by mid 2006. The European Commission's 2006 
Progress Report (2006c) notes that: "The scale of unregistered employment 
continues to be of concern. It constitutes 50.1% of overall employment and 88.2% of 
employment in the agriculture sector" (p. 50). 
 
A review of the European Commission's Turkey 2007 Progress Report (2007b, p.26) 
shows that no serious progress has been made in the sector of unemployment. The 
report records only a slight growth in the sector of new jobs, an increase of 1.3% 
from   2006.  
• According to the 2007 Progress Report (p. 27) the inflation for the second 
quarter of 2007 was 7.1% of the GDP, which is higher than the Turkish 
Central Bank's year/target of 5%. 
• According to the 2006 Progress Report (European Commission 2006c), the 
lira's  
exchange rate against the Euro fell by 25% in May-June 2006, but 
significantly recovered in the following months. The Central Bank of Turkey 
has increased overnight borrowing and lending rates by 425 and 625 basis 
points respectively. Financial markets have recently been very volatile. (p.26) 
•  According to the 2007 Commission Report, "the general government gross 
debt fell markedly to 60.7% of GDP by the end of 2006 from 69.6% the year 
before" (2007b, p.28). 
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4.6.3 Black Holes 
 
The Turkish goal of accession to the EU created a new impetus for changes within 
the Turkish political, economic and institutional scene. Upon initiating accession 
negotiations with the EU, Turkey simultaneously agreed to make profound structural 
changes. The implementation of these changes is vital, for the Turkish economy 
cannot stand on its own feet unless reforms are put in practise. However, 
modernising the Turkish economy is not an easy task. This is well understood by the 
Turkish government and by the Kemalists political establishment. Modernisation 
depends on the implementation of a package of structural changes.  
 
 
As a result of these changes: 
First, more concrete steps must be taken towards the transformation of the Turkish 
economy and productivity in the context of privatisation. According to the 2006 
European Commission's report on Turkey (2006c): 
Privatisation receipts amounted to about 2.8% of GDP in 2005. Largest 
privatisations included the Turpas oil refinery and the steel an iron producer 
Erdemir. The privatisation of Turk Telekom has been finished. Delays on the 
privatisation in electricity distribution were incurred. Public ownership in the 
business sector downscaled to 5% excluding agriculture (p. 28). 
 
With regard to the necessity of privatisation in transforming the Turkish economy, 
one must note the importance of reforms in the sector of the Competition Policy. The 
European Commission noted that some positive steps concerning anti-trust and 
mergers issues related to legislative alignment have been already taken in this sector 
(European Commission 2006c, p. 37). The Competition Authority is an active player 
in   and has operational independence with the Government. Therefore, it can play a 
key role in controlling the mergers and business through anti-trust practices.  At the 
same time, the Turkish economic system faces another problem: Although the 
European Commission notes its satisfaction with the operational action of the 
Competition Authority, the fact remains that the Turkish government has not yet 
proceeded with either  
the adoption of state aid legislation [or] the establishment of an operationally 
independent state aid and monitoring authority. The absence delays the adoption of 
implementing rules for competition under Custom Union Decision 1/95, and results in 
serious distortions of competition (European Commission 2006c p. 38).  
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One year later, according to Commission's 2007 Progress Report, the role of the 
state as an active player in the market has been further reduced. At the same time, it 
noted that:  
Transparency in the corporate sector improved and accounting standards were 
upgraded although the new legislation has not yet been fully implemented. The 
absence of a transparent monitoring of state aid and of supporting policies to decrease 
distortions adversely affects competition and competitiveness in the economy. Public 
procurement policies continued to be undermined by the exceptions made to the 
regulatory framework39 (European Commission 2007b, p. 31). 
 
 
 
Moreover, the Commission stresses in its report that 'in 2005, 100.000 enterprises 
were established and more than 26.000 firms went bankrupt.  These numbers were 
about 5% higher than in 2004" (2007b, p. 28). The Commission adds: 
a) Restrictions on foreign ownership still exist in the areas of civil aviation, maritime 
transport, road transport, ground-handling services, yachting, broadcasting, electricity, 
financial corporations, private employment offices, tourism, education and defence 
sectors (European Commission 2006c, p. 28). 
b) Barriers to market exit have not been significantly reduced (European Commission 
2006c, p.28). 
 
 
Second, the agriculture sector has been reduced, while some other sectors have 
been developed.  According to the 2006 Progress Report: 
The share of agriculture in employment decreased markedly during 2005, from 33% to 
26% of total employment. This trend continued in 2006. At the same time jobs were 
created in industrial sector (including construction) and its share in the total labour 
force rose from 18% to 26% in 2005. However, job creation in industry and services 
was not strong enough to fully compensate for the reduction in agricultural 
employment. The share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 11.7% to 10.7%. 
Industry gained in importance, increasing from 29% of GDP to 31.2%. Services 
remained stable at around 58% of GDP. In summary, the process of structural 
transformation of the economy accelerates (2006c, p.29). 
 
 
Third, the situation of the small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) was slightly 
improved in 2007 according to European Commission Report (2007b).  
 SMEs in Turkey account for 99% of total enterprises and 80% of total employment. 
However, SME ratios for capital investment (38% of the total), value added (26%), 
exports (10%) and bank credit (5%) point at low labour productivity, insufficient access 
to finance and barriers to enter foreign markets (p.31) 
 
                                               
39
 Transparency is also a political, economic, social and judicial phenomenon which is strictly connected 
to that of corruption. It is a crucial issue that Turkey should face in order to harmonise its legal, political, 
social and economic system with that of the EU.  
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Hereupon, I must note that the Turkish economy depends on external loans, 
especially from the IMF 40 (International Monetary Fund 2007; SETimes.com 2006; 
BBC News 2002). After discussions with the Turkish Authorities, the IMF made some 
proposals that must be implemented by Turkey in order to establish a reliable market 
and attract foreign investors who seek to function in a secure environment. These 
proposals included: 
a) continued fiscal and monetary discipline to secure low inflation and lessen 
vulnerabilities, especially from the still high public debt 
b) supply-side structural reforms to bolster productivity and increase employment and 
investment. 
Successful implementation of these policies could raise potential growth well above 5 
percent. Stronger growth, in turn, would reduce susceptibility to external shocks by 
improving the economy's ability to sustain current account deficits and by tilting 
external financing toward more stable sources, such as foreign direct investment. 
(International Monetary Fund 2007) 
 
 
On the other hand, I must assess the Turkish economic future in relation to that of 
the EU. As Katircioglu states (in LaGro & Jorgensen 2007)  "globalisation needs a 
well-developed local economic environment" and he comes to the conclusion that 
Turkey must proceed with more structural changes for the functioning market 
economy is not yet complete (p. 114 -115). In addition, Professor Erol Katircioglu 
(2007) of Istanbul Bilgi University, in the context of an interview conducted for the 
purposes of this research, stated: 
The reforms implemented as part of 'the structural adjustment programme'               
being carried out in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank after the economic 
crisis of 2001, and those implemented as requirements of the accession process for 
the EU, have led Turkey to come closer to global world. However, problems of 
development have still not been solved despite these steps being taken and reforms 
being implemented. 
 
 
As Professor Katrcioglou (2007) also maintained:     
Turkey will not be able to sustain an economic growth of 5% every year whereas the 
EU will achieve paces of economic growth of more than 2% annually.  However, 
Turkish economy will need almost forty years to catch up with the EU economy and 
the welfare level of its member-states.         
    
 
                                               
40
 This political instability, which has already been analysed in Chapter 4.4, has been recorded 
throughout the last five decades in Turkey. The last political crisis occurred in 2007 during the 
Parliamentary and Presidential elections.   
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Furthermore, Katircioglu provides a model of development for his country. This 
model, he says, is necessary to solve development problems resulting from structural 
ones, and he adds that "this model should take the democratic contribution of the 
whole society as its starting point". According to Katircioglu, this model of 
development is based on the following points:  
1. Such a model has to be democratic enough. Therefore a new industrial policy 
in line with development targets needs to be established based on a new 
organisation including all - local and national - parties. This approach 
comprises the representation of different views and thereby will have the least 
of wrong decisions because of its richness.    
2. In such a model, all parties should have a place as parties (sectors) to the 
problems. Among these parties, depending on the nature of the problem, 
bureaucrats, employers, representatives of labour unions, scientists, consumer 
representatives and other related social groups should also participate.  
3. In this model (organisation) the representative should participate through 
elections. This process will increase the responsibility of the participants and 
the credibility of the organisation. 
4. Such model (organisation) will not only eliminate the consequences of decision 
making at the government level, but will also eliminate the consequences of 
decision making in a poorly-functioning market. With this characteristic, 
accurate decision-making will be achieved.  
5. In such model (organisation), which will be established with the participation of 
different people from different sections, it is evident that the rent seeking 
behaviour will be minimized.                  
 
In other words, what Professor Katircioglu suggests, is the establishment of a model 
of development with the involvement of all Turkish productive powers and social 
forces. As he said (2007), "such process will maximize the interests of social forces 
as the decisions will be taken by their own on a democratic basis".  What he supports 
is a democratic model of development starting from the bottom, from ordinary people 
and going up to the highest level of the government machine.  On the basis of this 
model of development, strategic and other decisions will be directly legalised by the 
participants.            
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4.7 Cohesion Policy, Turkey and the EU 
   
Turkish accession to the EU relates to the next Enlargements and the absorption 
capacity of the EU. Certainly, European integration is not an easy task. Although 
many steps have been taken towards European integration, disparities still exist 
within regions of the EU. Therefore, the EU has established a cohesion policy aiming 
at reducing or, if possible, eliminating economic and social disparities. By definition, 
this policy is related to the Enlargement of the EU and its capacity to absorb new 
member states (see analysis in Chapter 2.). On the other hand, disparities exist 
within the Turkish state. According to a Commission decision on a multi-annual 
Indicative Planning Document 2007-2009 for Turkey (2007c) 
....Turkey has to contend with regional disparities that are much more marked than in 
any country of the EU. In 2001 per capita income in the five poorest NUTS II regions 
was between 33% to 53% of national average and another seven regions scored 
below 75% while income in the 5 richest regions varied between 127% to 190% of 
national average. Other social and economic indicators -life expectancy, literacy 
rates, education, and access to health services, sanitation, industrial activity, FDI 
fluxes and employment- also underline the development gap among Turkish regions. 
These factors lead to mass migration of skilled people to the more dynamic western 
regions, placing significant pressures on urban centres (p. 14). 
 
 
The EU has scientifically examined its capabilities to absorb new member states. In 
this context, the Policy Department, responsible for the structural and cohesion 
policies of the European Parliament, issued a report in November 2006 analysing the 
future Enlargement of the European Union (from 27 to 34 member states) and its 
cohesion policy (European Parliament 2006). Referring to the most recent 
Enlargement of the EU to incorporate Romania and Bulgaria, as well as to the likely 
addition of Croatia, Turkey and the Western Balkans, the report along with that of 
MEP Marcus Pieper on Cohesion (2006), indicates that should Turkey join the EU: 
 
1) 27, 3% of the resources of the Convergence Objective will be allocated to Turkey. 
That means that Turkey could absorb about 8, 43 billion euros during a budgetary 
period of seven years. In parallel, the European Commission has also undertaken an 
initial estimation of effects on the EU budget of the Turkish accession process (Table 
5). There are in fact two scenarios. In the first scenario, the cost would rise to 16.5 
billon euros by 2025. In the second, the cost would rise to 27.6 billion euros 
(Quaisser & Wood, 2004, p. 11).   
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Table 5 
 
(European Parliament 2006, p. 16) 
 
2) Turkey will absorb about 63% of the additional Structural Funds, whilst Croatia and 
the other Western Balkan countries will absorb only 9% (Pieper 2007, p. 3). 
3) The Turkish entry in the case of an EU- 34 will bring a reduction of the European 
GDP per capita about – 10.5% (Table 6- European Parliament 2006, p. 6).   
 
Table 6 
 
(European Parliament 2006, p.6)  
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In addition to this data concerning Turkish accession to the EU as a member state, I 
also note the following: 
1) Turkish productivity is concentrated in some big cities. The problems in 
Turkish rural areas are severe. According to the European Commission's 
October 2006 Report, Turkey suffers from regional disparities. More 
specifically, according to Quaisser and Wood (2004) 
80% of its value added is produced in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other large 
cities. The richest region reaches 46% of the EU-25 average (comparable to 
Slovakia) but the poorest only 8% (p.23) 
 
Turkish accession to the EU will increase the number of people eligible to be 
covered by the Structural Funds by 33% and the areas by 39% (See Figure 7 
below). Within the EU-27, 31% of the whole population lives in regions with a 
GDP less than the average 75% of the EU GDP, which is the limit for a region to 
take part in the Structural Funds under the Convergence Objective. Upon Turkish 
accession to the EU, the population eligible under the Convergence Objective will 
be increased by 32% (Figure 8 below- European Parliament 2006, p.8). 
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Figure 7 
 
 
(European Parliament 2006, p. 8) 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the consequences of previous and future EU Enlargements (including 
Turkey) on the Structural Funds, and more accurately, on the Cohesion Fund41.  In this figure 
are reflected the increasing tendency of areas and population of the EU, which are eligible for 
absorbing funds from the Cohesion Fund. In fact, Figure 7 is a comparative figure 
demonstrating the negative consequences of the Enlargements before and after Turkey's 
possible accession to the EU. Why are the consequences negative? The answer is simple. As 
long as the areas and the population, which are eligible for absorbing funds from the 
Cohesion Fund, increase, the budget of the EU is further burdened. This is a negative 
development on the cohesion policy of the EU. The same applies to Figure 8 concerning 
regions with GDP less than 75% of the average EU GDP, which are eligible for receiving 
funds under Objective 1 (see Chapter 2.3.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
41 According to Europa Glossary the Cohesion Fund is defined as following: 
In order to speed up economic, social and territorial convergence, the European Union set up a Cohesion 
Fund in 1994. It is intended for countries whose per capita GDP is below 90% of the Community average. 
The purpose of the Cohesion Fund is to grant financing to environment and transport infrastructure 
projects. However, aid under the Cohesion Fund is subject to certain conditions. If the public deficit of a 
beneficiary Member State exceeds 3% of national GDP (EMU convergence criteria), no new project will be 
approved until the deficit has been brought under control. 
(http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/structural_cohesion_fund_en.htm). 
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Figure 8 
 
 
(European Parliament 2006, p. 8) 
 
 
A huge number of Turkish workers – up to 3-4 million - are expected to migrate 
towards other countries of the EU upon Turkish accession (Group of the EPP-ED 
2004, p. 3; Erzan, Kuzubas & Yildiz 2004). These figures are not only presented by 
the services and the Institutions of the EU but also by independent researchers. 
These researchers argue that the wave of Turkish immigration after accession to the 
EU would be between 0.4 and 4 million (Quaisser & Wood 2004, p. 11; Kalin & 
Gerras 2005, pp. 10-11).   On the one hand, Europeans are afraid of this expected 
wave of Turkish workers. On the other hand, the argument put forward by Turkey is 
that young Turkish workers could offer a solution to an ageing Europe and that 
Turkish migrants will return to their motherland when they feel economically 
comfortable (Flam 2004, pp. 183-186).  
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Table 7 
 
(European Parliament 2006, p. 10) 
 
 
 The large population of Turkey, in conjunction with the disparities between the big 
cities and the rural regions and the structural problems of the Turkish economy, 
create negative perspectives within Europe on Turkish accession to the EU. Such an 
example is reflected in Table 7 above. In this table, one can observe that in the event 
that Turkey joins the EU as full member-state, Greece, Cyprus and Slovenia will be 
excluded from the Structural Funds.   
 
 
The solution to this problem is, firstly, that structural changes should be made within 
Turkey and secondly, that the EU should insist on its own structural changes in order 
to integrate Turkey. The President of the Budgetary Committee of the European 
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Parliament, Reimer Böge, stated (2007) in the context of an interview for the 
purposes of this research that: 
The next financial perspectives are to be based on the existing rules that entered into 
force in 2013. Then, we have to agree the rules of the new financial perspectives for 
the period 20013-2020 before Turkey can become member of the EU, if it meets all 
the requirements set out  by the  EU  and if all  EU member states ratify its 
membership. Turkey amounts more than 72 million of inhabitants. Therefore, if 
Turkey joins the EU with the existing rules, then there will be countries and regions, 
especially those including in "Objective 1"42, that will not have any longer profit from 
the cohesion policy and the structural funds. Such regions are located in Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Eastern Germany. The existing framework of the financial 
perspective is not possible to finance the Turkish Enlargement. Therefore, the EU 
cannot take Turkey in unless we reform the rules of financial perspective and 
structural funds, our cohesion policy.  
  
In addition, as Böge maintained, "cohesion policy is related to absorption capacity 
and EU cohesion. The EU cannot absorb Turkey and thereby, for this and other 
reasons, the Turkish accession to the EU will bring the end of the EU"!  
 
 
 
4.7.1. The Lion’s Share 
 
The EU assists candidate and potential candidate countries in their efforts towards 
harmonisation with the acquis communautaire. The whole instrument for pre-
accession assistance is to help candidate and potential candidate states to face 
economic, social and human rights problems, and of course to face the disparities 
between big urban centres and rural regions.  
 
 
In this context, Turkey receives the lion's share of European financial aid for 
candidate and potential candidate EU member states. This club of states includes not 
only Turkey, but also Croatia and the Western Balkan Peninsula. Taking into account 
the latest strategic planning document, adopted by the European Commission on 
June 20, 2007, the financial assistance of the EU to candidate and potential 
candidate states over the period 2007-2009 amounts to 3.961 billion euros. 
                                               
42
 For more details on 'objective 1', the cohesion policy of the EU and the cohesion of the EU in general, 
see Chapter 2.   
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(Europa.eu 2007) Turkey receives 1.602 billion euros, 40.4% of the total amount of 
the European pre-accession financial aid.  Pre-accession financial aid is allocated in 
the following way:  
Turkey: 1.602 billion euros. (225 euros per capita). 
Montenegro:  97.3 million euros. (142 euros per capita).  
FYROM: 210.4 million euros. (103 euros per capita). 
Croatia: 438.5 million euros. (94.4 euros per capita).    
Kosovo: 199.1 million euros. (90.5 euros per capita).  
Albania: 212.9 million euros. (59 euros per capita).  
Serbia: 527.4 million euros.  (56.4 euros per capita).   
(Europa.eu 2007) 
        
                 
This pre-accession assistance has a multidimensional character. It constitutes a 
package aimed at helping candidate and potential candidate countries align 
themselves with the EU's laws and the acquis communautaire in general. In 
particular, this financial aid assists in establishing infrastructures and creating fertile 
ground to enable candidate and potential candidate states to harmonise their 
political, economic and institutional systems with that of the EU, and to streamline 
their entry to the EU as smoothly as possible.  
 
 
Turkey has the opportunity to absorb 40.4% of the total amount. It is an impressive 
proportion. However, it is essential to see what the Turkish Professor Emre Gönen 
stated for the purposes of this research:  
The financial support of the EU is not as impressive as it looks like. If one takes into 
consideration the budget of Turkey and its financial perspectives, the Turkish 
economic growth, the size of the country and the population, he can easily come to 
the conclusion that the financial assistance from the EU is not so large.  
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Table 8 
 (European Commission 2007c, p. 49) In the table above, one can see how financial aid to 
Turkey will be allocated in the context of the structural reforms that this candidate country 
should complete as a result of its course towards the EU.  
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4.8 The Turkish Army in the System  
 
The Turkish army plays a manifold role in both domestic and foreign affairs.  The 
army holds a significant position within the system through the powerful Institution of 
the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu), the economy and society (see 
analysis for 4.6.1 on the Turkish economy and 'statism'). The decisive role of the 
army is mainly reflected in the National Security Council. Important decisions are 
taken by this Institution; decisions which focus on foreign affairs, security and other 
crucial national issues (Őzcan, cited in Kirişci & Rubin 2001, pp. 16-20).Under the 
pressure of the EU, the Turkish government proceeded to reform  the National 
Security Council (NSC), an institution which draws its legal ground from article 118 of 
the Turkish Constitution (2001). According to this article, the National Security 
Council functions as an advisory body comprised of the Chief of General Staff, four 
main Commanders of the Turkish army, and selected members from the Council of 
Ministers (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 2001). The NSC is chaired by 
the President of the Republic and acts within the context of what the Turkish scholar 
Sakallioğlu (1997) described as, 
a double headed political system: the civilian council of ministers coexists with the 
national Security Council on the executive level, and the military system of justice 
continues to operate independently alongside the civilian justice system (p. 157). 
 
 
The NCS strengthened its status within the political system as a result of the coup 
d'état organised by the Armed Forces in 1980. In 1992, when the Turkish army’s 
political power was at its peak, the Chief of the General Staff General Doğan Güreş 
asserted: "Turkey is a military state" (cited in Őzcan 2001, pp. 16-20). 
 
 
Under pressure from the EU, the Turkish government proceeded toward reformation 
of the NSC. In July 23, 2003, these reforms were outlined in a package comprising 
seven changes. According to Morris (2006) they constitute a 'quiet revolution'. Some 
of the most significant include the following:  
a) The NSC was transformed into a consultative body. Hence, its structure 
consists of a civilian majority. 
b) It was made possible for a civilian to be appointed as Secretary General of 
the NSC. 
c) The NSC no longer has extended executive and monitoring authorities. 
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d) The NSC no longer has the authority to follow up the implementation of 
NSC's recommendations on behalf of the President and the Prime Minister. 
e) The NSC no longer has unlimited access to Civil Institutions.   
f) The NSC is no longer represented in the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video 
and Music. In 2003, after the report issued by the European Commission and 
under EU pressure on the Turkish government, the NSC was pulled out from 
some civil Institutions, such as the High Board of Radio and TV (RTUK) 
(European Commission 2003a, pp. 18-19; European Commission 2004, pp. 
21-23; European Commission 2005a, pp. 12-15).  
 
 
Regarding the NSC reforms, the Commission's Monthly Report of September 2005 
on Turkey notes the following:  
Key posts in the NSC for the first time have been given to three civilians, including 
two women. Three civilians have been appointed as head of departments to which 
Generals used to be appointed. Former Counsellor Gürsel Demirkol has been 
appointed as head of Research Department, and two women, Füsun Arslantosun for 
Press and Public Relation, and Asuman Orhan for Personnel have been appointed as 
acting heads of departments. Besides, for the first time ever, by-laws of the NCS 
concerning personnel advancement, and personnel education have been published in 
the official journal. (European Commission 2005b, p.20) 
 
 
Although some changes have occurred within the NSC, the influence of the Turkish 
army on political life remains significant and determinant. The EU continues to 
criticise the role that the army possesses within the system. The European 
Commission states in its 2005 annual report:  
Reforms concerning civil-military relations have continued, but the armed forces still 
exert significant influence by issuing public statements on political developments and 
government policies (p. 41).   
 
 
Two years later, the 2007 Report of the European Commission followed the same 
line; it criticised the stance of the army and its involvement in the secular state. 
According to the Report (2007b): 
There were several attempts by senior members of the armed forces to restrict 
academic research and public debate in Turkey, in particular on security and minority 
right issues. Furthermore, the military targeted the press on various occasions (p.9). 
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4.8.1 The Role of the Army in the Economic System 
 
The role of the Turkish army can be seen within the Turkish political system and 
more precisely through the Institutions that the army established in order to take 
over the system. To achieve this goal, the Turkish army on the one hand builds on 
the Kemalist principle of ‘étatisme’, while on the other it seizes the opportunity 
offered by privatisation to achieve deeper involvement in the Turkish economic 
system by establishing an Institution under the army's control. This Institution is the 
‘Armed Forces Pension Fund' (OYAK), founded in 1961, just after the coup d’ état in 
1960, which today has around 217 million shareholders who are obliged to 
contribute 10% of their salaries every month to the Fund (OYAK portal; Massavetas 
2007, p.23). Through this mechanism, OYAK – which functions within the system as 
an Institution –always has ready cash flow:  indeed, it achieves an annual turnover 
of 6, 6 trillion dollars. Its activities occur within the following sectors:  
1. Banking (OYKA Bank) and Insurance (OYAK Bank portal; AXA OYAK portal). 
2. Food, energy, steel and technology industries as well as cement plants. 
(OYAK cement portal; OYAK beton portal)  According to the Chief Executive 
Officer, Şerif Coşkun Ulusoy (in OYAK portal), 
the OYKA participates to the privatization that took place in 2005. 
OYAK submitted bids in the tenders for Erdemir Turprafi, and a number 
of cement factories. The steelmaker Erdemir, which has consistently 
ranked among the top biggest companies in our country, joined the 
OYAK family. In a televised bidding on 4 October 2005, OYAK won the 
tender for a 46.12% stake in Erdemir with a bid of USD 2.77 billion.  
 
On this issue, the monthly report of the European Commission of September 
2005(b) notes the following:  
46.12 percent stake of Turkey’s biggest steel-maker state-owned 
Erdemir was sold for $2.77 billion to OYAK which was one of the 
biggest item on the privatization list. OYAK had been failed in Tüpraş, 
which is Turkey's biggest oil-refinery auction but prevailed in the 
bidding for Erdemir paying $2.77 billion for the steel giant. OYAK 
Holding is a group of companies owned by the Military Personal 
Solidarity fund which has total assets of $10.7 billion in 2004, now 
with the Erdemir OYAK has become the third biggest enterprise in 
Turkey comprising about 40 companies with total assets of $15.4 
billion after KOÇ and SABANCI Holdings (p. 20) 
 
3. Automotive industry (Renault portal; Massavetas 2007, p.23). 
The ‘OYAK’ participates in the process of privatization, and constitutes, in 
fact, an economic colossus including about 40 companies. OYAK is a 
shareholder of, among others, ‘Renault’, ‘General Motors’ and ‘General 
Electric’. In 2006, ‘OYAK – Renault’ claimed 16% of the Turkish market, with 
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a turnover of 2, 2 billion euros. According to ‘Radical’ newspaper, in the last 
ten years the ‘OYAK – Renault’ car exportations totalled 6, 7 billion euros.  
(Massavetas 2007, p. 23)  
 
 
In light of this, and keeping in mind what has been already noted in Chapter 4.8, I 
conclude that the army plays a dominant role within the Turkish economic system. 
On the one hand, it employs the principle of ‘étatism’ to consolidate its prevailing 
political, social and economic presence. On the other hand it uses Turkish 
infrastructures to become one of the key players in the process of the economic and 
social changes Turkey is required to pursue as a result of its course towards the EU 
accession. 
 
 
 
4.8.2 The Black Box, the Army and the AKP     
 
The Turkish political system is similar to that of the Soviet Union, whose political 
philosophy relied on the phenomenon of the ‘black box’. This phenomenon may be 
described by noting the following characteristics: All contradictory powers are locked 
in the ‘black box’. It is like a ‘can of worms’.  Should the contradictory powers be set 
free, then the system gets in trouble and runs the risk of collapsing. The army 
constitutes the main actor controlling and keeping in its possession the key that 
opens the ‘black box’. Thus it presents itself as the depository of the system.  
 
 
In the current period, however, the army is obliged to share power with the Islamists 
of the AKP43, since the latter enjoy the support of public opinion. During the political 
crisis of 2007, both sides adopted a rational mode of action. The army could not 
conduct a military ‘coup d´ état’ as it had done in the past. On the other hand, the 
                                               
43
 The AKP won the Parliamentary elections by a majority of 46, 6%, resulting in 341 seats. The 
Republican Peoples´ Party (CHP) won 20.9% and 99 seats, and the Nationalist Movement Party (NHP) 
obtained 14.3% and 70 seats. Independent candidates were also elected, gaining 26 seats, 20 of those 
from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP); these formed their own political group. Additional 
parties represented in the Parliament included the Democratic Left Party (DSP) with 13 seats and the 
Grand Unity Party (BBP) and the Freedom of Democracy Party (ODP) with one seat each (European 
Commission 2008, p. 6). In parallel, the AKP also won the Presidential elections. Mr. Abdullah Gül was 
the first Turkish President to be elected from an Islamist party. 
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leaders of the AKP, even if they had this at the back of their mind, could not bring to 
the surface of the political system any political agenda aimed at the erosion of the 
system’s secular character. An indication of this political approach may be found in 
the statement of Tayip Erdogan on April 24, 2007 just before the August 28, 2007 
announcement of Mr Gül’s candidacy for the Presidency of the Turkish Republic. 
According to Mr. Gül, "the aim of the AKP was to serve our people and to reach the 
contemporary civilisation objective of Ataturk" (European Commission 2007d, p. 9).    
Gül himself, after his nomination, underlined his commitment to the basic principles 
of the Republic (democracy, secularism, state of law).  If the AKP acted or acts in the 
political context of threatening the secular state, it would lose the support it enjoys in 
the current period from the EU given its presentation of itself as the reformist power 
of Turkey. Besides, the AKP and the Islamists in general consider the EU to be the 
shelter which protects them from the Kemalists.    
 
 
On the other hand, if the Generals attempt to overthrow the AKP, then progress 
toward Turkish accession to the EU would run the risk of stalling. On March 31, 2008 
the Turkish Constitutional Court accepted prosecution charges against the AKP 
party, Prime Minister Tayip Erdogan, President Abdullah Gül and 69 officials of the 
party. The Court decided to try them on the allegation that the AKP had put at risk the 
secular character of the state. The stormy petrel was the Government's decision to 
authorise the headscarf in the universities. These developments sparked a new 
period of political instability. Behind the judicial power, there was the army – or at 
least, this was the international impression. Thereby, the trial was named a 'judicial 
coup d' état' (Abramowitz & Barkey 2008; Akyol, Koker & Soysal 2008). Regarding 
this development, Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that such issues should be 
discussed on a political level, not before the courts, and that a judicial intervention 
would affect Turkish accession to the EU.  At the same time, he supported AKP by 
evoking the rules and preconditions set out by the Council of Europe. These 
preconditions refer to the dissolution of a party, but according to Rehn (2008), in 
Turkey the reasons for dissolving a party do not exist (see Appendix 5). 
 
 
In that case, the army should be ready to pay the cost - whatever that entails. On the 
other hand, should the AKP attempt to 'pull the carpet' out from under the feet of the 
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Turkish army, a crisis would erupt44. In the case of a severe turbulence in political life, 
there is high risk that the country will face the nightmare of Kurdish secession. The 
Kurdish issue is thereby transformed into a political cancer for Turkey, one which 
discourages Turkish politicians from putting Turkish national interest and territorial 
integrity at risk. Finally, on July 13, 2008 the Constitutional Court took a rational 
decision. On the one hand, it imposed financial penalties on AKP, on the other hand 
it did not deprive the party's officials of their political rights (Hooper 2008; see also 
Chapter 6.5.2). 
 
 
 
4.8.2.1 The Delphic Sword 
 
The AKP presents itself as the reformist power in Turkey, one which enjoys the full 
support of the EU. Before the 2007 elections, and during the political crisis in Turkey, 
the EU sent its own message, which seemed to be a ‘Delphic Sword.’ The 
Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, set out the position of the European 
Commission in an address to both the Turkish army and the Islamists. In this 
statement, he maintained that democratic civil power will prevail over the power of 
the army. 
 
 
The declaration of the European Commission notes the following:   
The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, and the supremacy of 
democratic civilian power over the military. If a country wants to become a member of 
the Union, it needs to respect these principles. This is the core of the Copenhagen 
criteria of EU accession (Rehn 2007). 
In fact, this declaration of the European Commission supports the secular Turkish 
state, while at the same time it warns the Islamists of the AKP that they will have no 
chance to enjoy European support if they hold a secret agenda aimed at eroding the 
secular identity of the state.  
 
 
                                               
44
 The threat of a crisis is always there, if both sides do not play their political game in a rational way. 
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4.8.2.2 The Beacon of a Moderate Islam   
The EU believes that Turkey should be anchored to Europe in some way or another. 
In order to achieve this, it puts forward a policy aimed at safeguarding the secular 
character of the state. This is accomplished by establishing a modern democratic 
political system, one which could serve as a model for other Muslim countries. On 
July 4, 2007, during a speech before a conference organised by the SDP in 
Germany, Olli Rehn stated the following:  
The EU’s relationship with Turkey is a valuable way to strengthen our links with the 
Muslim world. Turkey is undergoing a difficult process of self-transformation at the 
moment. EU conditionality can help the country to see its choices clearly, and to 
emerge from this process as a stronger democracy and a more vibrant society. 
Turkey can then provide a beacon to all the moderates in the Muslim world who want 
to see their own societies open up and democracy become the normal mode of their 
politics. But to use the EU’s conditionality to help Turkey to move from modern to 
post-modern democracy, we have to ensure that the Turks know that we are serious 
about negotiating accession with them (Rehn 2007b). 
 
 
 
This statement seems to be the answer to the French policy. During the 
Intergovernmental Conference held on June 26, 2007, the French government 
rejected Chapter 17 on the Single European Currency.  Paris considered that this 
Chapter is included in the 'hard core' of European economic integration and Turkish 
membership. President Sarkozy publicly stated that there is no place for Turkey in 
the EU as a full member-state, because it does not belong to Europe. The French 
President offered Turkey two options: first, the status of a 'privileged partnership', and 
second, the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean in which Turkey could 
participate as a full member state (Seale 2008; Driss 2008; Schmid 2008). 
 
 
Therefore, the main European goal is not to blow the 'black box' up. On the contrary, 
the European states believe that the reforms required by the EU in the context of 
Turkish accession to the EU can depressurise the Turkish political system before it 
explodes.    
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4.8.2.3 Risks and Human Rights  
 
Returning to the concept of the 'black box,' it should be noted that some Turkish 
politicians are afraid that democratisation and Europeanisation could place the 
country at risk if Turkey does not, in the end, obtain the legal status of full member 
(European Parliament 2006b). They also fear that the Turkish state could run the risk 
of dissolution.  Their fears are based on the following line of reasoning: the territorial, 
social and national cohesion of Turkey, which appears to be a multiethnic and multi-
religious mosaic, is actually based on the 'democratic deficit'45 and on the role that 
the army plays in the system as a depository of  Kemalist precepts and principles, 
especially that of nationalism. The implementation of human rights is likely to bring 
problems to the political surface; problems that the Turkish establishment was trying 
to conceal. As a result, minority, religious and women's rights -to name but three- are 
not fully respected by the state. Indeed, a constant breach of human rights is 
recorded in the reports of the European Parliament and the European Commission. It 
is illustrative that the Turkish penal code has had to be amended. Article 301 of this 
code provoked negative reactions from Europeans and was viewed as challenging 
the democratic system of values. This article, which referred to the concept of 
'Turkishness', offered the opportunity to extremist lawyers, politicians or even public 
prosecutors to turn against journalists, the press in general and the spiritual elite 
(European Commission 2007, p.14).  
 
 
On April 30, 2008 the Turkish National Assembly amended article 301 as follows: 
a) The word 'Turkishness' was replaced by 'Turkish nation'. That is, the key phrase is 
no longer 'insulting Turkishness', but rather 'insulting the Turkish nation.' 
                                               
45
 The first use of the term 'democratic deficit' can be found in the German publication JEF Manifesto in 
1977. The phrase, however, has been attributed to British MEP Bill Newton Dunn who used the term in 
a pamphlet in the 1980s (Wikipedia). According to Sanford Levinson "a 'democratic deficit' occurs when 
ostensibly democratic organisations or Institutions in fact fall short of fulfilling what are believed to be the 
principles of democracy" (cited in Wikipedia). The term ‘democratic deficit' is employed by the US in the 
context of addressing gaps within  the American democratic system and avoiding problems in the 
functioning of this political system. It is also used in reference to the UN, an organisation that has no 
directly elected representatives (Moravcsik 2004; Follesdal & Hix 2005).  
In the context of this project, the term 'democratic deficit’ is understood as the existing gap between the 
reality of EU institutional functioning and decision-making processes on the one hand, and beliefs about 
or understanding of these Institutions and decisions by EU citizens on the other. That is, it refers to a 
lack of communication between European public opinion and the elite on how EU Institutions and 
processes actually function. The 'democratic deficit' reflects a lack of political and even legal legitimacy. 
For example, the only institution of the EU directly elected by the European citizens is the European 
Parliament, whose authority, competence and effectiveness is much less than those of the national 
parliaments. Therefore, the 'democratic deficit' is also connected to the full respect of democratic 
principles and values. For this reason, the term is not limited to the EU and regional European 
integration, but concerns as well the degree of democracy within a state.  
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b) The permission of the Minister of Justice is now required in order to file a case on 
this issue. 
c) The maximum penalty for such a violation has been reduced from three years to 
two. 
 
 
The EU welcomed these amendments as a first step towards Turkey's harmonisation 
with the democratic system of values. As Commissioner Rehn stated on April 30, 
2008, "this is a step forward." At the same time, he added that he is waiting for 
further steps and changes on similar articles in order to ensure that unfounded 
prosecutions will stop (Today's Zaman 2008). Joost Lagendijk welcomed the 
amendment of article 301 but made clear that, "this will not win the beauty contest of 
the legal reforms" (Today's Zaman 2008). That is, Turkey should do more. On the 
other hand, some MEPs, such as Jacques Toubon, were more severe in their 
comments on and criticism of article 301. Mr. Toubon asserted, during the Plenary 
Session of the European Parliament on May 21, 2008, just one month before the 
official ratification of the amendment on article 301 that the content of this 
amendment was not enough. 
 
 
Democracy, economy, human rights and corruption are factors affecting the cohesion 
of the EU.  Documents evaluating Turkish accession to the EU give evidence of 
Turkey’s 'democratic deficit' in the following areas: 
1. Violation of human rights. According to the European Commission report 
(2007) of the European Commission, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) "delivered a total of 330 judgments finding that Turkey had violated at 
least one article of the ECHR. More than two thirds of the applications before 
the ECHR refer to the right of fair trial and the protection of property rights" 
(p.12). This report  also stresses that: 
there have been no developments as regarding the Institutions in charge of 
monitoring and promoting human rights. These Institutions such as the 
Human Rights Presidency, lack independence and resources…. There is a 
lack of prompt, impartial and independent investigations into allegations of 
human rights violations by number of security forces (p. 60). 
 
 
2. Corruption.  An example is the statement of MEP Ria Oomen-Ruitjen, the 
Rapporteur of the European Parliament for the Turkish accession to the EU, 
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who alleged that corruption is one of the main problems in Turkey.46 A 
relevant paragraph (35) appears in the Oomen- Ruijten report (2008) as well 
as in the European Commission progress reports (2008, p.29; 2007b p.14).  
In the latter it is stated that corruption is related to the violation of fundamental 
human rights and the judiciary system. Among other matters, the report 
maintains that "there was no progress on the development of anti-corruption 
strategy." It adds that: "no public body is in charge of collecting data and 
statistics on corruption" (European Commission 2007b, p. 11). Moreover, the 
reports stresses that there is no overall National Reform Strategy for the 
judiciary, nor are there plans to implement such reforms (European 
Commission 2007b, p. 59; Bryane 2004, pp. 19-23). The Diagnostic 
Household of Istanbul created a table to delineating the sectors affected by 
corruption. The aim was to measure corruption in Turkey and to compare the 
results with those in other countries.  The sectors affected by corruption 
include the following: traffic policy, customs, tax inspectors, land registry, 
municipalities, non-traffic police, public hospitals, courts, primary and 
secondary schools.  In addition to these areas, I would add the army, which 
was excluded from the table. It has been already mentioned how the army 
employs ‘étatisme’ in the context of the ‘rent seeking’ phenomenon, with the 
goal of accruing political profit and presenting Kemalism as the saviour of the 
Turkish nation and of the political system (Bryane 2004 p. 20). The remedy to 
corruption is the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria. Institutions must 
guarantee democracy, rule of law and functionality of economy, and must 
successfully carry out the obligations linked to Turkish accession to the EU. 
Within the context of these obligations, Turkey should "adopt a number of 
international conventions making bribery a civil and/or a criminal offence in 
domestic legislation" (Bryane 2004, p.20). 
 
3. Lack of respect for minority and religious rights. According to European 
Commission report (2007b) on Turkish accession to the EU, "the Circular 
acknowledges that there has been an increase in individual crimes against 
non Muslim citizens."   The report also notes that restrictions on the training of 
the clergy as well as on their property rights remain (pp.16, 17, 23, 60). 
 
                                               
46
 Statement made on 11.3.2008 during the EPP-ED Preparatory Meeting of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. 
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4. Lack of respect for freedom of expression. An indication of this inadequate 
respect for freedom of expression may be seen in the 2007 assassination of 
Hrant Dink47 in Istanbul.  The handling of this case has made clear the 
problems existing in the judicial sector. Until now, the Turkish justice system 
has not delivered a decision and the procedure has been stigmatised by 
negative developments (European Commission 2008 p. 29). The 2007 report 
on the Turkish accession to the EU notes that "the number of persons who 
were prosecuted almost doubled in 2006."  The main reason for this 
phenomenon is rooted in article 301 of the penal code prohibiting the insulting 
of Turkishness   (European Commission 2007b, p.16). 
 
5. Lack of respect for women’s and children’s rights. According to the 2007 
European Commission report, the Law of Protection of the Family, whose 
definition of family includes family members living separately, has been 
amended.  However, problems persist: 
The access to reliable data for these types of crimes continues to be 
problematic. More shelters for the victims should be established. At the same 
time training for law enforcement bodies, judges and prosecutors should be 
stepped up (European Commission 2007, p.18). 
 
One example of the lack of respect for children’s rights is child labour – a 
major problem for Turkish society. "A child survey revealed a decrease in the 
proportion of working children, from 10.3% in 1999 to 5.6% in 2006" 
(European Commission 2007, p.19).    Although the statistical data show a 
decrease in child labour, children face obstacles in accessing health and 
education services.  As the report stresses (2007), "shortcomings remain in 
the labour law and its implementation and the national recourses allocated to 
tackle child labour are insufficient" (p. 19). 
 
6. Violation of cultural rights. The report of the European Commission (2007) 
states that no progress has been made in the area of cultural rights. 
Expressing oneself in a language other than Turkish remains illegal in political 
life, and no steps have been taken to amend the law on foreigners residing 
and travelling in Turkey. Such law contains discriminatory provisions (p.22). 
 
                                               
47
 Hrant Dink (1954-2007) was a Turkish -Armenian editor, journalist, and columnist. As editor-in-chief of 
the bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos , Dink was a prominent member of the Armenian 
minority in Turkey. Dink was best known for advocating Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and human and 
minority rights in Turkey. Hrant Dink was assassinated in Istanbul in January 2007, accusingly by Ogün 
Samast, a 17-year old Turkish nationalist. 
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All these problems mentioned above compose the mosaic of the 'democratic deficit.' 
This deficit results from the principles of Kemalism, including Nationalism, 
Republicanism and Secularism.  The Turkish state was founded on the concept of 
Secularism. Although Secularism advocates respect for religious and minority rights, 
in Turkey both have been systematically violated. Kemalism was highly effective at 
keeping Turkey in cohesion.  However, political, economic and social realities have 
changed dramatically. Therefore, Kemalism should be reformed if Turkey intends to 
respond to the new contemporary era.   Its principles do not comply with those of the 
EU, and indeed are considered a threat to the cohesion of the EU. For this reason, 
the EU evaluates Turkey’s progress within these and other sectors. 
 
 
One of the most important points to be made is this: no serious progress can be 
made in Turkish accession negotiations unless Turkey achieves political stability. 
This was the conclusion of the European Commission and other EU Institutions such 
as the European Parliament. Certainly, Turkey can not join the EU while the Turkish 
armed forces play a key role in ruling the country. Turkey’s army is the second 
largest force in NATO and the largest in Europe.  If Turkey joins the EU, it will have 
the opportunity to play a key role within the Institutions of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP)48. Europeans therefore have real reason to be concerned 
about the power and influence of the Turkish army.  
 
 
 
4.9 Turkey in the European Security and Defence Policy    
 
The European Defence System stands on two feet. The one is NATO, which plays a 
global catalytic role in security issues due to the experiences and prestigious 
                                               
48
 According to the official website of the European Commission (www.ec.europa.eu) :  
The CFSP was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the 1993 Treaty on European 
Union signed at Maastricht ... and since then there have been numerous developments in CFSP. It has 
been agreed to embark on a common security and defence policy (CESDP) within the overall framework of 
the CFSP... The European Council at Laeken of 14-15 December 2001 adopted a declaration on the 
operational capability of the ESDP, officially recognising that the Union is now capable of conducting some 
crisis management operations.  
The Amsterdam Treaty spells out five fundamental objectives of CFSP: a) to safeguard the common 
values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of 
the United Nations Charter ; b) to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; c) to preserve peace and 
strengthen international security; d) to promote international co-operation; e) to develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
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character that it gained during the Cold War. The other is that of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). NATO and the EU have established a 
structural dialogue aimed at finding a formula for coexistence. It is in this context that 
the US has acquired a dominant leading role in the European and global system.  
Throughout the years NATO and Europe have created many concrete links of 
interdependences; these have been transformed to links of dependence which favour 
American national interests.  Turkey was a devoted ally of the US and an important 
NATO state, especially during the Cold War era (Ifestos 1999, pp. 23 -24).   
 
 
 
4.9.1 Traditional Power   
  
 Turkey could be considered a traditional military power. During the Cold War, it 
acquired an essential role within NATO as a result of its pivotal geo-strategic and 
geopolitical location.  Thereafter, Turkey built a strong and reliable army and 
employed it as a methodological tool for achieving the following goals:  
•     Becoming an indispensable ally of the US during the Cold War era 
and beyond, continuing into the current period, in which a volatile 
political environment still exists, especially in the sensitive Caucasus 
region49 (Larrabee & Lesser 2003, pp: 162-163). Its military strength 
and strategic location offer Turkey the opportunity to play a key role 
in the diplomatic arena. In the current period, Turkey prospects to 
revive its historic role in a new version of the silk – road, by 
presenting itself as the bridge between Asia and Europe and a 
crucial geopolitical oil crossroad (Larrabee & Lesser 2003, pp. 99-
108; Turkish Foreign Ministry 2007d; Robertson 2001a). 
• Confirming that the Turkish army is the guarantor of the territorial 
integrity and the depository of the Turkish secular state (see Chapter 
4.8). 
• Using its military forces to participate in international operations 
organised by NATO, the ESDP and others operations under the 
auspices of the UN and within the context of peace-keeping 
missions (Turkish Foreign Ministry 2008a).      
 
                                               
49
 See also the crisis in Georgia (8-12 August 2008). 
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Turkey is a member state of NATO and a candidate state of the EU. Official figures 
from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed during an official presentation 
of the Turkish delegation at the European Commission in Brussels on October 6, 
2006,50 give an idea of the army’s spending allowance. According to the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008a, see Appendix 6), the entire Turkish National 
Defence budget is 6.406.436 billion euros. This amount represents 6.81% of the 
entire national budget, one of the highest in Europe. These figures show that for the 
Turkish political system, investments in the army sector are of great importance. 
Indeed, Turkey uses its army in order to serve both domestic and external interests 
and needs. Such interests and needs are focused on Turkey's aspiration to play a 
key role in the international field and consolidate itself as a regional power (Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008b).                    
 
 
 
 4.9.2. US, NATO and ESDP   
 
The political developments in the Post Cold War era seem to have moved beyond 
the Turkish political system, which remains faithful to Kemalism and thereby runs the 
risk of missing the European train. The end of the Cold War created a new 
momentum. At the same time, as Europeans took further steps towards European 
integration, they also undertook to establish a more independent and reliable 
European security and defence system. The ESDP is an EU Institution responding to 
the needs of the new era. However, Turkey does not belong to the EU. 
Consequently, Ankara was concerned that the ESDP would progressively replace 
NATO and that Turkey would be excluded from the European Security and Defence 
Policy.  According to Ambassador Marc Otte, former Head of ESDP Task Forces in 
the Council Secretariat of the EU, the time has come for the EU to "develop its own 
security needs and the means to defend itself"  (Gerry 2001, p. 26).  Meanwhile, the 
US gave the green light to the restructuring of the European security system in the 
context of the ESDP. The former Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, stated 
the following:  
Strengthening the EU does not mean that NATO will lose its central role in European 
security, nor will the transatlantic security link will be weakened. On the contrary, 
when the long-sought European security identity comes to fruition, Europe and North 
                                               
50
 The presentation took place in the context of the screening of Chapter 31 on Turkey's participation in 
CFSP/ ESDP]. Turkey needs to fulfil 35 Chapters in order to become full member-state of the EU.  
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion 
 
114                                                                                         Ioannis Charalambides    
America will still be working together, only through more flexible arrangements and 
with more capability at hand (Robertson 2001b, p. 30).    
 
 
In January 1, 2007 the EU, in the context of the ESDP and responding to the 
Petersberg51 tasks, established 'battle groups'52 with full operational capacity to 
promote the following aims: 
•  To undertake military and civilian operations, either autonomously or in the 
event of joint action between EU and NATO (Terzi 2002, pp: 44-46). 
• To prevent conflicts, to manage crises, including humanitarian operations, 
peacemaking and joint disarmament operations, and to combat terrorism with 
the support and participation of third countries. (Sanberk 2001; Council of the 
EU 2006). The ESDP takes action by using NATO capabilities and strategic 
planning in situations which NATO has no intention of engaging in (2002 
Terzi, p.46). 
 
 
The EU and the ESDP have no adequate infrastructure with which to carry out their 
military, civil and humanitarian missions in the context of led operations and ´battle 
groups´ (Council of the EU 1999a). Thus, should the EU wish to conduct its 
operations successfully, two conditions are required. First, it is obliged in some cases 
to get the green light from NATO, of which Turkey is a member state with the right of 
veto.  Second, it may need to invite Third countries and especially its candidate 
states to participate and contribute to the operations (Terzi 2001, p. 47; Council of 
the EU 2001, NATO IMS Press Release 2001). 
 
 
According to a military attaché in Brussels (2007)53:  
                                               
51
 The Petersberg tasks are those military tasks of humanitarian peacekeeping nature that both the EU 
and Western European Union (WEU) are empowered to follow. They were created in June 1992 at 
Hotel Petersberg near Bon in Germany.  The Petersberg tasks constitute a list of military and security 
priorities of the EU Security and Defence policy.   
52
 The idea of establishing ‘battle groups’ within the EU was launched at the European Council summit 
on 10-11 of December 1999 in Helsinki. This issue was also touched upon during the Franco - British 
Summit in February 2003 in 'Le Touquet'. At that summit the EU considered as priority the need to 
improve its rapid response capabilities in order to have the opportunity to deploy land, sea and air forces 
within 5-10 days. In the framework of the next Franco - Brutish summit, which took place in November 
2003, the member states decided that the EU should be able to deploy forces within 15 days in 
responding to a UN request.  In February, 10 2004 France, Germany and the United Kingdom drafted a 
document proposing a number of ‘battle groups’ consisting of about 1500 personnel and able to be 
deployed within 15 days. The whole plan was approved in November 2004 and the first thirteen ‘battle 
groups’ were pledged.            
53
 Because of his position this military attaché only agreed to give a confidential interview, without 
mentioning his name. For reliability purposes, his testimony was crossed-checked with other sources in 
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In the case of a military operation falling within the military operation of the EU and 
more precisely in the ‘Battle Groups’, not only the Member states but also Third states 
can be invited and contribute to the military operation. The Decisions are taken by the 
European Council and the invited Third state has no vote on the decisions and on the 
implementation of the schedule and the operation (Terzi 2002, p. 47; Council of the 
EU 2001). Theoretically and practically it has no vote (Terzi 2002, p. 54). However, 
beyond typical and legal aspect, there is the political aspect too. Turkey and any other 
invited countries can enjoy the support of friendly countries that take into account the 
Turkish interests (Council of the EU 2001, Terzi 2002, pp. 47-50, 55). Besides, 
although Turkey has legally no right of vote, the Council should logically take on 
board its views and interests under the status of the invited country. Thus, Turkey has 
a political say through member states whose national interests are in line with its own. 
Since member states invite  Turkey or any other Third country to participate in the 
'Battle Groups', this initiative means that the member states of the EU -or at least 
some of them- should respect Turkey and its interest if they do not contradict those of 
the EU or of its member states.                       
 
 
Turkey is not a member-state of the EU. However, it is a member state of NATO with 
the right of veto. In this context, should Turkish interests impose it, Ankara can use 
its right of veto (Terzi 2002, p. 56). Certainly, the use of the Turkish veto is not only 
related to the Turkish national interests but, also, to the American ones.   
 
 
In any case, Turkey has two options: Either block the allowance of NATO assets to 
the EU or get involved in a diplomatic process of 'trading off,' predicting that by 
threatening to use its veto it will get an 'equivalent exchange'. Turkey has already 
proven that it knows the 'trade off' game very well. In 2002, "in order to voice its 
concerns, Turkey chose to veto the EU’s use of strategic NATO assets" (Terzi 2002, 
p. 53). At the end, NATO and the EU reached an agreement reflected in a document 
bearing the title, 'ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the involvement of 
the non-EU European Allies'. This document paved the way to the North Atlantic 
Council of the December 13, 2002 where EU- NATO cooperation was decided upon, 
and to the EU-NATO joint Declaration of December, 13 2002  (Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2008c).   
 
 
During that period, Turkey's "contribution to the EU’s Headline Goal stands as the 
sixth largest contribution in total" (Hurriyet, in Terzi 2002, p. 53). In the current period, 
Turkish contributions remain important. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
(2008c):  
                                                                                                                                       
order to examine if what he stated was in line with legal documents of the EU (see also Chapter 3.4.1- 
Methodology). 
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Turkey is making a significant contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA, including to its civilian 
aspect. In total, her contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA comes to nearly 255 personnel. 
Furthermore, Turkey has 4 police officers deployed to the EU Police Mission in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey also contributed one police officer to the EU Police 
Mission in Kinshasa, plans to send one police officer to the EUPOL-COPPS Mission 
in Palestine and is also considering participating in the EU Border Assistance Mission 
in Rafah/Palestine. Turkey has also participated in the EU’s EUFOR RD Kongo 
mission aimed at assisting the UN in the Democratic Republic of Kongo, with one 
Turkish C-130 aircraft and its crew deployed in Gabon. Turkey declared her readiness 
to contribute to the EU Battle Groups in November 2004. Turkey will provide both 
troops and capabilities to the Italian led Battle group which will be assigned to the EU 
for the second half of 2010.  
 
 
 Due to its crucial contribution, Turkey’s influence over the ESDP is not trivial.  
Certainly, the Turkish impact on ESDP should be seen within the spectrum of Turkish 
military contribution globally, including its role in International Peace -Keeping 
Activities through: 1) UN Operations, 2) NATO, 3) Led Operations in the Balkans, 4) 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and 5) NATO Training 
Mission in Iraq (Turkish Foreign Ministry 2008a -Appendix 6).   
 
 
By definition, Turkish accession to the EU is related to Turkish participation in the 
common European security policy and European Institutions as a full and equal 
member enjoying the right to vote. The US wants Turkey to join the EU for its own 
national interests. As the President of the EU- Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee, Joost Lagendijk (2007), stated:  
The US is strongly in favour of the Turkish entry as a member of the EU. The Prime 
Ministers of Italy and Spain, Berlusconi and Aznar, who were then in power (2004) 
said publicly that they did not like this US pressure… So they made clear to the 
Americans: "do not push us too much…"   
 
On this point Mr Lagendijk (2007) explained why the US supports the Turkish 
accession to the EU:  
• It argues that since Turkey is already a member of NATO, why should it not 
become a member of the EU?  
• It wants to see a democratic and stable Turkey.  
 
 
Certainly there is another side of the coin.  One view asserts that the US may use 
Turkey as its 'Fifth Phalanx' or ‘Trojan Horse’ within the EU (Kalin and Gerras 2005, 
p.17). Other political views articulate that Turkey is an important actor for regional, 
even global security and as such, it is indispensable for the fulfilment of EU's 
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ambition to play a global role in foreign and security affairs (Kalin and Gerras 2005, 
pp. 5-6; Rubin, 2005, p. 1).Indeed, this is Joost Lagendijk´s (2007) point: "Turkey is 
indispensable for NATO, why can not it be indispensable for the EU"?  
 
 
However, the strategic game is not so simple. The US supports the Turkish 
accession to the EU but, at the same time, creates fertile ground for the upgrading of 
the Kurdish role in the region, especially after the Turkish refusal to permit American 
troops to pass through Turkish territory to invade Iraq.  In northern Iraq, the Kurds 
have established their own autonomous region with American blessings. Turkey 
considers this region as a basis of Kurdish military operations and as a permanent 
threat to its soft belly (de Benderm 2008).  On the one hand, the US pushes Turkey 
to the EU, and on the other it puts a Kurdish stiletto into the Turkish back.  
Turkey is an important country for the Common European Security and Defence 
Policy for the following reasons:  
• Turkey has the second largest army in NATO and the largest army in the 
EU.  
• Turkey has an embattled army always ready to take action.  
• Turkey has a very important and dominant geopolitical and geo-strategic 
location in the region of Eurasia. 
• Turkey is a big contributor to the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP and NATO) and to UN led operations.    
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Table 9 
 
Rank   Flag Nation   
Active 
Service 
Personnel   
Reserve 
Force   
Paramilitary   Total   
Active 
troops per 
thousand 
citizens   
1 
 
People's 
Republic 
of China 
2,255,000 800,000 3,969,000 7,024,000 1.71 
2 
 
United 
States 
1,426,026 1,458,500 53,000 2,937,526 4.76 
3 
 
India 1,325,000 1,155,000 1,293,300 3,773,300 1.20 
4 
 
North 
Korea 
1,106,000 4,700,000 189,000 5,995,000 49.03 
5 
 
Russia 1,037,000 2,400,000 359,100 3,796,100 7.24 
6 
 
South 
Korea 
687,000 4,500,000 22,000 5,209,000 14.20 
7 
 
Pakistan 619,000 528,000 302,000 1,449,000 3.72 
8 
 
Iran 545,000 350,000 11,390,000 12,285,000 11.74 
9 
 
Turkey 514,850 380,000 148,700 1,043,550 7.03 
 (Wikipedia 2008) 
In this table, one can observe that indeed, Turkey possesses the ninth biggest army globally, 
the second biggest in NATO after the US, the biggest army in the EU in the context of the 
Western Security Institutions and the second largest in the Old Continent after Russia. 
Therefore Turkey is a pivotal country for European and international security issues because 
of its geo-strategic and geopolitical position and the large size of its army.  
 
 
Turkish accession to the EU falls under the question of whether Turkey can bring 
structural changes to the European Security and Defence Policy. If one considers 
that the political word of a member state is defined by its strength and contribution to 
the ESDP, then if Turkey becomes a full member state of the EU, it could play a 
leading role within the ESDP. Should Turkey have a strong say on defence and 
security issues, then Ankara will also have a strong political say on issues of foreign 
affairs, since defence and foreign policy are the two sides of the same coin. The main 
issue is that should Turkey join the EU as a full member-state, redistribution of power 
will occur and a new balance of power will be shaped. Turkey has a strong powerful 
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army, while the EU has developed a 'soft, power' army.  In light of this, the big bet is 
whether both sides could find a way to couple their different types of military strength 
and mentality.  At the same time relevant questions must be raised: are the leading 
countries of the EU ready to share European power with Turkey?  Is the cohesion of 
the EU under threat as a result of the redistribution of power? 
 
 
Map 1 
                                  Major Pipeline System and Projects  
              
                                             CEYHAN TERMINAL 
    (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 2008d) 
This map demonstrates the importance of the Turkish geopolitical and geo-strategic position 
on regional and global levels. It explains why Turkey positions itself as a regional power, a 
geopolitical bridge between Europe and Asia and an energy crossroad. At the same time, it 
shows why advocates of Turkish accession to the EU consider Turkey as an indispensable 
actor, should the EU wish to play a global role. This would play to Turkey’s great advantage 
within the context of accession to the EU. However, it also stands as a disadvantage, if we 
take into account that leading countries of the EU are not ready to share the power they enjoy 
in the EU with Turkey.       
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4.10 The Institutional Power of Turkey in the EU  
 
Turkey is currently the largest country in Europe. If Turkey joins the EU as a full 
member state, it will be the largest country both in Europe and in the EU.  The 
Turkish population is currently estimated to be 73.792 million (European Commission 
2008, p. 35).  By 2025, Turkey's population will reach 87 million (Neuwahl and 
Kabaalioglu 2006, p. 76). The size of a state is a decisive factor of its institutional 
power within the EU. The political discussion on the capability of the EU to absorb 
new member states sparked by the Enlargement process is based on the following 
question: whether the Enlargements will lead the EU towards regional integration or 
towards a Babylon state.  
 
 
Whether or not the EU can absorb new member states– its absorption capacity - is of 
great importance in relation to the functionality of the EU, as well as to its economic, 
social and political cohesion. This issue is closely connected to the institutional 
reforms indispensable to the operational ability of an enlarged EU. Two conditions 
create fertile ground for the establishment within the EU of an institutional and 
political system based on the classical hierarchy of an international system structured 
according to the principles of Realism: on the one hand, the abolition of veto, which 
symbolises the legal equality between the member-states; on the other hand, the 
implementation - in same cases - of the 'weighted vote.' The needs of the EU 
resulting from the process of Enlargement guide the EU, in theory, to regional 
integration and in practice, back to the political rules of Realism. That is, they guide 
the EU back to the hierarchy of an international system based on the power of each 
member state (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 115-127a). 
 
 
It is in this context that Turkey aspires to become a full EU member-state. The 
question is whether the leading counties of the EU will wish to share with Turkey -a 
Muslim country with different culture, mentality and even different system of values - 
not only the EU’s military power but also its institutional power54.  
 
 
                                               
54
 On this point, note that institutional power in general is also related to military power, as the ESDP is 
an integral part of the European institutional system.      
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In the event that Turkey joins the EU as a full member-state, it will be in possession 
of:   
• The second largest number of MEPs at the European Parliament after 
Germany, due to its population size.  
• Strong political say in the context of the ESDP. Turkey has: a) the second 
largest army in NATO and the largest within the EU, b) an important geo-
strategic and geo-political role as a bridge between Asia and Europe and c) 
embattled troops, as a result of its ongoing conflict with the Kurdish regions. 
The embattled troops offer Turkey the experience and capability needed to 
contribute to the operations of the EU as well as to the building up of the 
ESDP.  
• Strong political say in the European Council and the European Commission55.    
 
 
Richard Βaldwin and Mika Widgrén (2005) have elaborated scenarios on the basis of 
a particular methodology to examine the absorption capacity of the EU in 
conjunction, among others, to Turkey's power and its contribution to the EU after its 
accession to the EU. For the purposes of their research, they name the measures 
that they use the Normalised Banzhhaf index (NBI) and the Shapley-Sjubik Index 
(SSI). These indices test how likely it is that a nation will find itself in a position of 
breaking a winning coalition on a randomly selected issue, and therefore how 
influential a country is likely to be. More concretely, the NBI assumes that each 
possible coalition has the same probability of occurrence. According to the 
researchers:  
This makes all the winning coalitions equally likely as well and the measurement of 
power is simply counting the score of breaking positions for each player. To derive 
a relative measure of power this is then divided by the total number of scores. Of 
course, on particular issues various countries may be much more or much less 
powerful -especially if they are part of a like-minded group, but the NBI has recently 
proved its worth, especially as unbribeable tool in assessing and designing voting 
rules (Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p.2)  
 
                                               
55
 The European Commission is, by definition, an institution which has been established to serve the 
common European interests. At the same time, the European Commission is also always under 
pressure to serve the national interests of the member-states. The common European interest is 
comprised of convergent national interests. At the same time, the leading countries in particular attempt 
to identify their national interests with the common European ones. Therefore, politically and practically 
speaking, in the context of the 'power game' the most powerful member-states can exercise their 
influence over the European Commission. If Turkey joins the EU, it will be one of the most powerful 
member-states.  
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This study examines the effect of Turkish accession to the EU in the context of the 
voting rules of the Treaty of Nice (weighted vote) on the one hand and of the 
Constitutional Treaty (double majority) on the other. The researchers draw the 
following conclusions:  
• If the voting rules of the Constitutional Treaty had come into effect, Turkish 
accession to the EU would have had “relatively small impact” on the EU's 
capacity to act (Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, p 8). However, were the EU 
functioning under the Nice Treaty, then an enlarged Europe of 27 to 29 
member-states would substantially reduce the EU-25's ability to act. 
According to the analysts, "our findings confirm that the enlarged EU cannot 
function well under the Nice Treaty rules" (Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, p.8). 
Indeed, the researchers note the necessity of institutional reform in the event 
that the Constitutional Treaty was rejected (Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, p.8).  
• If the Constitutional Treaty had been adopted in the context of a new 
institutional reform, then all member states within an EU of 29 states, with the 
exception of Germany and Turkey, would lose power. Moreover, the leading 
countries would lose more of their power than the small countries. The 
researchers give the following example:  "the power loss of France under the 
Nice rules is something like seven times larger than power loss of Malta" 
(Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, p.8). At the same time, Turkey would be - in the 
framework of the Constitutional Treaty - one of the most powerful member-
states, the second most powerful after Germany (figure 1 below). Under the 
Nice Treaty, Turkey would be also one of the most powerful member states of 
the EU, together with Germany, France and Britain (Baldwin & Widgrén 2005, 
p.8). 
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Figure 9 
 
(Baldwin and Widgren 2005, p. 6) 
This figure illustrates the redistribution and reshaping of power after Turkish accession to the 
EU. If the rules of the Constitutional Treaty had come into force Turkey would have been the 
second most powerful country of the EU. The Constitutional Treaty was rejected and was 
replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon. However, even this reformed Treaty was turned down by 
Ireland on June 13, 2008. 
 
 
Turkish accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of power within the EU. Turkey 
will be in the club of the leading countries. Baldwin and Widgrén note in their 
conclusions that 
under either the Nice or the CT voting rules, Turkey would be the second most 
powerful member of the EU- 29. Under the CT rules, Turkey would be substantially 
more powerful than France, Italy and the UK, while under Nice rules the power 
differences among those countries with populations of 50 million or more would be 
small (Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p. 9, see Figure 2).  
 
On this point, they prophetically note the following: "plainly, this might decrease the 
acceptability of the Constitutional Treaty or Turkey's membership (or both)" (Baldwin 
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and Widgrén 2005, p.9). In fact, the Turkish accession to the EU is considered as 
one of the reasons for the French and Dutch 'no' to the Constitutional Treaty. Going 
one step further, in accordance with  some statistical estimations, one comes to the 
conclusion that if Turkey is to surpass Germany "becoming  the largest country in 
about 2020, then it will be the most powerful  country of the EU" (Flam 2004, p. 177).   
 
On the other hand, some other analysts argue that: 
Germany and Turkey will be strong player but unable to block proposals even 
together… However, to block a decision, they need the votes of another strong player 
or the votes of other medium and small countries. At the same time, the leading 
countries can not take decision by their own due to the fact that their votes are not 
enough since they also need the majority of the European population"  (Hughes 2004, 
p. 3; Neuwahl and Kabaalioglu 2006, p. 76).  
 
The essence of this political position is the following:  both Turkey and all the strong 
players of the EU have casting votes regarding decision-making. Therefore, Turkey 
will be one of the most powerful countries and as such it could catalytically:  
a) Influence the decisions taken on the level of the European Council.  
b) Participate in the winning-vote process. The power of a member state does not 
focus only on its capacity to block a decision but also on its contribution to the 
procedure of a winning vote. This contribution is proportional to the power of each 
state and to the coalition that this state can obtain in the context of the European 
Council mechanism.  Therefore, leading countries can play an increased political role 
in the EU.  If Turkey becomes the biggest country of the EU, then institutionally, it will 
also be the most powerful.                                       
 
 
The scenarios referred to are still valid, since the decision of the European Council 
on June 22, 2007 paved the way to the voting on the Reformed Treaty or Treaty of 
Lisbon, signed on December 14, 2007. The new Treaty endorsed the same voting 
procedure provided for in the Treaty of the European Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon 
2007). The figures and elements of Baldwin and Widgren’s research are employed to 
infer conclusions on the blocking votes and the political and institutional power of 
each member state. However, the result of the referendum which took place on June 
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13, 2008 in Ireland was negative. The Irish voted ‘no,’ and therefore the Treaty of 
Lisbon remains pending56.      
 
 
Figure 10 
 
(Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p. 6) 
 
This figure, which envisages an EU of 29 states, shows the balance of power which might 
ensure between the EU member-states, including Turkey. The figure also demonstrates how 
powerful each member-state would be in the context of the Treaty of Nice versus the 
Constitutional Treaty. The figure clearly shows that if Turkey joins the EU under the rules of 
the Constitutional Treaty it would be the second most powerful country of the EU. However, 
the Constitutional Treaty does not exist anymore. It was replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which was rejected by the Irish on June 13, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
56
 Even if changes will be made on the Treaty of Lisbon, it will be difficult to overturn its essence. 
Therefore, the power sharing on the institutional level will remain more or less the same. In any case, if 
Turkey joins the EU it will also join in the 'club 'of the leading EU countries.  
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Table 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p. 10) 
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Table 11 
 
 
(Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, p. 11) 
By observing tables A1 and A2 above, one can see how the researchers measured the 
institutional power of the member states of the EU, first under the Nice rules and second 
under the Constitutional Treaty rules. It is obvious that if Turkey becomes a full member-state 
of the EU, it will belong to the club of the leading countries, and will indeed be the second 
most powerful country of the EU. 
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4.11 Conclusion  
 
In analysing the data regarding the Turkish accession to the EU, I come to a number 
of conclusions:  
a) Kemalism can not lead Turkey to the EU. Turkey needs to make profound 
structural changes if it wishes to achieve accession. On the other hand, the EU 
should be ready to implement structural changes of its own if it really wants Turkey to 
join as a full member-state. My research shows that it is obvious that Europeans 
suffer from prejudice and preconceptions regarding the Turkish accession to the EU. 
At the same time, whether the Europeans and especially the leading countries, such 
as France, are truly willing to share their EU power with Turkey remains a question.  
This question will be answered through the questionnaire survey which follows in the 
next chapter.  
b) The decisions in the EU are not taken only on the basis of common interests, but 
also on the basis of national interests and under the influence of the US, a dominant 
global power. The decisions on Turkish accession to the EU have been made within 
this spectrum of interests.      
c) Turkey intends to play the role of a regional power and a key role within the 
international system and the EU by contributing to and participating in the missions 
and operations of NATO, ESDP and others, under the auspices of the EU and the 
UN.          
d) The EU cohesion cannot be restricted in the context of the cohesion policy.  The 
cohesion policy of the EU is only one parameter of the EU cohesion. The latter is 
composed of more than one –variable. It is causally related to the Enlargements of 
the EU, and is consistent with the absorption capacity of the EU.  The absorption 
capacity is related to the structural changes that both the EU and Turkey should 
enact: Turkey in order to join the EU and the EU in order to achieve smooth 
Enlargements.  
 
 
Taking into account the analysis of this chapter, and extrapolating from the research, 
one can infer some crucial factors - variables integral to EU cohesion, beyond the 
traditional factors identified in the cohesion policy of the EU. These factors - variables 
comprise the following:  
1) democracy, which includes the rule of law and human rights (freedom of 
expression, religion, property, women’s and children rights, minority rights); 2) 
corruption; 3) economy and commerce; 4) social stability; 5) cultural rights and 
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policies; 6) immigration (related to size of population);  7) army’s role in the 
system; 8) prejudice, racism and syndromes; 9) institutions and their functionality; 
10) redistribution of power, share of power and balance of power; 11) common 
European interests and national interests.  
 
 
The main objective of the survey discussed in the next Chapter is the verification of 
the factors-variables mentioned above. The survey provides a means of triangulating 
available data, with the aim of reliably defining the factors-variables upon which a 
cohesion model of the EU in the context of Turkish accession can be based. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 Survey Findings and Analysis 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the results of the survey within the context of theories of 
International Relations as they apply to Turkish accession to the EU and to European 
integration. Theories, of Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-
Functionalism, constitute the theoretical basis of this research (see Chapter 2) and 
provide the framework for my data analysis and conclusions. The survey results are 
also analysed in the context of the findings detailed in Chapter 4, which examined the 
Turkish political system and Euro-Turkish relations. By analysing the survey results in 
the framework of this theoretical and practical body of information, I attempt to 
delineate the variables affecting the EU cohesion in the context of Turkish accession 
to the EU.  
 
 
The design of the survey questionnaire not only draws upon the theories mentioned 
above but also derives from information and insight obtained from bibliographical 
sources, archival material, newspaper articles, official EU documents, personal 
interviews, and debates on Turkish accession to the EU within the European 
Parliament and other Institutions of the EU (see Chapter 3). The debate on Turkish 
accession to the EU is not limited to institutional contexts, but is widespread across 
the EU.  
 
 
By exploring issues and attitudes related to Turkish accession to the EU, the 
questionnaire seeks to achieve the following goals: a) Measure political attitudes of 
MEPs;   
b) Compare and cross-check information and data concerning Turkish accession to 
the EU with the political opinions and attitudes of Members of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament57 (See Chapter 3.4.3.4); 
                                               
57
 In Chapter 3 on 'methodology', the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European 
Parliament are used as samples for this survey. The reasons for choosing this Committee in the context 
of a 'proxy sample' - 'generalisation' are also explained and analysed in Chapter 2 (see Chapter 3.4.3.4). 
MEPs are the only politicians directly elected by European citizens. They represent all political and 
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c) Fill in any gaps of knowledge existing within the literature;  
b) Examine whether the factors - variables identified during research, especially 
those identified in Chapter 4, are in accordance with the results of the survey.  
 
 
Therefore, the survey provides a means of a verifying data presented in primary and 
secondary sources within the context of ´triangulation' (see Chapter 3.3).The 
conclusions arrived at by analysis of the survey data provide a framework for 
assessing the impact, positive or negative, of the Turkish accession on EU cohesion. 
In particular, this Chapter examines the following:   
• The role of the US 
• Negative reasons 
• Leading countries and power-sharing 
• Positive reasons 
• Turkish contribution to the EU and the strengthening of the EU position to the 
global system 
• Redistribution of power 
• Structural changes 
• The cohesion of the EU 
• Democracy and human rights 
• Reforms 
• List of variables  
• The next step 
 
 
 
5.2 The Role of the US  
 
My main concern here is to examine relations between the EU and Turkey from the 
stance of legal, economic, social, military and political issues and their relevance to 
Turkish accession to the EU. The EU is a multinational regional organisation, one 
consisting of independent member-states58.  It is therefore a multinational and multi-
                                                                                                                                       
ideological trends existing within the EU.  The Committee on Foreign Affairs is in charge of evaluating 
Turkish accession to the EU on behalf of the European Parliament. Therefore, the positions and ideas of 
the MEPS reflect the various opinions, ideas and political stances of the European peoples. Some of 
them also participate to the EU- Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee.  
58
 According to the theory of Realism, the international system is composed of sovereign independent 
states. The EU, despite its ongoing efforts towards regional integration, has not yet transformed the 
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state player within the international system. As such, it acts in the context of 
'globalisation'. Within this international system, the US is not only a superpower but 
also the major actor of the system, one which plays a key role on both global and 
regional levels.  It thus plays an external but decisive role within the European 
system. It is therefore a matter of great importance to determine whether and to what 
extent the US influences EU decisions, especially those concerning Turkish 
accession to the EU.          
 
 
Within this context, I note that the US has been playing a significant and catalytic role 
in European affairs since the Cold War, and still maintains its influential role in the 
Post Cold War Era both on its own and through its role in NATO59 (Valasek 2007; 
World Security Institute 2006; Kucheida 2005)60. The Northern Atlantic Alliance plays 
a leading role in European security issues and is also closely connected, politically 
and institutionally, to the EU through agreements such as 'Berlin Plus'61 and others 
(Kucheida 2005; Council of EU n.d.)  
 
 
The influence of the US is reflected both in the decisions of the EU in general and in 
decisions related to Turkish accession to the EU. As shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3 
below, MEPs clearly agree with this analysis of the US relationship to the EU. In Q8, 
'Do you believe that the US influences the decisions of the EU', 87% of the MEPs 
answered that the US influences the decisions of the EU (Figure 1). In Q9 'Do you 
believe that the US influences or not the Turkish accession to the EU?', 93.8% 
answered positively (Figure 2). In Q10 'In what way does the US influence the 
Turkish accession to the EU?' (Figure 3), 30.5% of the MEPs believe that the US 
influences Turkish accession to the EU negatively. On the other hand, a percentage 
of 67.8% maintains that the US has a positive influence on prospects for Turkish 
                                                                                                                                       
classical structure of an international system or subsystem composed of sovereign states.  Within such 
a system, any treaty must be ratified unanimously by all 27 member states of the EU; otherwise it can 
not come into effect. Therefore, the upper hand and the political and legal last say belong to individual 
sovereign states. Clear examples of this may be seen in the two 'no' on the Constitutional Treaty from 
the Netherlands and France in 2005, and the Irish 'no' on the Lisbon Treaty on June 13, 2008.  
59
 The dialogue between the EU and NATO on security issues shows the close relations still existing 
between the EU and NATO. Certainly, behind NATO one can find the US functioning as the leading 
country. Furthermore, in the global economic system the EU and the US constitute two important poles 
of a multi-pole international system. In this context the one affects the others economically and 
commercially. They are allies and competitors at the same time.             
60
 To avoid any misunderstanding, I mark that the US involvement in the European affairs begun during 
the World War I and intensified during the World War II. 
61
 'Berlin plus' is the arrangement between NATO and the EU that in event of crisis an EU-led operation 
would make use of NATO assets and capabilities (Council of the EU, n. d.) 
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accession to the EU. This position can be seen as the view that American policy 
favours Turkish national interests. If this is so, one may also assume that, by 
definition, US policy on Turkey serves American national interests. However, one 
may maintain that US policy favours the interests of all three involved parties; itself, 
the EU and Turkey62 (Lagendijk 2007).        
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Figure 1: Degree to which MEPs believe that the US influences the decisions of the EU 
 
 
                                               
62
 On this point, one could raise the following question: If the EU is so influenced by the US, how could 
the ‘banana wars’ be explained, or the issues of the steel industry and CAP? The answer is the 
following: the US is a dominant power attempting to govern the international system. To achieve this 
goal, it tries to influence the decisions of the EU. Such influence varies depending on the issue under 
discussion and its importance to the EU and the interests of its member-states on the one hand and the 
interests of the US on the other. Therefore, the cost-benefit analysis of national interest defines the 
extent and weight of US influence on the EU decision-making.  Besides, this is the process usually 
followed by international actors in order to reach a compromise and to follow a minimum code of 
common interest. This is a power game existing within and even ruling the international system. 
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Figure 2: Degree to which MEPs believe that the US influences Turkish accession to the EU 
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Figure 3: The way that the MEPs believe that the US influences Turkish accession to the EU. 
 
 
The EU is part of the global system. It constitutes a political, economic and social 
arena within which conflicting and converging national interests are addressed. The 
US functions as an external actor trying to serve its own national interests. However, 
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within the EU there are two types of interests: the common European interest and 
member-states´ national interests.  The US has the political ability to intervene in 
European affairs in order to serve its own national interests63 (Lagendijk 2007; 
Laçiner, Őzcan & Bal 2005, p. 71). Therefore, one must see EU-US relations through 
the lens of conflicting, converging and common interests. What remains in question is 
whether such an American engagement is in accordance with or in opposition to the 
interests of member states of the EU and the EU as such. If the US supports Turkish 
national interests, this does not necessarily mean that such an American policy is in 
opposition to the common European interest. Taking into consideration that the 
member-states of the EU decided, on December 16, 2004  to begin Turkey's 
accession negotiations, and on October 3, 2005 (Council of the EU 2004; Council of 
the EU 2005c) to open negotiations with Turkey, one can assume that Turkish 
accession to the EU has been defined as a common EU interest. However, the 
common European interest is likely to be in contrast to the national interests of some 
member-states. An example is the French position on Turkish accession to the EU 
arguing that Turkey can only acquire the status of a ‘privileged partnership’ and not 
that of full membership (see Chapters  4.3 and  4.8.2.2).   
 
 
How and why Turkish accession to the EU fell 'victim' to the Franco-German axis, the 
national interests of these countries and the ‘trade-off’ which both states engaged in 
have been already analysed (see Chapter 4.3). With regard to the Franco-German 
position, Chancellor Merkel of Germany supported French President Sarkozy in his 
refusal to open the chapter on Turkey's participation in the Single European 
Currency. Sarkozy reciprocated by demonstrating a positive stance towards the 
Treaty of Lisbon in the EU Summit of June 2007(Conference of the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States 2007). However, Turkish accession to the 
EU is not just a 'victim' of external factors, it is also a 'victim' of Turkey’s own internal 
problems, which present impediments to rapid structural change64. The impediments 
to rapid structural change in Turkey were expressly mentioned on March 11, 2009 by 
                                               
63
 The efforts of the US to install  antiballistic missile systems on the territory of Czech Republic and 
Poland gave rise to an ambivalent discussion between EU member-states, the US and Russia. The 
Russians clearly view the installation of such antiballistic systems as a way of serving US interests in 
Europe (Shanker 2007). At the same time, one may allege that this action is a new step, one expected 
to reconnect the European and especially the EU defence system to that of the US. 
64
 Reference has already been made in Chapter 4.8.2 to the political and constitutional crisis from which 
Turkey suffered before the Parliamentary and Presidential elections, as well as to the judicial 'coup 
d´état' against AKP. 
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MEP Ria Oomen-Ruitjen65, during a Plenary Session debate on Turkish accession 
progress. 
 
 
The political games which develop within the EU, having Turkish accession as their 
epicentre, are closely connected to the serving of national and common interests. In 
this respect, Q 19 of the survey66 queries whether 'the decisions of the EU are taken 
according to national interests, common interests or both?' Examination of Figure 4, 
which charts the responses to this question, leads one to make the following 
observations about the EU decision-making process: 
a) 50% of the MEPs replied that decisions are taken in accordance with national 
interests.  
b) 50% replied that decisions are taken in accordance with common interests.  
c) A majority (81.3%) believes that the decisions of the EU are taken on the basis of 
both common and national interests.  
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Figure 4: The kind of interests that MEPs believe to define EU decision making 
 
 
In other words, decisions result from a combination of common and national 
interests. The process of decision-making is a matter of interaction between the 
policies and interests of the EU member-states. The EU functions as an international 
landscape where national interests are met. It is not a 'closed club'.  Rather, it is part 
of the international system.  
 
 
                                               
65
 MEP Ria Oomen-Ruitjen is the Dutch Rapporteur of the European Parliament on Turkey's accession 
progress to the EU. 
66
 Question 19 was a question where multiple answers were possible (see Appendix 2 - Questionnaire) 
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American engagement in European affairs and the influence that the US exercises 
on the decisions of the EU regarding Turkish accession to the EU have been testified 
by Joost Lagendijk (2007; Larrabee & Lesser 2003, pp. 68-69). As Lagendijk stated, 
two years before the summit of December 16, 2004, -in 2002- the US had begun 
exerting pressure on EU governments in order to push EU leaders to give the green 
light to the commencement of Turkish accession negotiations. (2007) On the other 
hand, US support for Turkish accession to the EU provides evidence for the 
allegation that Turkey will turn into a 'Fifth Phalanx' of the US (Laçiner, Özcan and 
Bal 2005, p.71). In other words, support for Turkish accession to the EU is a political 
position bearing a serious risk. In particular, one risk is that Turkey might serve 
American rather than common EU interests. Whether or not this is true depends on 
the extent of the convergence or the divergence between:  
1) Turkish national interests on the one hand and common European interests on the 
other. 
2) Turkish national interests on the one hand, and on the other, the national interests 
of EU member states of the EU, especially the leading countries.  
3) Turkish national interests on the one hand and US interests on the other.   
There is always another side of the coin. In the post- Cold War era, a new political 
and strategic web of relations has been created within the Caucasus region and Iraq, 
thereby affecting US-Turkish affairs. The alliance between the US and Turkey still 
exists. However, the refusal of Turkey to allow the US to pass through Turkish 
territory in order to invade Iraq in 2003, and some differences between Ankara and 
Washington on the Kurdish issue, may imply that Turkey does not completely agree 
with American foreign policy, and that their national interests are not entirely 
congruent (Larrabee2008, p.9). 
 
 
On top of this, there are those who allege that Turkey follows an independent policy 
devoid of the strong American influence of the past. Taking the above issues into 
account, these analysts raise the following question: Can Turkey become a ‘Fifth 
American Phalanx in the EU’ (Laçiner, Őzcan and Bal 200, p. 71)? However, the 
situation is a complicated one. It might be argued that Turkey needs US support for 
the following reasons:  
1) The US presence in Iraq and especially in northern Iraq can reduce the threat of 
PKK and of the creation of an independent Kurdish state, a scenario which could 
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have a domino effect that would irrevocably harm Turkish national interest67. In 
addition, the US appears to support the Kurds of Northern Iraq even as it also backs 
Turkey in its fight the PKK, considered by the former and the EU as a terrorist party68 
(Larrabee 2008, pp. 10-11). At the same time, "Iran has conducted military 
operations in 2004 in line with Turkey's requests" (Laçiner, Őzcan and Bal 2005, 
p.58).  
2) Turkey is opposed to Iranian aspirations of acquiring nuclear weapons for three 
main reasons: a) the threat of destabilising of the region, b) the threat of terminating 
the Turkish aspiration of becoming a regional power and c) the threat of getting 
involved in a post-Cold War nuclear arm race with Iran in order to preserve the 
balance of power (Larrabee 2008, p. 13). 
 
 
At the same time, Turkey does not support massive military action against Iran for 
fear of destabilising the region. Moreover, it clearly takes into account the fact that 
Iran is the "second biggest supplier of natural gas to Turkey after Russia" (Larrabee 
2008, p.11). Given these facts, Turkey’s political refusal on supporting military action 
against Iran appears to approach the stance of the majority of EU member-states69 
(Aras 2002, p. 47) However, if Iran continues its current policy of testing ballistic 
missile systems with the aim of becoming a nuclear power, Turkey will be obliged to 
follow American strategic options70.  At the same time, if it takes action against Iran, 
the US will need Turkish territory and support. 
      
 
In any case, Turkey is a member of NATO and a reliable US ally. After the Russian-
Georgian war of August 8-12, 2008, which brought with it the allegation that Europe 
is running the risk of 'going back to the future' to a political situation similar to that of 
the Cold War, Turkey enhanced its geo-strategic role in the wider Caucasus region. 
This development is not only connected to NATO Enlargement towards Georgia and 
Ukraine but also to relations between Russia and NATO, the US, the EU and EU 
                                               
67
 The Turks are afraid that if a Kurdish state is established in northern Iraq, they will face an increased 
Kurdish irredentism aiming at the annexation of part of Turkish territory inhabited by Kurds. In the 
context of the 'domino effect', one incident will bring the other, and thereby Turkey will run the risk of 
collapse or being found in big trouble. 
68
 In 2004, the Council of the EU included PKK in the list of terrorist organisations (wikipedia.com). 
69
  As Aras stated (2002) "an Iranian-Turkish-European natural gas pipeline project has been proposed. 
This project would take Iranian natural gas to Europe through Turkey" (p.47).This example can explain 
how states can be bound by national interests and why the Turkish national interest may not be 
completely in line with that of the US. 
70
 On July 7, 2008, Iranian TV showed pictures from ballistic missile systems tests, thereby causing the 
American reaction (Mooney 2008).  
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member states. By definition, it is also connected to the new EU Enlargement and 
the Turkish role as a close ally of the US. 71 
 
 
The assertion can therefore be made that after a further EU Enlargement, one which 
will include Turkey, the pro-American block within the EU will become stronger, 
respectively or irrespectively of the strategic conception of the 'three American 
wedges on the European back' 72. It  does not, therefore, come as a surprise that in 
response to Q11, 'According to your opinion which are the reasons behind the stance 
of some Europeans, who do not wish to see Turkey joining the EU as a full member 
state?', the majority (53%) of MEPs answered that Turkey will become the ‘Fifth 
Phalanx’ of the US. (Figure 5). This view of Turkey as a 'Trojan Horse' results from 
US influence on EU decision-making and from the American position toward and 
support for Turkish accession to the EU (see Chapter 5.2.1). In addition, there is yet 
another reason: that of the historically close relations between the US and Turkey, 
and the inclination of new member states toward the US, many of whom follow a pro-
American policy, especially on security issues. This pro-American political position is 
reflected, among other ways, in the installation of American antiballistic missile 
systems in the Czech Republic and Poland73 (US Today 2007; Russianforces.org 
2006; APF 2007).   
                                               
71
 The political atmosphere of tension between the US and Russia offered Turkey the opportunity to 
provide a balance between the two 'superpowers,' thanks to its pivotal geostrategic location. In times of 
crisis, it is very important for the US to have a strong and embattled army like that of Turkey by its side 
(see Chapter 4.9.2).]The US cannot afford to lose Turkey, even though Ankara has already established 
commercial and economic interests with Moscow. At the same time, Turkey cannot align with Russia in 
the event of the latter flirting with Iran. If Russia further strengthens its relations with Iran, such a 
development may be considered as presenting an increased threat for Turkey, thereby encouraging it to 
more deeply align itself with the US Therefore, a rational game of interests and influence is already 
under way in the context of controlling energy resources (see Chapter 4.9.2). 
72
  Britain is a traditional ally of the US, and its policy vis-à-vis the EU is imbued with scepticism. For the 
British, NATO has the primary role. At the same time, the safeguarding of their sovereignty within the 
EU is also of utmost importance. The views and interests of the British regarding issues of security and 
foreign affairs are mostly in line with those of the US. At the same time, they refused to participate in the 
Euro zone. Inspired their lost Imperial identity, the British is supporters of ‘Real Politic’. Furthermore, 
their geographical location situates them as an American “wedge” located in the northwest. After the EU 
Enlargement of May 1, 2004, there was a tendency of central European countries to function as other 
American 'wedges' in the heart of Europe. As a result of agreements signed between Poland and the US 
on the deployment of antiballistic missile systems, Polish security was placed under the American shield 
(MFA of Republic of Poland 2008; Hildreth & Ek 2008, pp. 6-8). In the case of Turkish accession to the 
EU, a third American 'wedge' will appear in the European soft belly, on the south-eastern side. Although 
the puzzle is incomplete, this is a scenario which is not so far from reality. Such a situation is related to 
US efforts during the NATO Summit in Bucharest on April 3, 2008 to establish a roadmap for 
incorporating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO and therefore isolating Russia geo-strategically. In other 
words, this American policy tends to justify the thesis of Richard Holbrook, former US Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, as set forth in his 1995 article 'America, a 
European Power'.  
73
 The US wishes to establish missile systems on the territories of both the Czech Republic and Poland, 
thereby preventing possible terrorist threats from looming over Europe and the world in general. 
However, Russia fears that these missiles might be turned against it in the future. At the same time, 
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5.2.1 Defence Deficit, Soviet Syndrome and Babylon State 
 
The EU is currently experiencing the consequences of two recent Enlargements. 
Some EU countries, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, are increasingly 
'flirting' with the US. This is especially the case given two factors: the EU 'defence 
deficit' and the 'soviet syndrome'.  These terms may be understood as follows: the 
EU does not yet have an adequate or reliable European defence system, nor does it 
have defence Institutions or an army upon which member states can credibly rely for 
their security. In light of these deficiencies, European citizens have good reason for 
not feeling safe. There is, in fact, a 'defence deficit,' one filled by NATO and even 
more by the US74. Meanwhile, the countries of the former Soviet block feel insecure. 
They always have in mind the Russian threat, and in the context of a preventive 
policy they want to be supported by a reliable military power. They consider that the 
only military powers able to offer them security are those of the US and NATO. This 
explains why the Czech Republic and Poland have both established constructive 
dialogue with the US to install antiballistic missile systems on their territories75.   
 
 
On August 20, 2008, the American and Polish governments signed an agreement 
providing for the establishment of an anti-ballistic antimissile system. The signing 
came just after the ceasefire between Russia and Georgia and within the polarised 
climate of tension and the fear of returning to the Cold War Era.  Among other things, 
the agreement charges the US with the "duty to defend Poland in the event of a 
ballistic missile attack" (MFA of the Republic of Poland 2008). This phrase illustrates 
the extent of American engagement with and influence over European affairs. The 
entire political situation also  manifests the above-mentioned 'security deficit' and 
‘Soviet syndrome’, which one may  allege that emerged once again on the European 
scene after the Russian invasion of Southern Ossetia (Boot 2008, p. 15; Baran 2008, 
p.15).  
                                                                                                                                       
missile systems will consolidate and enhance the American geo-strategic presence in Europe despite 
the end of the Cold War and the absence of the Soviet threat.           
74
 The European defence deficit focuses, among other things, on the issue of infrastructures. No EU-led 
operation may be successfully concluded unless it uses NATO infrastructure. The ‘Berlin Plus’ 
agreement provides the rules upon which defensive NATO and EU relations are based.   (NATO 2006).     
75
  The American argument was that this antiballistic missile system was to be installed in order to 
protect Europeans from rogue states with a technological capacity to manufacture nuclear bombs. On 
the other hand, Russia strongly opposed the installation of such an antiballistic missile system. As 
President Bush stated, the US is planning to install 10 interceptors in Poland and radar operations in 
Czech Republic (Shanker 2007).     
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Such an action as the Russian invasion can be seen as a reaction to the  
US plan to integrate Georgia into NATO and thereby isolate Russia geo-
strategically76. As the agreement states, Poland is to be placed under the American 
Antimissile Defence System (MFA of the Republic of Poland, 2008). Such a political 
scene demonstrates the complicated relations between the EU, its member-states, 
the US and Russia77. Such complicated relations are ruled by conflicting national 
interests, as follows:  
a) The interests of member states on the one hand versus the interests common to 
all parties on the other (such common interests are defined in the context of efforts 
towards regional integration). 
b) The interests of the EU member-states versus those of the US or even of 
Russia78.   
 
 
Turkish accession to the EU is a primary goal of the US. At the same time, Turkish 
accession to the EU must be seen in the context of its potential impact on the 
cohesion of the EU and political and strategic bilateral relations between the US and 
EU member-states. Considering that these relations are ruled by conflicting and 
convergent national interests, we may conclude that regional integration of the EU 
might run the risk of becoming trapped in a Babylonian situation79. Such a situation 
                                               
76
 There are voices in Russia, such as that of military expert Anton Surikov, which maintain that the US 
aims to surround Russia. As Surikov stated: "We are witnessing US intensive efforts to create a sanitary 
cordon around Russia in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states. The euphemism for 
this plan is creating a so-called 'Eurasian transport corridor.’ Our duty is to counteract these plans" 
(Surikov, cited in Aras 2005, p.20). 
77
 On the 26 of September 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev delivered a statement understood 
to convey the message that if the Americans and the western countries wish to have a war, they will 
have it (CNN News, 2008; ERT SAT, 2008). This was in the headlines of various TV channels, including 
CNN, BCC and ERT Sat. It also constituted a statement in support of the view of going back to the Cold 
War political climate.   
78
 Following the crisis in Caucasus (August 8-12, 2008), Russia, indeed, plays a role of an external, 
power in EU affairs. However, it cannot directly affect EU decisions on Turkish accession to the EU. On 
the other hand, in analysing the volatile political environment emerging after the crisis in Caucasus, I 
note the following:  
a. If Russia is deemed a threat to the European interests, the supporters of Turkish accession to 
the EU could put forward the following argument: We must integrate Turkey into the EU, as its 
alliance is necessary to prevent the Russian threat.  Such a threat hearkens back to the Cold-
War era, but has a new geostrategic, economic, commercial and political identity. Moscow acts 
within the international system by employing the rules of capitalism, tailored to its interest and 
to the peculiarities of the Russian political system.     
b. If Russia is not considered a threat, the decision regarding Turkish accession to the EU will be 
mainly defined within the framework of EU relations on the one hand and US and NATO 
relations on the other, as the latter are external actors who nonetheless play a part in the EU. 
Hence, whether, to what extent and how Russia will affect the Turkish accession to the EU positively or 
negatively is a matter connected to the interests of the EU and its member states on the one hand and 
those of Turkey in relation to Russian and American interests on the other.  
79
 Babylonian situation: Chaotic, incomprehensible situation. On July 10, 2008, during the EP Plenary 
Session, MEP Jean Marie Le Pen stated that the EU is becoming "a new Babylonian state found on the 
ruins of the national identities of the member states". Le Pen alleged that the EU cannot function in such 
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would hamper regional integration, and prevent the EU from creating one common 
voice on sensitive and important issues. Therefore, the weakness of not having a 
European common policy on important issues places EU political cohesion at risk80.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
a situation, and strongly criticised French President Nikolas Sarkozy, holder of the EU Presidency since 
July 1, 2008. President Sarkozy responded that France is lucky to have gotten rid of Le Pen (!).     
80
 I consider it important to refer to the 'defence deficit', the 'Soviet syndrome' and the phenomenon of a 
'Babylon state'. These issues are connected with the cohesion of the EU and the role of the US in the 
European affairs as an external actor, which also influences Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore, the 
references to the 'defence deficit', the 'Soviet syndrome' and the phenomenon of a 'Babylonian situation' 
are related to one of the main research questions and the aim of this project.       
In light of this I note the following:  
1. The creation of a 'Babylonian state' may threaten the cohesion of the EU. Why? According to the 
'theory of Babylon' the more the states which join the EU, the less is the possibility for regional EU 
integration. The problem becomes more severe in the case that a state, which is characterised by 
'democratic deficit', different system of values and economic problems, joins the EU.  This is why the 
argument of the 'Babylonian situation' may be used by those who do not support Turkish accession to 
the EU.  How Turkey is related to the 'Babylonian state'? Turkey has a large territorial size and 
population. According to a European Parliament research (2006a) presented in Chapter 4.7. Turkish 
accession to the EU will cause problems on cohesion policy and furthermore on EU cohesion (For a 
definition on the difference between EU cohesion policy and the cohesion of the EU, see Chapter 2.4).  
At the same time, the creation of a 'Babylonian state' is further encouraged through the existence of 
conflicting national interests, an issue already examined in this Chapter (National interest constitutes 
one of the main variables related to EU cohesion). The significance of national interests has been also 
presented in Chapter 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 in the context of theories of International Relations.    
2. The European 'defence deficit' is connected to the cohesion of the EU and Turkish accession to the 
EU. Why? As it has been already seen in Chapter 4.9.2, Turkey has the largest army in Europe and 
thereby it will have a strong political say within the institutions of the EU in case that Ankara joins the EU 
as a full member state. Therefore, this issue falls under the concept of 'power game' which is one of the 
main theoretical issues of this project (see Chapter 2.3.2) able to affect both Turkish accession to the 
EU and EU cohesion.  Both national interest and 'power game' are relevant to the question of whether 
the leading European countries are ready to share their power - which they enjoy within the EU - with 
Turkey. Analysis on national interests is already presented in Chapter 2.3.2, where I explained theories 
of Realism and Structural Realism as the main theoretical background of this project. The other 
theoretical background is Functionalism and Neo- Functionalism. In this concept, it is also important to 
examine the bloody incidents in Georgia in summer 2008. Such incidents and others -as for example, 
the current economic crisis - constitute unpredictable developments able to negatively influence 
European affairs and Turkish accession to the EU. On this point, I refer to the following example:  as a 
result of a military or economic crisis, European economy may be negatively affected and member 
states or even Institutions of the EU may argue that the EU can not absorb new member states. The 
excuse might be the possibility of putting EU cohesion at risk.         
3) The crisis in Georgia and the strategic relations between the US and Czech Republic, both, are 
incidents, which reveal the dominant role of the US within Europe. They are also incidents, which are 
connected to the balance of power and the redistribution of power within Europe. This redistribution of 
power can affect, at least, the political cohesion of the EU. Structural changes and redistribution of 
power are of great importance regarding the aims of this project.   
4) The 'Soviet syndrome' explains why member states of the EU support the US as an external actor of 
the EU and how the US influences European geo-strategic issues. The US affects the Turkish accession 
to the EU and such a development may be put forward as an argument against Turkish accession to the 
EU under the allegation that Turkey may play the role of a Trojan horse on behalf of the US.  The 
presentation and in-depth analysis of the aforementioned issues is needed in order to enhance the 
validity of this research.            
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 5.3 Negative Reasons  
 
The fear that Turkey could become the ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of US national interests is only 
one of the reasons given by those who do not wish to see Turkey join the EU. The 
answers to Q11 (see Figure 5) identify a number of other reasons put forward by the 
MEPs for opposing Turkish accession to the EU. The MEP’s answers to the question 
were as follows: 
1) Turkey's Muslim character. 75.4 % agreed and 24.6% disagreed.  
2) The role of the Turkish army in the political system. 73.8% agreed and 26.2% 
disagreed.  
3) The fact that leading countries of the EU are not ready to share with Turkey 
the power they now enjoy in the EU. 67.7% agreed and 32.3% disagreed.   
4) The unresolved Cyprus issue. 67.7% agreed and 32.3% disagreed.   
5) Negative stereotypes. 58.5% agreed and 41.5% disagreed.   
6) Extra burden on cohesion policy. 58.5% agreed and 41.5% disagreed.  
7) The flow of Turkish immigrants to the EU. 56.9% agreed and 43.1 disagreed.   
9) Prejudice against Turkey. 55.4% greed and 44.6% disagreed. 
10) Turkey is seen as the US’s ‘Fifth Phalanx’. 53.8% agreed and 46.2% 
disagreed.    
11) Political instability. 53.8% agreed and 46.2% disagreed. 
13) Turkey's economic weakness. 52.3% agreed and 47.7 disagreed.   
14) The strengthening of the status of the Turkish immigrants already residing in 
the EU. 52.3% agreed and 47.7% disagreed. 
15) Cultural differences. 46.2% agreed and 53.8% disagreed. 
16) Turkish foreign policy.  41.5% agreed and 58.5% disagreed.    
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Figure 5: The reasons that -according to MEPs- Europeans do not wish to see Turkey in the 
EU as a full member state. 
 
 
Taking these results into account, one can see that the list is reduced from 16 to 14 
reasons, as the MEPs answered negatively on the factors of culture and foreign 
policy. That is, they do not consider cultural differences and Turkey's foreign policy 
as reasons to oppose Turkish accession to the EU. However, taking into account the 
analysis of Chapter 4 in relation to the answers to Q 11, one could conclude that 
there are some parameters within which Turkish cultural factors might be viewed as 
negatively impacting the cohesion of the EU.  As outlined in Chapter 4, the factors 
and variables capable of affecting the cohesion of the EU, include negative 
stereotypes, prejudice against Turkey, immigration, syndromes like that of Vienna, 
religion and racism.  These factors are causally connected to the issue of cultural 
differences. 
 
 
On this point, two observations can be made:  
First, a majority (67.7%) of respondents support the statement that the unsolved 
Cyprus issue is one of the main reasons for opposing Turkish accession to the EU. 
Indeed, eight Turkish accession chapters have been frozen by European Council 
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decisions because of this issue (Council of the EU 2006a). The Cyprus issue is 
integrally related to Turkish foreign policy due to the fact that Turkish troops have 
been occupying the northern part of Cyprus since 1974. Furthermore, Turkey is 
engaged in 'border disputes' with Greece in the Aegean Sea and with the Kurds in 
Northern Iraq (Oomen-Ruitjen 2007; Oomen-Ruitjen 2008; Council of the EU 2006a).  
 
 
However, 58, 5% of the MEPs do not consider that Turkish foreign policy, and the 
way Ankara exercises it, constitutes a negative factor towards Turkish accession to 
the EU.  This answer is relevant to that of Question 13 of the questionnaire (Figure 7 
below) referring to the geo-strategic and geopolitical position of Turkey as well as to 
the stabilising role that Ankara can play in the region81 (Rehn 2007b; Chapters 
4.8.2.2; 4.9; 4.9.1 and 4.9.2). A majority (87, 7%) of respondents consider that 
Turkey should join the EU due to its significant geo-strategic and geopolitical 
position.  Furthermore, a majority (73, 8%) of respondents support the statement that 
Turkish accession to the EU will bring political stability both to the country and the 
region. Therefore, some Europeans connect the geo-strategic and geopolitical role of 
Turkey to their national and common European interests82. Other countries, like 
France and Germany, take a negative view of the Turkish role in the EU, and see 
Turkish accession to the EU as standing in opposition to their national interests. Both 
of these states, numbered among the leading European countries, try to promote 
their own policy within the EU and to identify their national interests with the common 
European ones. In other words, they attempt to dress their national interests in a 
European costume83.    
                                               
81
 On this point, one may raise the following questions: how can Ankara play such a central role, while 
not possessing the necessary financial power to address relevant issues? What about Turkey’s own 
political instability and the overall role of the Turkish military in domestic issues? Although Turkey has 
internal economic and political problems, it is still considered a strong military-regional power. Its army is 
the second largest in NATO and the largest in Europe (see the analysis in Chapter 4.9.2 of Turkish 
strategic advantages and why the US and some European countries view Turkey as both an 
indispensable ally and a stabilising factor in the region). In addition, one may recall that Commissioner 
Rehn called Turkey the "beacon of a moderate Islam" (Rehn 2007b). 
82
 On this point one should note that the political stance of France and Germany results from two 
factors. First, both in France and in Germany the President and the Chancellor belong to the right wing 
parties. If the leftists-socialists come to power then it is likely that we will see a new political approach to 
Turkish accession to the EU. Second, in both Germany and France a huge majority of public opinion is 
against Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore, even if the politicians wish to express a different 
political position they can not oppose the peoples´ political will (see Chapter 4.3 and 4.4).              
83
 Article 23 of the EU Council Presidency Conclusions (2004, p. 7) opened the window for the 'third 
road'. In other words, the decision is clear about the unclear future of the Turkish accession to the EU. 
The Presidency Conclusions document supports the idea that Turkish accession to the EU is an 'open 
ended' process. Paragraph 23 includes an additional phrase stressing that in case negotiations do not 
come to a successful end, the EU should find other ways to anchor Turkey within the EU.  
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion 
 
146                                                                                         Ioannis Charalambides    
In light of these facts, the following can be noted: the majority of the MEPs consider 
the Cyprus issue as an argument against Turkish accession to the EU84.  However, 
they are ready to turn a blind eye to this matter and to support the position that the 
Turkish foreign policy might bring political stability to the region. But there is another 
explanation for this European attitude: the idea that Turkish accession to the EU will 
transform Turkey into a moderate democratic state, one more flexible and capable of 
resolving its problems with neighbouring countries than before. According to the 
answers to Q 23, 'According to your opinion, for what reasons is Turkey undertaking 
reforms?', 55.4% support the statement that one of the main reasons Turkey is 
undertaking reforms is its desire to establish a moderate state (Figure 21).  
Therefore, one may witness a conflict between respect for human rights and 
international law on the one hand and the obligation to serve national interests on the 
other.  On the one hand, Europeans know and realise that the illegal presence of the 
Turkish troops in Cyprus systematically violates international and European laws, 
values and principles85. However, on the other hand, they are guided by their national 
and common interest to tolerate the illegal reality in Cyprus under the pretext that 
efforts are being carried out to find a comprehensive solution86. 
 
 
                                               
84
 The Turkish side alleges that in 1974, the Turkish army did not invade Cyprus but rather intervened in 
response to the `coup d' état' organised by the Greek Junta. It asserts that the 'intervention' was aimed 
at restoring Constitutional order and protecting Turkish Cypriots. At the same time, Ankara alleges that 
the Turkish troops brought peace in Cyprus.  However, these troops violated the Charter of the UN, the 
principle of human rights, and the values upon which the EU is founded. They are still occupying 
Cyprus. If we take into account its small size, Cyprus is one of the most militarised regions in the world 
(UNSC 2003). At the present time, the Republic of Cyprus is a member state of the EU. Yet Turkey 
refuses to recognise it. This is why the EU issued, on the September 21, 2005, a declaration making 
clear that Turkey should recognise the Republic of Cyprus and that such recognition is a precondition for 
Turkish accession to the EU (Council of the EU 2005a).             
85
 At this point, I must note that the unresolved Cyprus issue constitutes a negative factor in the question 
of Turkish accession to the EU. It is true that the purpose of this research is to examine whether the 
Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not, and the unsolved Cyprus issue 
does not fit directly in the list of variables that could negatively affect the cohesion of the EU. However, 
due to the fact that this issue falls within the spectrum of human rights violations and International and 
European laws and principles, the member-states of the EU could eventually use the issue to allege that 
Turkey is not a democratic country and that its accession to the EU will threaten not only the system of 
European values and principles but the very cohesion of the EU. Therefore, a solution of the Cyprus 
issue in line with the principles and the values upon which the EU is founded will facilitate Turkish 
accession to the EU, and will prevent those who do not want Turkey to join the EU as full member state 
from using the unresolved Cyprus issue as an argument against Turkish accession. Consequently, the 
unsolved Cyprus issue can be considered a variable of conflicting national interests between the 
member states and Turkey, or between member states on the one hand and Turkey and the EU on the 
other.    
86
 Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn (2.4.2008) stated during a meeting of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs that the responsibility for the solution to the Cyprus problem belongs to the leaders of the 
two Communities. In fact, the Commissioner avoided making any reference to the responsibility of 
Turkey for the solution, despite its role as an occupying force in Cyprus since 1974 (Charalampidis 
2008; Xanthoulis 2008). 
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Secondly, a majority (53.8%) considers that cultural differences are not an argument 
against Turkish accession to the EU. This may be interpreted as evidence of an 
absence of racism on the part of Europeans. However, this conclusion does not 
address the issue of immigration. Problems stemming from immigration are among 
the most significant issues confronting the EU. These problems include 
unemployment and xenophobia (see Chapter 4.4). In the case of Turkey, the 
immigration issue is accentuated by the fact that an estimated 4 million Turkish 
workers are expected to migrate to richer European countries when Turkey becomes 
full member-state of the EU (Lenski in Group EPP-ED 2004, p. 3).  Taking into 
account the fact that there are already thousands of Turkish nationals residing in 
Europe, especially in Germany (Erzan, Kuzubas & Yildiz 2004) and taking into 
account as well the results of the survey (Figure 1) showing that prejudice still exists 
against Turkey, reflected in negative stereotypes about Turkish Muslim character,87 
one may come to the following conclusions:  
a) The majority of Europeans are afraid that Turkish accession to the EU will 
strengthen the status of Turkish nationals already residing in Europe.  
b) Turkey has a good reason to allege that Europeans have not overcome their fears 
about Muslims and that they still consider the EU as a 'Christian Club' (Johnson 
1999; Lugo, Davidson, & Pirzio-Biroli 2005).  
c) The vast majority of Europeans are afraid that Turkish accession to the EU will 
create social and economic problems related to immigration and unemployment (see 
Figure 1 above; Chapter 4.4). 
 
 
 
5.4 Leading Countries and Power-Sharing  
 
One of the main questions raised by this project is whether leading European 
countries are ready to share their EU power with Turkey or not.  In this section, I 
analyse the opinions of the MEPs on this crucial matter.   
 
 
 Question 12 asks, 'If in Q 11, option 2 is chosen (i.e. that the leading countries within 
the EU are not ready to share their power with Turkey), please specify, which kind of 
                                               
87
 With regard to prejudice and negative stereotypes, one may recall the Vienna Syndrome analysed in 
Chapter 4.4.   
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power.' In response to this question, a majority (67.7%) considers that the leading 
countries of the EU are not ready to share the power they enjoy in the EU with 
Turkey.  
 
100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Economic Power
Institutional Power
Political/Diplomatic Power
No Yes
 
Figure 6: The kinds of power which, according to MEPs, leading EU countries are not ready to 
share with Turkey. 
 
 
Analytically, and according to Figure 6 above, it can be stressed that:    
1) A majority (60%) considers that the leading EU countries are not ready to share 
their EU institutional power with Turkey. A minority (40%) holds the opposite opinion. 
Institutional power is related to the political power that member-states possess within 
the EU. This answer justifies the conclusions already reached about the conflicting 
national interests and the 'power game' still existing within the EU. The leading 
countries of the EU are not ready to share their institutional, political and economic 
power with Turkey. This is one of the main conclusions reached by the survey.  
 
2) A majority (52.5%) supports the statement that the leading countries of the EU are 
not ready to share their economic power with Turkey. A minority (47.5%) considers 
that the leading countries are ready to share economic power with Turkey in the 
context of the EU.   
 
 
Data shows that if Turkey joins the EU as full member state it will be institutionally, 
the second most powerful country within the EU.  This assessment is based on the 
existence of the blocking vote and on the way that the member states take decisions 
on the level of the European Council (Chapter 4.10). However, there is another 
aspect one may focus on: Due to its territorial and demographic size, Turkey will 
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have, after Germany, the second largest delegation of MEPs in the European 
Parliament. In this context, Turkey will acquire political and institutional power beyond 
that it will enjoy on the level of the European Council. The argument that Turkey will 
possess extra political and institutional power is grounded on the following fact: 
Pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the competence of the European 
Parliament, its political power, its legal power and its institutional power will 
increase88. The impression created by the survey data is that the leading EU 
countries do not want Turkey to join the EU because they are afraid of losing their 
power, and because their national interests will be at stake. Therefore, one may 
maintain that Turkish accession to the EU does not depend only on the objective 
criteria the EU has determined for Turkey, but also on political criteria. In this context, 
French President Nikolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued 
that Turkey should acquire a ‘privileged partnership,’ not full membership (see 
Chapter 4.3) According to Joost Lagendijk (2007):  
When Turkey becomes member it will be, probably, the biggest member with regard 
to size and population. This means that in the new system, Turkey will be a big player 
in the Council.  
 
Noting that Turkey is approximately the size of Germany, Mr. Lagendijk observed 
that according to the rules of the EU one or two states can not in fact 
block a policy or push through policies, but it is clear that Turkey will be a dominant 
player. And I think this is one of the reasons why especially France is not very happy. 
France is one of the one or two big players and if Turkey joins the EU, then France 
will lose its influence in the EU (2007).   
 
 
3)  A majority (65.6%) supports the statement that the leading countries of the EU are 
not ready to share their political power in the EU with Turkey. A minority (34.4%) 
expressed opposition. The view here is based on the fact that political power is 
related to economic and military power. Moreover, should the EU truly wish to play a 
global political role, economic power is not enough. As Lagendijk said: "if we want to 
be players, it is good to have Turkey because we will be stronger on the global 
scene" (2007). The EU must enhance the functionality and capabilities of its 
Institutions, in particular those belonging to the common defence and foreign policy. 
In other words, the EU must enhance the pillar of political integration. Turkish military 
power is closely connected to the European Security Defence Policy (ESDP)89. On 
this point, it should be noted that the issues of Common Defence and Foreign Policy 
                                               
88
 The question is whether the EU will find the formula to break the deadlock created by the Irish “no” on 
the referendum of June 13, 2008.   
89
 European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) 
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are related to the global role that the EU wishes to play. At the same time, Turkey, 
which has a huge military budget and the biggest and one of the most embattled 
armies in Europe, is a significant player in the geo-strategic and geopolitical game.  
(Chapter 4.9.1;4.9.2).  On the one hand, the fact that Turkey has a strong army which 
will participate in EU missions through large contributions is a positive factor. On the 
other hand, such contributions can offer a member-state a strong political say within 
the Institutions of the EU, especially in the context of the ESDP (see Chapter 4.9.2). 
In light of this evidence, one may question why the leading countries would want 
Turkey to join the EU as a full member-state, given the fact that Turkey will be able to 
use its army even in the context of a ‘privileged partnership’? Why should they bring 
Turkey into the EU 'power game'?  
 
 
 
5.5 Positive Reasons  
 
Supporters of Turkish accession to the EU provide a number of answers to the 
aforementioned questions.  Q 13 asks, 'According to your opinion, which are the 
reasons behind the stance of some Europeans to support that Turkey should join the 
EU as a full member state?' In response, a majority (87.7%) answered that one of the 
main arguments of those who support Turkish accession to the EU is the importance 
of the Turkish geo-strategic and geopolitical position in Eurasia. A percentage (12. 
3%) held a negative position on this issue (Figure 7).  
 
100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60 80 100
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Political stability in the region
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Figure 7: The reasons given for supporting the entrance of Turkey to the EU as a full member 
state   
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Another relevant question and answer on this point concerns the stabilising role that 
Turkey could play in the region. Reading the results of Question 13, Figure 7, it can 
be observed that:  
1) A majority (70.8%) supports the idea that Turkey, as a Muslim democratic country, 
could become a model for other Muslim countries in the region. A smaller percentage 
(29.2%) answered negatively.  
2) A majority (73.8%) supported that Turkish EU membership would bring stability 
within the countries of the region. A percentage (24.6%) held the opposite position. 
Joost Lagendijk (2007) stated that Turkey would not be a model but rather an 
example in helping the countries of the region. At the same time, speaking about the 
geo-strategic role of Turkey, he said that Turkey will provide 'a buffer zone' between 
the EU and the Middle East.  Similarly, Professor Yunus Emre Gönen (2007) from 
the Social Sciences Institute and European Studies Program of the Istanbul Bilgi 
University, interviewed for the purposes of this project, stated that  
the Turkish model can not be exported and Turkey can play only a role model if you 
wish to establish a 'Laicité Republic' (for the countries of its region). It will be an 
example that such a thing is possible and ultimately these societies do have a chance 
if properly governed for instance.    
  
 
Other reasons in support of Turkish accession to the EU put forward in the survey 
include the following:  
1) A majority (69.2%) considers that Turkey must join the EU because its large 
size provides the promise of a large economic market. This is one side of the 
coin. However, there is another side to the issue, one which has been already 
analysed in Chapter 4.4.  Turkey is the seventh biggest market for the EU and 
the EU is the biggest market for Turkey. At the same time, the EU would be 
perceived as providing an opportunity for young Turks to immigrate to the EU. 
The implications of such immigration could be put forward as reasons to 
oppose Turkish accession to the EU for the reasons already analysed here 
and in Chapter 4.4. These reasons include economic problems, especially 
unemployment. A huge part of the European population bases their views on 
Turkish immigration to the rest of the EU on prejudicial stereotypes of 
Muslims and Turks, and link social and economic problems in the EU to 
Muslim immigrants. Since Turks are Muslims, they are considered to play a 
role in of these problems, or to be a factor contributing to such problems (see 
analysis in Chapter 4.4).  These prejudicial views could have ramifications for 
EU cohesion should Turkey join the EU. 
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On the other hand arguments put forward by both Turkey and the European 
supporters of Turkish accession to the EU include the following:  a) Turkey has a big 
economy, and b) the young Turkish population can revive the ageing European 
Society. However, this second point is a 'Delphic Sword' due to the prejudice of the 
Europeans against Turkey and the 'power game' which does not allow Turkey to 
share European power with the leading countries of the EU, especially France and 
Germany. In addition, the historically close relations between Turkey and the US -
reflected among others in the strong public American support for Turkish accession 
to the EU- make Europeans more suspicious of Turkish accession. Therefore, some 
of them consider Turkey to be the American 'Fifth Phalanx' within the EU. On this 
point, it is important to note what Professor Yunus Emre Gönen (2007), of Istanbul 
Bilgi University, stated during an interview for the purposes of this research: "we will 
not make war with the US in order to show that we are not their Fifth Phalanx!"  And 
he added: "Turkey cannot wait for ever the EU to give the green light in order to 
become full member. The EU should respect the procedure and the decisions by 
taking Turkey in. In other words, it is a matter of political will". And he added: "if the 
Turkish economy becomes strong and healthy, there will be no reason for Turkey to 
join the EU".  
     
         
2) A majority (50.8%) supports the idea that one of the benefits of Turkey joining 
the EU is its cheap labour. An explanation for this opinion is that Europeans 
view Turkey in the same way that Americans used to consider the countries 
of the Far East. This view of Turkey as a source of cheap labour is related to 
the estimate that Turkey will need forty years in order to catch up with 
European economic standards (see Chapter 4.6.3).  At the same time, this 
political stance is also based on the huge disparities between the big Turkish 
cities on the one hand and the poor rural regions suffering from high 
unemployment rates, on the other.90.  Such a situation makes the Europeans 
conclude that Turkey is and will be a place of cheap labour. On this point, an 
important factor should be noted: One of the main reasons for cheap labour is 
not only the lower (compared to the EU)Turkish standards of living, but also 
                                               
90
 During the meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee on September 7, 2005, the 
Mayor of Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir asserted that there are regions in South Eastern Turkey where 
unemployment is higher than 65% and inflation is around 39%, and where the people of the region 
cannot feel safe due to the presence of the Turkish army. 
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the ‘democratic deficit', evidenced in part through the lack of reliable 
legislation to protect children’s rights. As a result of the illegal exploitation of 
children in the market as cheap labour, the EU urges Turkey to improve 
legislation on children rights (see Chapter 4.8.2.3).   
 
3)  Only a small minority (15.4%) believes that Turkish accession to the EU will 
enrich European cultural identity. This answer is linked to the responses given 
to Question 11 (Figure 5) on the Turkish Muslim character. In response to that 
question, a majority (75.4%) considered the Turkish Muslim character as a 
negative factor affecting the desirability of accepting Turkish accession to the 
EU. 84.6% answered that Turkish accession to the EU would not enrich 
European cultural identity.  However, this answer is also related to that given 
to Q11 as to whether cultural differences are a negative factor affecting 
Turkish accession to the EU.  A majority (53.8%) considered this not to be a 
negative factor. One can allege that this reply shows that there are no racist 
feelings against Turkey in Europe. At the same time, however, Europeans 
seem to feel that Turkey does not have much to offer culturally. A question 
must therefore be posed: is this a sign of European cultural superiority91?  
 
 
 
5.6 Turkish Contribution to the EU and the Strengthening of the EU Position in 
the Global System   
 
Question 14 is important in the context of assessing Turkish contribution to the EU 
position: 'Will the accession of Turkey to the EU contribute to the strengthening of the 
EU position on the global system?' Positive answers totalled 60% and negative 
responses totalled 33.8% (Figure 8).   
 
                                               
91
 As analysed in Chapter 4.4, Europeans possess by negative stereotypes of Turkish people. Such 
negative feelings may negatively affect European willingness to endorse Turkish accession to the EU. 
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Figure 8: Degree to which MEPs believe that Turkish accession will strengthen the global EU 
position  
 
 
In the context of the power game, the argument that Turkey will strengthen the EU 
globally has two sides:   
First: The idea that Turkey will strengthen the EU position globally constitutes a 
positive argument for Turkey's supporters in the EU. Within this framework, 
advocates of Turkish accession to the EU point toward Turkey's important geo-
strategic and geo-political location as their main argument (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Turkey 2008d). By definition, the importance of Turkey's geopolitical and geo-
strategic position is related to its military strength, energy resources, economy and 
commerce.    
 
Second: The statement that Turkey's accession to the EU will strengthen the position 
of the EU globally can also constitute a negative argument for those who do not 
support Turkish accession to the EU. Why? A strengthened EU, as a result of Turkish 
accession to the EU, means that Turkey will be, by definition, one of the most 
powerful and leading countries of the EU (scenarios analysed in Chapter 4.10). In the 
context of the 'power game', the leading EU countries, especially France and 
Germany, do not wish to see a powerful Turkey joining the EU. They are not ready to 
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share their power with Turkey (Figure 5)92. In light of this, Turkish contribution to the 
EU can be transformed into a negative factor with regard to Turkish accession to the 
EU.  
 
 
In addition, I note the following: in the event that the Turkish contribution to the EU is 
seen in positively, then, with the contribution of other factors -variables, it can 
positively affect the cohesion of the EU. One such variable could be the structural 
changes to be followed by both the EU and Turkey. Most important is Turkey's 
reform of the role of the army within the political system. Certainly, it takes two to 
tango. Therefore, the Europeans must move away from their negative stereotypes of 
Turkey and their prejudicial views of Turkish accession. As MEP Lagendijk (2007) 
points out, politicians and the media should do direct their best efforts towards this 
goal.  On the other hand, if Turkish accession to the EU is viewed negatively, then 
Turkish inclusion in the EU can negatively affect EU cohesion.  This will especially be 
true if Turkey cannot positively respond to the reforms required by the EU for full 
member-state status, or if the EU, for its own reasons – including problems of 
absorption capacity, conflicting national interests, negative stereotypes and lack of 
political will from European states to share power with Turkey- chooses not to 
integrate Turkey (see Chapter 4). Relevant to the above is Q15: If (answer to Q14 is) 
yes, to what extent? This question focuses on the areas in which the EU will be 
strengthened after Turkey's accession.  
 
 
                                               
92
 The political stance of France and Germany regarding Turkish accession to the EU currently relies on 
two main reasons: Firstly, public opinion in both countries is for the most part against Turkish accession 
to the EU as full member-state. Secondly, the governments of these two countries mostly belong to the 
right wing. Although in Germany there is a coalition between the right and the socialists, the Chancellor 
belongs to the right and has the first say on foreign policy, especially on crucial issues such as that of 
the accession to the EU. If the government changes, it is likely that the policy will change too. Certainly, 
this scenario might occur if public opinion and national interest impose different policies.  
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Figure 9: The area within and the extent to which Turkish accession will strengthen the EU 
position. 
 
 
As for other areas in which it is thought that Turkey will contribute, the answers are 
the following (Figure 9):  
1) 29.2% consider that Turkey will contribute economically to some extent; 12.3% 
consider it will contribute to a large extent. 18.5% answered that there will be little 
economic contribution by Turkey and 1.5% believed there will be very little 
contribution. 38.5% of the MEPs did not answer this question, either because they do 
not believe that Turkey's contribution in general is to strengthen the EU within the 
global system, or because they estimate that Turkey will not contribute to the EU 
economically or simply because they did not wish to commit themselves.     
 
2) 35.4% consider that Turkey will contribute politically to some extent to the EU and 
12.3% believe it will contribute to a large extent. 12.3% answered that Turkey's 
political contribution will be little. 40% of the MEPs chose not to answer this question, 
either because they believe that Turkish accession will not strengthen the EU within 
the global system or because they believe that there will be no political contribution 
by Turkey to the global position of the EU or simply because they did not wish to 
commit themselves.  
 
3) 43.1% consider that Turkey will contribute militarily to the EU to some extent and 
13.8% believe it will contribute to a large extent. 6.2% answered that there will be 
little military contribution. 36.9% of the MEPs chose not to answer this question, 
perhaps because they do not believe that Turkey's contribution will strengthen the 
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EU within the global system, or because they do not believe that Turkey can 
contribute to the EU militarily, or simply because they did not wish to commit 
themselves. 
 
4) Taking into consideration the answers to this question, I note that 20% answered 
that Turkish cultural contribution to the EU will be little and 10.8% very little. The 
percentage of those who answered little and very little totals 39.8%. Only 23% 
supported the position that Turkish accession to the EU will contribute culturally to 
the EU to some extent. Just 1.5% considered that it would contribute culturally to a 
large extent.  Regarding this point, it should be noted that Europeans believe that 
Turkish accession to the EU will not enrich European culture, and moreover hold 
negative views of Turkish religion and culture. In this context, one could allege that 
such an approach demonstrates either an arrogant European cultural attitude or the 
fact that Europeans still harbour negative stereotypes and prejudice (Chapter 4.4).       
 
 
Analysing the results above, one can observe that many European MEPs (43.1%) 
believe that Turkey will make an important military contribution to the EU. This is the 
highest result in this set of questions. One may allege that the perception of the 
European MEPs is that Turkey constitutes a strong military power. Therefore, it 
seems that they believe that Turkey can play a key role in the European defence 
system. This conception is grounded on the following reasons: 1) Turkey has the 
biggest army in Europe and the second biggest army in NATO. 2) It makes an 
important military contribution to NATO-, UN- and ESDP-led military missions. 3) It 
has an embattled and experienced army (see Chapter 4; 4.9; 4.9.1 and 4.9.2). The 
relevance of these may be seen in the context of French President Nicola Sarkozy’s 
statement on July 10, 2008, during the Plenary Session of the European Parliament, 
that the EU should acquire "its own, even autonomous defence." Moreover, he 
added, "the European defence system cannot be based on the contribution of four or 
five member-states." Although, in principle, Sarkozy does not agree with Turkey's full 
EU-membership and Ankara's influential role in the institutions of the EU, Turkish 
accession to the EU may be considered by some Europeans as a means to partially 
resolve a number of the existing defence problems. 
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As a military press attaché93 in Brussels stated:  
there are member-states who want Turkey in for two main reasons: 1) its contribution 
to the ESDP and 2) the Turkish contribution will release the countries which do not 
wish to contribute economically to the common European defence system from the 
obligation to do so, or, at least, reduce their military expenditure (2007). 
 
At the same time, in terms of the 'power game', such a military contribution maybe 
turned against Turkish accession.  Turkey, as Joost Lagendijk (2007) maintained, will 
become one of the dominant countries of the EU. Therefore, the interest of other 
leading countries may be at stake, forcing them to vote against Turkish accession to 
the EU or forcing them to believe that Turkish accession will threaten the EU 
cohesion. Indeed, this is the answer given to the following question on whether 
Turkey's accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU (see Chapter 5.9.1 
and Figures 14, 15).  
 
 
 
5.7 Redistribution of Power  
 
Redistribution of power is a key issue related to the contribution of Turkey to the EU, 
the balance of power, the new share of power, the conflicting, converging and 
common national interests, the structural changes and the cohesion of the EU.  
Pursuant to the findings of the survey, in the event of Turkey's accession to the EU, 
redistribution of power will occur on the economic, military, political and institutional 
levels.  Relevant to this is Q16 'Will Turkish accession of the EU bring a redistribution 
of power within the EU?' and the complementary Q16a on the extent of redistribution 
of each kind of power. 
                                               
93
 See footnote 35, Chapter 4. 
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Figure 10: Whether Turkish accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of power 
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 Figure 11: The extent of power redistribution following Turkey's accession 
 
 
The answers to these questions suggest the following (Figures 10 and 11):  
1) A majority (75.4%) felt that Turkish accession to the EU will bring about an 
economic redistribution of power. A minority (15.4%) answered negatively. Those 
who supported the economic redistribution of power, 41.5% answered that such 
redistribution will occur to some extent; 13.8% replied that it will occur to a large 
extent, and 24.6% responded that little redistribution will occur. 20% preferred not to 
answer, perhaps because they believe that Turkish accession to the EU will not bring 
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about a redistribution of power in general or else will not bring about an economic 
redistribution of power.   
 
2) A majority (84.6%) believes that Turkish accession to the EU will bring about a 
redistribution of political and diplomatic power within the EU. Only 9.2% answered 
negatively. Out of those who replied positively, 58.5% consider that political 
redistribution will occur to some extent, 13.8% consider it will occur to a large extent 
and 13.8% held that little redistribution will occur. 13.8% preferred not to answer, 
perhaps because they believe that Turkish accession to the EU will bring neither a 
redistribution of power in general nor a political and diplomatic redistribution of 
power.   
 
3) Certainly, political and diplomatic redistribution of power is relevant to military 
power. According to the results of the survey on this topic, a majority (84.6%) 
believes that Turkish accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of military power. 
Only 9.2% answered no. 38.5% consider that military redistribution of power will 
occur to some extent, 27.7% believe it will occur to a large extent and 20% believe 
that the redistribution of power will be little. In other words, they support the position 
that Turkish accession to the EU will not bring a redistribution of military power. 3.1% 
preferred not to answer, perhaps because they believe that Turkish accession to the 
EU will bring neither a redistribution of power in general nor a diplomatic 
redistribution of power.  
 
 
 
5.8 Structural Changes  
 
This redistribution of power can enhance the global role of the EU, should Turkey 
continue its substantial military contributions to the ESDP (see Chapter 4.9.2). There 
is another factor supporting this political position, that of the Turkish pivotal geo-
strategic location. Furthermore, the Turkish military forces and Turkish contributions 
to various military and civilian missions under the auspices of the EU enhance and 
will enhance Turkish political role and power, both institutionally and politically, for the 
reasons already explained in Chapter 4.10. The political say of a member-state, 
especially on the level of the Institutions of common defence and foreign policy, and 
more precisely within the context of the ESDP, is proportional to its military strength 
and to its contributions to EU, NATO or UN-sponsored missions (Chapter 4.9.2).  It is 
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safe to say that Turkey will be one of the dominant European powers, not only due to 
its size, but also because of other relevant factors by which the strength of each 
member state is defined, such as economic, political, military and institutional power.   
As far as institutional power is concerned, a majority (81.5%) considers that Turkish 
accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of power. (Figure 10) 41.5% believe 
that such redistribution will occur to some extent, 32.3% believe it will occur to a large 
extent and 10.8% believe that little redistribution will occur. 15.4% did not answer the 
question, perhaps because they believe that Turkish accession to the EU will bring 
neither a redistribution of power in general nor a diplomatic redistribution of power or 
simply because they did not want to commit (Figure 11).  If Turkey joins the EU as 
full member-state, it will be the second most powerful country of the EU after 
Germany. If Turkey’s population surpasses that of Germany, it will institutionally be 
the most powerful state of the EU (see Chapter 4.10).  
 
 
As has already been mentioned, the redistribution of power is related to the structural 
changes that Turkish accession will bring to the EU. This is a major reason for the 
huge debate prevailing across the EU over Turkish accession, a debate which 
focuses on the role of Institutions in founding a functional EU. The question posed is 
whether we will go towards a "wider or a deeper EU"94 (Lagendijk 2007). Certainly, 
the redistribution of power is also connected with the 'power game' within the EU. 
Turkey is not only part of the game, it plays a role in the balance of power between 
the member states of the EU and the resulting consequences, negative or  positive, 
for EU  cohesion in the event of Turkish accession. Therefore, on Q17 'According to 
your opinion, would Turkish accession to the EU lead or not to structural changes?' 
(Figures 12 and 13), I received the following answers:  
 
                                               
94
 One of the main debates is whether we should have a wider or a deeper EU. In other words, if priority 
should be given towards expanding or/and enlarging Europe or whether we should first deepen the EU 
by making it economically, politically and socially strong and institutionally functional before  proceeding 
to new Enlargements. 
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Figure 12: Whether Turkish accession to the EU could lead to structural changes 
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Figure 13: The extent of the structural changes following Turkish accession to the EU 
 
 
1) A majority (75.4%) believes that Turkish accession to the EU will bring military 
structural changes; 12.3% gave a negative answer. Out of those who answered yes, 
44.6% consider that military structural changes will occur to some extent and 13.8% 
to a large extent. 18.5% believe that little structural changes will occur. 12.3% 
answered that they do not know. 
 
2) A majority (89.2%) considers that political structural changes will occur. 63.1% 
considers that these political structural changes will occur to some extent, 13.3% 
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion 
 
163                                                                                         Ioannis Charalambides    
believe they will occur to a large extent and 16.9% believe that little political structural 
changes will occur.  A minority (12.3%) answered no to the question that Turkey of 
whether bring political structural changes and 3.1% answered that they do not know.  
 
3) A majority (87.7%) considers that Turkish accession to the EU will bring 
institutional structural changes. 46.2% believe that institutional structural changes will 
occur to some extent, 35.4% believe they will occur to a large extent and 7.7% 
believe that little institutional structural change will occur. 7.7% answered no and 
4.6% said they do not know.  
 
4) A majority (76.9%) considers that cultural structural changes will occur. 35.4% 
believe that these cultural structural changes will be realised to some extent, 36.9 to 
a small extent and 9.2% to large extent. A minority (16.9%) gave a negative answer 
and 4.6% answered that they do not know.   
 
5) A majority (75.4%) believes that Turkish accession to the EU will bring social 
structural changes. A minority (15%) answered no and 6.2% said they do not know.   
 
6) A large majority (90.8%) considers that Turkish accession to the EU will bring 
about economic structural changes. 53.8% consider that such economic structural 
changes will occur to some extent, 21.5% believe they will occur to a large extent 
and 16.9% believe they will occur to a small extent.   Only 3.1% answered that no 
changes will occur and 3.1% said that they do not know.         
 
 
 
 5.9 The Cohesion of the EU 
 
The findings of Q17 on whether Turkish accession to the EU will lead to structural 
changes have been already presented above (Figures 12 and 13). The findings of 
this question are relevant to Q18 on whether such changes will threaten or 
strengthen the cohesion of the EU (Figure 14). This means that the structural 
changes as well as the redistribution of power are -according to the terms set out in 
theories of Realism and Structural Realism - theoretically and practically consistent 
with the cohesion of the international system or subsystem. On this point, it should be 
noted that I consider the EU as a subsystem of the global system. Therefore, as 
analysed in Chapter 2 (2.3.2 and 2.3.3) the redistribution of power and the structural 
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changes that could occur within a system or subsystem will bring a new balance or 
imbalance of power. Such an imbalance of power could threaten national interests, 
especially those of the leading countries of a system or subsystem. In light of this, in 
order to assess whether Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the 
EU, one must examine the following:  
1) Turkey's contribution to the EU  
2) Redistribution of power 
3) Structural changes  
 
 
 
5.9.1 The Threat 
 
Topics 1 (Turkey's contribution to the EU) and 2 (Redistribution of power) have been 
already addressed. Therefore, I will focus on the answers to Q 18 (i.e. 'Taking into 
consideration your response to question 17, will such changes potentially threaten or 
strengthen the cohesion of the EU?'-Figure 14)  
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Figure 14: Effect of the potential structural changes on the cohesion of the EU due to Turkish 
accession. 
 
 
According to the answers to Q18 a majority (47.7%) believes that the structural 
changes that Turkey will bring to the EU will threaten the cohesion of the EU. A 
minority (35.4%) considers that Turkish accession to the EU will strengthen the 
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion 
 
165                                                                                         Ioannis Charalambides    
cohesion of the EU. 10.8 % answered 'do not know.' The percentage of those who 
ticked 'no answer' totals 4.6%. 
 
 
Examining Figure 15 below, one can see that from the majority of 47.7% a smaller 
percentage (24.6%) considers that the cohesion of the EU will be threatened to some 
extent. 20% believe that the cohesion of the EU will be threatened to a large extent, 
9.2% believe it will be threatened a little and only 1.5% feel it will be threatened to a 
very small extent. 4.6% did not give an answer to this question. On the other hand, a 
percentage of 35.4% believes that Turkish accession to the EU will strengthen the 
cohesion of the EU. Of these, 24.6% believe that such a strengthening will occur to 
some extent, 9.2% to large extent and 9.2% to a small extent. 
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Figure 15: Extent of effect of potential structural changes on EU cohesion 
 
 
 
5.9.2 National Interests and Balance of Power  
  
As has already been noted, Turkish contribution to the EU and the strengthening of 
the EU role in the global arena is one aspect of the argument. Two other aspects 
involve the redistribution of power and conflicting national interests, factors related to 
the cohesion of the EU. That is, Turkish contribution to the EU is one thing, and the 
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way that the leading and other member - states evaluate and measure it, as well as 
the political position they take on this, is another. The position that the contribution of 
Turkish accession to the EU will strengthen the EU in the global arena is justified by 
the following arguments:  First, Turkey is a vital actor on the international scene and 
will play an indispensable part in the EU’s global role. Second, if Turkey joins the EU 
it will be a leading and dominant power.  However, the fact remains that the leading 
EU countries are not ready to share their EU power with Turkey. This political attitude 
results from the conflict of national interests within the EU which rule, to a large 
extent, the international system, even though  the EU, functioning within the context 
of regional integration,  seeks a code of minimum common national interests. The 
end result of this is what we call 'common European interests'.  
 
 
In light of these common interests, it should be noted that if Turkish accession to the 
EU threatens to upset the existing balance of power, then those member-states 
whose interests are at stake will react, whether  before or after accession.  We have 
already noted the reactions of France, Germany and Austria as well as from other 
countries of the EU. Even if one considers that popular reactions result from, among 
other things, prejudice and xenophobia, leaders may be assumed to act rationally, in 
accordance with national interests, rather than in accordance with prejudice. If 
Turkey’s accession results in structural changes which lead to the upsetting of the 
existing European balance of power, then it is logical to assume that the EU could 
run the risk of facing a crisis and/or a cohesion problem (see Chapter 6.4.4, Worst 
case scenario). 
 
 
 
5.9.3 The Role of the US and Conflicting Interests 
 
One cannot turn a blind eye to the role that the US plays within the EU and the global 
system. What might happen if the US insists on supporting the full Turkish 
membership despite the opposition of leading EU countries? First, a conflict among 
the member-states of the EU may occur between those who support Turkish 
accession to the EU and those who wish to offer Turkey a 'privileged partnership'. 
Among the leading countries, England’s position is typically in line with that of US. 
Furthermore, some of the new member states, such as Czech Republic and Poland, 
typically choose to go along with US decisions. In such a situation things will not be 
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easy. The final decisions will depend on the national interests of each member-state, 
on the extent of US influence, and on the results of cost- benefit calculations in the 
context of a rational game95 (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 135). Second, if both 
sides remain adamant, conflict among member-states of the EU may occur. Is it 
possible or not that the US might use Turkey to create a crisis in the EU? Might it 
exploit Turkish accession to the EU, playing upon the rifts created by conflicting 
European national interests?           
 
 
 
5.9.4 Double Structural Changes 
 
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned issues, the following can be stressed:  
Contribution to power leads to redistribution of power and to structural changes. 
These factors - variables not only affect the cohesion of the EU but also lead to new 
power-sharing arrangements. The combination of these factors-variables threatens to 
harm national interests, to upset the existing balance of power, and to destabilise the 
cohesion of the EU leading to a possible threat to the cohesion of the EU. 
 
 
Therefore, these key questions must be addressed:  
First, will the EU or not undertake such structural reforms in order to avoid upsetting 
the balance of power and threatening to EU cohesion? Certainly, structural, 
institutional and economic changes are not enough. If the member-states, especially 
the leading ones, have no political intention to integrate Turkey because they fear 
losing their power, then no one can predict whether Turkish accession will lead to 
internal trouble in the EU or not.  
Second, will Turkey conclude or not the structural reforms required by the EU and by 
the contemporary economic and political international environment? If Turkey 
concludes the whole package of reforms, will the EU take it in as a full member-
state? If not, will we have a crisis or not? At the same time, if Turkey does not 
conclude the reforms but  joins  the EU, will the EU cohesion be threatened or not?              
     
   
                                               
95
 As Morgenthau wrote, national interest has the last word in international politics (Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff  1992a, p. 138). 
 
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion 
 
168                                                                                         Ioannis Charalambides    
In this context, it can be articulated that EU cohesion depends on structural changes 
that must be enacted from both sides, Turkey and the EU. Given that the absorption 
capacity of the EU is crucial to the success of the coming Enlargements, if the EU 
does not wish to see itself in trouble, then Turkey should be absolutely ready before 
joining the EU. The Turkish entry to the EU must not threaten the social, political and 
institutional stability, nor must it burden the budget of the EU, for, the EU cannot be 
expected to accept or take responsibility for Turkey's economic, political and 
'democratic deficits.'        
 
 
 
5.10 Democracy and Human Rights   
 
Relevant to the cohesion of the EU are the concepts of human rights, transparency 
and the democratic system of values as they are described in the context of the 
Copenhagen criteria (Europa Glossary)96. All these factors are crucial to democracy, 
which is indispensable to, and underlies, EU cohesion. Therefore, my study 
measures opinions on issues such as respect for political rights, women’s and 
children’s rights, religious and minority rights and the right of freedom of expression.  
Pursuant to my analysis in Chapter 4, these topics constitute dependent variables, 
affecting the independent variable of the cohesion of the EU (Van Evera 2001, pp. 26 
-27).  
 
 
 
5.10.1 Political Rights  
 
Regarding Q 20, 'According to your opinion, to what extent are human rights 
respected in Turkey?' the answers we received are the following. On ‘political rights', 
the majority (42.2%) answered that there is 'little' respect, 37.5% answered that they 
                                               
96
 Respect for human rights is a fundamental factor - variable of EU cohesion and one of the main 
issues upon which the EU evaluates Turkey (European Commission 2007, pp. 18-19; Chapter 4.8.2.3). 
Respect for human rights is included in the Copenhagen criteria (Chapter 1, footnote 2), which Turkey 
must fulfil in order to become full EU member-state). This is why human rights are measured in my 
Survey. In fact, I try to investigate whether the MEPs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs consider 
human rights as an important factor - variable of Turkish accession to the EU. According to the results of 
the Survey, there is no adequate respect for human rights in Turkey. In case that Turkey does not fully 
respect human rights, two things might happen: 1) Turkey will not join the EU as a full member-state. 2) 
If, nevertheless, Turkey joins the EU, the cohesion of the EU might be placed under threat (see also 
Chapter 6.4.5).          
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are respected to some extent, 10.9% specified 'very little' and 9.4% said they are 
respected 'to a large extent'. The answers of 'little' and 'very little' arrive at a 
percentage of 53.1%.  46.9% choose to answer 'to some extent' and 'to large extent' 
(Figure 16). 
 
 
 
5.10.2 Women's Rights  
 
Regarding respect for women’s rights: 49.2% answered that in Turkey there is ‘little 
respect,’ 27% answered ‘very little,’ 17.5% specified ‘to some extent’ and 6,3% said 
they are respected to ‘a large extent.’ That is, a majority (76.2%) answered 'little' and 
'very little' while 13.8% specified 'to some extent' and 'to a large extent' (Figure 16). 
 
 
 
5.10.3. Religious Rights  
 
Regarding respect for religious rights, 39.1% answered ‘little,’ 34.4% ‘very little,’ 20. 
3% ‘to some extent’ and 6.3% to ‘a large extent.’ 73.5% answered that religious 
rights are respected ‘little’ and ‘very little.’ 26.9% answered ‘to some extent’ and ‘to 
large extent’ (Figure 16). 
 
 
 
5.10.4 Minority Rights    
 
Regarding respect for minority rights, 45.3% answered that minorities enjoy ‘little 
respect,’ 40.6% specified ‘very little,’ 9.4% said they are respected ‘to some extent’ 
and 3.1% said they are respected to ‘a large extent.’  85.9% answered ‘little’ and 
‘very little’ while 12.5% answered 'to some extent' and 'to a large extent' (Figure 16). 
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5.10.5 Freedom of expression  
 
 Regarding respect for the right of freedom of expression, a 46.9% answered that in 
Turkey there is ’little respect,’ 18.8% specified ‘very little,’ 32.8% said that freedom of 
expression is respected ‘to some extent,’ and 1.6% said it is respected to ‘a large 
extent.’ That is, a total of 65.7% chose 'little' and 'very little,' while 34.4% answered 
‘to some extant’ and ‘to a large extent’ (Figure 16). 
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Figure 16: The extent that the MEPs believe that human rights are respected in Turkey 
 
 
 
5.10.6 Corruption  
 
Combating corruption is one of the main criteria a state should fulfil if it wants to join 
the EU. In Q21, 'Is there corruption in Turkey?' and the relevant Q21a, 'To what 
extent?' a huge majority (92.1%) answered positively (Figure 17). From this majority, 
46.7% considers that this corruption exists ‘to some extent,’ 45% ‘to a large extent’ 
and 8.3% ‘to a small extent’ (Figure 18). 
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Figure 17: Existence of corruption in Turkey according to MEPs 
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Figure 18: Extent of corruption in Turkey 
 
 
These results give the picture of what the surveyed MEPs believe regarding the 
respect of human rights in Turkey. The extent of respect of human rights is related to 
the Turkish political system and the role of the army within that system. As discussed 
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in Chapter 4, the army is deeply involved in the political system and enjoys a large 
share of the 'pie' of Turkish economy. In addition, it employs the Kemalist principle of 
‘statism’ in order to achieve political, economic, social and institutional consolidation 
within the system. Throughout the years, the Turkish army ruled the country by 
relying on the ‘democratic deficit'. This deficit now comes to the surface for two main 
reasons. First, Turkey's accession negotiations require that the Turkish political 
system proves that it enacts all necessary reforms before accession. In the context of 
these requirements, deficits become apparent. Second, the Turkish state must enact 
these reforms not only to meet EU entrance requirements, but also in order to be 
able to function without serious problems on internal and international levels.  An 
inability to do this will point toward Turkey's weakness to escape from the above-
mentioned 'democratic deficit'. 
 
 
 
5.10.7 Turkish Army 
 
The role of the Turkish army within the Turkish system is relevant to the cohesion of 
the EU on the one hand and Turkish cohesion on the other. Since the establishment 
of the Turkish democracy, the army has structured itself on the basis of Kemalist 
principles (see Chapter 4.5). As such, it defines itself as the depository of the system 
and of the territorial integrity of the state, in case these are placed under external and 
internal threats such as those presented by the Kurdish PKK. On the other hand, the 
EU rejects the existing dominant role of the Turkish army within the political system. 
One of the essential criteria required by the EU for Turkey’s accession is that its army 
should act like a European army (European Commission 2006c; European 
Commission 2007b.) That is, the Turkish army should act within a ‘democratic 
political system,’ and the upper hand should belong to the politicians, not to the 
generals (Rehn 2007a). By observing the answers to Q22, 'Is the Turkish army 
involved within Turkey's political system?' and Q22a, 'To what extent', one can see 
that a huge majority (96, 8%) believes that the Turkish army is involved in the Turkish 
political system (Figure 19). The opinions are measured as follows:  72.6% believes 
that the army is involved ‘to a large extent,’ 25.8% ‘to some extent’ and 1.6% 
believes that there is ‘little’ involvement of the army in the system (Figure 20). 
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Figure 19: Involvement of Turkish army in politics according to MEPs 
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Figure 20: Extent to which MEPs believe that the Turkish army is involved in politics 
 
 
Despite this fact, if Turkey enacts the reforms, then a new Turkish political system 
will be born, thereby reducing any risk of threat to the EU and its cohesion, and 
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Turkey is likely to coexist tolerably with the EU member states.  However, there are 
some factors that will influence some of the leading EU countries to consider the 
Turkish course towards the EU with scepticism, or to support the 'privileged 
partnership' option. Such factors include Turkey's size, the army, the Muslim 
character of the Turkish state, and the leading role that Turkey will play within the 
EU. As the results of the survey show, the leading countries of the EU are not ready 
to share their EU power with Turkey. Therefore Turkish accession to the EU does not 
depend only on reforms but on the serving of national interests, especially those of 
the leading countries of the EU.  Besides, the accession negations constitute an 
open ended procedure. Thus, nobody can guarantee that Turkey, at the end of its 
European road, will meet the status of full member-state (Council of the EU 2004, 
p.6).  
 
 
 
 5.10.8 'Democratic Deficit' 
 
These results presented above suggest why the Europeans are afraid of Turkish 
accession to the EU. The impression is that the Turkish political system will threaten 
the ‘democratic system’ of European values, principles and Institutions as well as the 
cohesion of the EU in general. Why? Because democracy is one of the main factors 
affecting the functionality and the cohesion of the EU.  In this context, the role of the 
army in the Turkish system increases the 'democratic deficit' which is, by definition, a 
negative factor with regard to Turkish accession to the EU.   
 
 
 
5.11 The Reforms  
 
Turkish accession to the EU depends on the political will of the member states of the 
EU and the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and other obligations stemming 
from the accession partnership between EU and Turkey (Europa Glossary; Council of 
the EU 2006b). This is one side of the coin. On the other side, Turkish accession to 
the EU depends on the Turkish political will and on the manner in which the Turkish 
side approaches its course towards EU accession. On this point, it is important to see 
what the MEPs answered to Q23, 'According to your opinion, for what reasons is 
Turkey undertaking reforms?' (Figure 21) 
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Figure 21: Reasons for which MEPs believe that Turkey is undertaking reforms 
 
 
 
The answers to this question were as follows: 
1) ‘In order to fulfil EU obligations.’ A majority (84.4%) answered yes and a minority 
(15.6%) answered no. Hereupon, I note that the reforms in Turkey will be not 
implemented simply as a result of the requirements imposed by the EU, but for 
another crucial reason: because the reforms constitute an economic and political 
necessity if Turkey wishes to stand on its own feet within the competitive global 
system. In order for Turkey to respond to internal necessities, Kemalism must be 
reformed on political, institutional, economic and social levels.  In Chapter 4 was 
analysed why ‘statism’ is a negative factor for the development and viability of the 
Turkish economy. As Professor Yunus Emre Gönen stated, "statism helped the 
Turkish economy in the past" (2007). However, in the contemporary period 'statism' 
can not adequately help the Turkish economy. At the same time, as was also 
analysed in Chapter 4.8, the EU considers institutional and constitutional structural 
changes to reduce the role of the army an issue of priority97 (Oomen- Ruijten 2008). 
This role should be constitutionally and institutionally defined and clarified in the 
context of a democratic political system such as those existing and functioning within 
the member-states of the EU.  
 
                                               
97
 The EU considers the procedure leading to the amendment of the Turkish constitution to be very 
important. Such a reform is viewed as fundamental to the establishment of a democratic political system 
based on European principles, one which can counteract the existing ‘'democratic deficit'.’  
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The way the internal economic, political, social and institutional sectors function in 
Turkey affect its reliability on an international level, enabling the country to become 
friendlier to and approachable by the EU and democratic states internationally. On 
the flipside of the coin, proponents of Turkey's accession argue that the existing 
‘democratic gap’ between Turkey and the EU as well as the required structural 
reforms, are not huge, and that the only thing that remains to be done is the 
following: that the EU as such and its member-states should show political intention 
to assist Turkish accession by avoiding an interminable procedure. The argument is 
that "Turkey can not wait for long…" (Gönen 2007)  
 
2) ‘In order to establish a modern state.’ A majority (56.3%) chose to answer yes and 
a minority (43.8%) answered no. Analysis of the answers to Q23 suggests that 
Turkey intends to complete reforms in order to establish a new political system, one 
able to respond successfully to international, economic, social and political 
challenges. Certainly, on this point one should take into account the sensitiveness of 
the Turkish people, as based on two points:  
a) The Turkish political message is that, indeed, the Turkish political system needs to 
be reformed, but that it is not much worse than the ones existing in other candidate 
countries at the time they joined the EU98.  
b) Therefore, the key word is ‘moderate’.  It is regarded as a challenge to refer to a 
‘moderate state’. The Turks consider that it is too much for someone to allege 
indirectly that the Turkish Republic does not belong to the ‘club of contemporary 
political systems’. The Turks accept that they have to improve their existing political 
system, but they can not accept that theirs is not a democratic one.99 
 
3) ‘In order to stabilise the political system.’ A majority (67.2%) answered that this is 
true. A minority (32.8%) answered no. This is a justification to Question 23 regarding 
the reasons for Turkey undertaking reforms (Figure 21). The argument is the 
following:  The reforms in Turkey aim at stabilising the 'political system' and 
                                               
98
 One of the arguments of the proponents of Turkey's accession is that, despite its problems, Turkey 
deserves to join the EU. They argue that neither Greece nor other countries, including Portugal, Bulgaria 
and Rumania, had fully met the criteria necessary to join the EU (then EEC) at accession (This 
argument, employed many times in the context of the EU- Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee in 
2005 and 2006, is frequently provided as an answer to those who argue that Turkey cannot join the EU 
as a full member-state, and/or to those who alleged that Turkey was not even ready to open accession 
negotiations with the EU). 
99
 This position was articulated by Mr Onur Öymen Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
during the EU -Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee meeting in Ankara on 2-5 May 2006. The 
summary here is based on my personal notes. 
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responding to the necessities of the contemporary era, so that Turkey will be capable 
of acting positively within the European and the global scene.  
 
4) ‘In order to stabilise the economy.’ A majority (67.2%) answered yes and 32.8% 
no. This answer is related to the political stability of the system and to Question 22 on 
the involvement of the Turkish army to the system. The message is clear: The 
Turkish economic system should be reformed so that the Turkish economy can stand 
on its own feet. A stable economy should rely on market rules and on a democratic 
political system free of the army's involvement. (Chapter 4.8; 4.8.1; 4.6.3) 
 
 5) ‘In order to strengthen social cohesion.’ A majority (63.5%) answered yes and a 
minority (36.4%) no. As we analysed in Chapter 4, reforms should be undertaken for 
the sake of strengthening Turkey's social cohesion. Turkey's social and economic 
cohesion will become of concern to the EU after its entry in the context of the 
structural funds. This concern is also reflected in Question 11, regarding the reasons 
behind the stance of some Europeans who do not wish to see Turkey joining the EU 
as a full member state. According to the results received on this question (see Figure 
5), a majority (58.5%) of the MEP's considers that Turkish accession to the EU will 
place an extra burden on EU cohesion policy and on the structural funds.  It is also 
reflected in research undertaken by the European Parliament (2007c), and analysed 
in Chapter 4.7. 
 
 
Another issue regarding Turkish accession to the EU is set forth in Q24. This 
question asks, 'Regardless of the EU requirements, should Turkey continue with the 
reforms?'  
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Figure 22: Whether MEPs believe that Turkey should continue with reforms 
 
 
A huge majority (98.4%) answered yes and only 1% answered no. Such an answer 
reflects the opinion that even if Turkey undertakes the reforms only to fulfil EU 
obligations, it should continue with them regardless of EU requirements (Figure 22). 
This question is related to Q25, 'Do you believe that Turkey will by itself put an end to 
its course to the EU?' (Figure 23). A majority (45.2%) answered no and 25.8% said 
yes. 27.4% answered that they do not know. This percentage shows that this is a 
difficult question and that in politics, it is rather difficult to make speculations on a 
prickly issue.     
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Figure 23: Possibility of Turkey putting by itself an end to its course towards the EU 
 
 
Those who answered yes to the question of whether or not Turkey is likely to stop its 
course toward the EU chose the following reasons for such possible behaviour:   
(Figure 24) 
1) Privileged regime (partnership): 56%.  
2) Political forces in Turkey do not wish to see Turkey in the EU: 43.8%.  
3) Turkey cannot successfully respond to the reforms required by the EU: 62.5%  
4) Fear that Turkish Europeanisation will threaten territorial cohesion: 66.7%.   
5)  Fear that Turkish Europeanisation will threaten social cohesion: 66.7%. 
6)  Fear that Turkish Europeanisation will threaten state cohesion: 62.5%. 
 
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion 
 
180                                                                                         Ioannis Charalambides    
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Privileged regime (partnership)
Political forces in Turkey
Turkey´s unsuccesful response to EU
reforms
Europeanisation as threat to Turkey´s
territorial cohesion
Europeanisation as threat to social
cohesion
Europeanisation as threat to state's
cohesion
No
Yes
 
Figure 24: Reasons for which MEPs believe that Turkey could put by itself an end to its 
course towards the EU 
 
 
On this point it should be noted that, over and above the reasons mentioned above, 
there are some other, unpredictable factors - incidents which might lead to the 
freezing, or even to the inglorious end of Turkish EU accession negotiations EU.  An 
example is the judicial procedure of the public prosecutor against the ruling AKP 
Party, President Gül, Prime Minister Erdogan and another 69 officials of the Party100.       
 
 
 
5.12 List of Variables  
 
One of the main goals of this project is to find out the factors - variables which could 
affect the cohesion of the EU as a result of Turkish accession to the EU. The survey 
was the last step of this procedure. The results of the survey have been analysed in 
this Chapter and compared to those of Chapter 4. Bearing in mind the results of the 
survey as well as the theoretical literature, I have arrived at some useful conclusions 
regarding the variables upon which a model of EU cohesion in relation to Turkish 
accession to the EU can be based.     
 
                                               
100
 This development triggered a political and institutional instability, ended by the verdict of the court 
which provided for a financial penalty against AKP because of the law it had voted into effect on the 
headscarf (Boland 2008). 
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In Chapter 4 a list of factors -variables which may affect EU cohesion was set forth.  
The survey shows that those variables mentioned in Chapter 4 do indeed affect the 
cohesion of the EU. By analysing the results of the survey, one can get a clear 
picture of the variables affecting the cohesion of the EU either positively or 
negatively.  Within this spectrum, some other variables can be included, such 
conflicting national interests, the economic, social, cultural political and military 
contribution of Turkey to the EU, the redistribution of power and structural changes. 
There is a causal coherence between them. These variables affect the EU by 
creating a redistribution of power and subsequent structural changes such as new 
power-sharing, a change in the balance of power and an upsetting of the balance of 
power. Such an upsetting of the balance of power may lead to conflicting national 
interests or even to a crisis and hence threatens the cohesion of the EU.  
 
 
Therefore, in the event that military power brings about a redistribution of power and 
structural changes, and that the structural changes threaten EU cohesion, one could 
note the following:  The cohesion policy is the independent variable, while the 
economic, social, institutional and military variables become dependent and 
redistribution of power becomes an intermediate variable. In the event that the 
redistribution of power brings about structural changes threatening the cohesion of 
the EU, then the cohesion of the EU will become an independent variable, the 
structural changes will become the dependent variable and the redistribution of 
power will be the intermediate variable (see Footnote 21 in Chapter 3.2.1).                
 
  
Therefore the list of the variables affecting the EU cohesion regarding Turkish 
accession to the EU comprises the following:  
1) Democracy and respect for human rights. (Religion, women’s rights, 
children's rights, property and political rights as well as freedom of 
expression).  
2) Economy (inflation, competitiveness, unemployment, banking and monetary 
system, statism)    
3) Society  
4) EU cohesion policy  
5) Culture  
6) Immigration 
7) Role of the Turkish army  
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8) Corruption  
9) Size of population  
10) Prejudice   
11) Negative stereotypes  
12) Functionality of Institutions.  
13) Contribution to the EU 
14) Balance of power  
15) Redistribution of power 
16) Structural changes    
17) Share of power  
18) Conflicting and national interests  (Cyprus issue)101 
  
 
In order to explain how these variables can contribute to the establishment of a 
model of the EU cohesion in relation to Turkish accession to the EU, I must stress a 
point of methodological importance. Each variable affects the others, and all, taken 
together, shape, through their interaction, the model of the EU cohesion.  For 
example, by examining the variable of democracy we can obviously see that it is 
causally related to human rights. Human rights are indispensable components of 
democracy. If democracy is considered as an independent variable, then human 
rights are dependent. If the cohesion of the EU is considered as an independent 
variable, then democracy is the dependent variable and human rights is  the 
intermediate variable, leading to democracy and to the cohesion of the EU (Van 
Evera 2001, p. 26-27). There is, in fact, a chain of variables.   
 
         
   
5.13 The Next Step  
 
This chapter lists the variables that will affect the cohesion of the EU as a result of 
Turkish accession to the EU. The next step is to analyse the conclusions of this 
project in the context of our main goal, that of establishing an EU cohesion model for 
Turkish accession to the EU.  
 
 
                                               
101
 See Footnote 64  
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CHAPTER 6 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Turkish accession to the EU is one of the main issues prevailing across the 
European political scene. It bears much in common with the so-called 'German 
question.'  With regard to this question, politicians and academics were trying, 
especially after the reunification of Germany, to determine whether there would be a 
German Europe or a European Germany. Similarly, the question which emerges from 
the process of Turkish accession to the EU is whether we will have a European 
Turkey or a Turkish Europe. A second question which complements the first is this: 
Will Turkish accession to the EU threaten the cohesion of the EU. 
 
 
 In this chapter, various scenarios will be elaborated on regarding the question of 
whether Turkish accession to the EU will threaten EU cohesion. Through the analysis 
of these scenarios, and by employing variables affecting the cohesion of the EU, I will 
establish an EU cohesion model. Therefore, in this Chapter the following issues are 
examined: Theoretical justifications for Turkish accession, EU cohesion models, 
potential positive and negative scenarios linked to the accession process, issues of 
democracy, EU Institutions, and economic and societal factors. These topics are 
comprised under the following sub-headings: 
• Theories and Justifications  
• Variables and Model of EU Cohesion 
• The Pillars of EU Cohesion 
• First Scenario: Negative 
• Second Scenario: Positive 
• Third Scenario: The Two Capitals of the EU and the Historical Circle 
• Fourth Scenario: Worst Case Scenario and Crisis 
• Fifth Scenario: Democracy in Relation to the Turkish Accession to the EU 
• Sixth Scenario: The EU Institution and the Turkish Accession to the EU 
• Seventh Scenario: EU Cohesion policy and the Turkish Accession to the EU 
• Eight Scenario: Economy and the Turkish Accession to the EU 
• Ninth Scenario: Society and the Turkish Accession to the EU 
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• Final Scenario: Model of the EU Cohesion 
• Third Road and Unpredictable Development 
• Epilogue 
 
 
 
6.2 Theories and Justifications  
 
The analysis of this project has been based on theories of International Relations, 
including Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo- Functionalism. One of 
the main challenges of this project has been to examine whether theory could meet 
experience and reality.  This is the quintessence of the scientific method (see 
Chapter 3.2). As analysed in Chapter 3.2, a theory cannot be considered concrete 
and reliable unless it is justified by real facts.  For the purposes of this project, the 
theories of Realism and Structural Realism are used as a theoretical basis. Particular 
emphasis is given to Gilpin’s theories about the causes for the decline of an 
international system (see Chapter 2.3.3). As Classical and Structural Realism point 
out, structural changes and the redistribution of power can upset the existing balance 
of power, thereby causing the decline of a system (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, 
pp. 167). This is likely to trigger a crisis, perhaps even lead to armed conflict 
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp. 166; Gilpin 1981, p. 230).Such a worst-case 
scenario may particularly occur if the cost of structural changes and the imbalance of 
power are significantly higher than any benefit (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 
169; Gilpin 1981). The theories of Realism and Structural Realism focus on the way 
that national interests affect or even rule the international system and shape and 
guide the behaviour of international actors (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp. 166-
169; Gilpin 1981, pp.9-11, Waltz 1979, pp. 60-67). 
 
 
On the other hand, the EU has been constructed in the concept of regional 
integration. This political, legal and economic structural process of integration is 
fuelled by the creation of common interests as the theories of Functionalism and 
Neo-Functionalism underlie (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1992b, p. 161; Groom & Taylor 
1975, p. 2). In this respect, Europe moves between Realism and Structural Realism 
on the one hand and Functionalism and Neo- Functionalism on the other (See 
Chapter 2.3.4). What this project attempted to examine was whether Turkish 
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accession to the EU will bring a redistribution of power and structural changes, and 
whether, at the and of the day, Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the 
cohesion of the EU.  
 
 
In order to fulfil this aim, nine research questions were identified in Chapter 2: 
1) Which are the main factors affecting the shaping of the EU’s policy on Turkish 
accession to the EU?  
2) What is the role of the US, as a major actor of the international system, and to 
what extent does it influence the shaping of EU policy and decision making on 
Turkish accession to the EU? 
3) Are the decisions of the EU taken in accordance with the national interest of its     
member states or in accordance with the common European interest? What is the 
role of national interest in the EU decision making process? 
4)  What is the Turkish political situation? 
5) What is the role of the Turkish army within the Turkish political system? 
6) Are Europeans afraid of Turkish accession to the EU? To what extent and why?  
7) Will Turkish accession to the EU bring a redistribution of power? 
8) Will Turkish accession to the EU change the structure of the EU?  
9) Could such structural changes threaten the cohesion of the EU?  
 
 
In answering these questions I expected to form a list of factors-variables affecting 
the cohesion of the EU (see Appendix 7- Short list of answers to research questions)  
These variables have been generated through the analysis in Chapter 4 and their 
credibility has been cross-tested in Chapter 5.   At the same time, in the framework of 
the following nine scenarios on Turkish accession to the EU, one can observe under 
what circumstances and what combination of variables should come together so that 
the aforementioned theories of international relations are to be justified102.  
 
 
 
                                               
102
 Theories of International Relations, which constitute the theoretical basis of this project, have been 
presented in Chapter 2. Their justification (or not) is reflected in the conclusions of this research. This 
justification is connected to Chapter 3 (methodology) where I explain that science can be justified only if 
theory is coupled with practice. The diagrams, which follow, present the findings of this research and 
illustrate, step by step, though various scenarios, why, how and under which circumstances, Turkish 
accession to the EU may threaten or not the cohesion of the EU.     
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6.3 Variables and Model of EU Cohesion 
 
In Chapter 2.4, it is already clarified that through this project I attempt to examine 
what factors-variables affect the cohesion of the EU in practice and more specifically, 
using Turkish accession to the EU as my case-study (see Chapter 3.2). Therefore, in 
this sub-chapter and taking on board the findings of Chapter 4 and 5, I aim at two 
things: 1) Identity the factors affecting the cohesion of the EU in conjunction with 
Turkish accession to the EU. 2) Define the EU cohesion as such. That means the EU 
cohesion on its own and not in relation to Turkish accession to the EU.    
 
 
With these issues in mind, I attempted to construct a model of EU cohesion, focusing 
in particular on how and under what circumstances the EU and its cohesion might be 
at stake. Responding to the first aim mentioned above and taking into account the 
analysis of Chapter 4 and the relevant answers from the questionnaire (Chapter 5), 
one can infer that the following variables affect the cohesion of the EU:  
 
1) Democracy (rule of aw and respect for human rights which include, in the 
case of Turkey,  religious, minority, property, women’s, and  children’s rights, 
as well as the right of freedom of expression).       
2) Economy ('statism', unemployment, inflation, banking system, privatisation, 
competitiveness, role of the army).     
3) Military power (state expenditures, size, quality, ability and embattled 
character of the Turkish army; contributions to the ESDP, NATO and the UN).    
4) Society (immigration, prejudice, religion, system of values, racism).    
5) Cohesion policy (structural funds, disparities, large size of state and 
populace).     
6) Culture (Muslim identity, system of values, education, nationalism as one of 
the main principles of Kemalism).   
7) Corruption (political system, ‘democratic deficit’, deficiency of the judicial 
power and other Institutions).   
8) Role of the Turkish army. 
9) Institutions (democratic nature and functionality of Institutions and of the 
European system).  
10) Immigration (inflation, unemployment, racism, prejudice, negative 
stereotypes). 
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Each of these variables affects or is affected by other variables, and vice versa. In 
other words, these variables illustrate the phenomenon of interaction.  A chain of 
causal relations is thereby created between the independent variables of cohesion on 
the one hand and the dependent and intermediate variables on the other. Analysing 
Chapter 2 (theories of International Relations) and Chapter 4 in relation to the results 
of the survey (Chapter 5), I note that the cohesion of the EU is a matter of a ‘power 
game,’ and is affected by the following factors variables:   
1) Contribution to the EU. 
2) Redistribution of power. 
3) Structural changes (The EU absorption capacity is included in the positive 
structural changes).  
4) Share of power.  
5) Threat to the balance of power.  
6) Upsetting of the balance of power.   
7) Conflicting national interests103.  
 
 
These variables are closely related to the ten variables mentioned above. A negative 
combination of these variables may even cause a crisis threatening the cohesion of 
the EU. On the other hand, a positive combination of variables might reduce the 
threat to EU cohesion.  In other words, if a crisis scenario occurs, then the theories of 
Realism and Structural Realism are justified.  
 
 
According to the results of the survey, Turkish accession to the EU will contribute to 
the global position of the EU (Chapter 5, Questions 8 and 9). On the one hand, this is 
a positive development for Turkey and for the EU as well. However, these results 
must be also examined in relation to other answers. In this context, one can observe 
that despite the positive assessment of the potential Turkish contribution to the EU, 
the answers to other questions - for example, with regard to the redistribution of 
power and whether this redistribution will bring structural changes -  are related to the 
political will and national interests of the leading EU countries such as France and 
Germany. Indeed, regarding the political will of the leading countries, the majority of 
the MEPs appear to believe that some of the leading countries of the EU are not 
ready to share the power that they now enjoy within the EU with Turkey. In this 
                                               
103
 These may include the Cyprus issue (see also Footnote 64, Chapter5). 
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framework, it is obvious that the variable of 'national interest' affects the political 
scene and developments, as well as the EU cohesion, such as the relevant theories 
of Realism and Structural Realism suggest (Chapters 2.3.2 - 2.3.3). 
 
 
At the same time, the majority of answers to questions about cohesion confirm the 
view that Turkish accession will threaten the cohesion of the EU (see Questions 16, 
17, 18 of the Questionnaire). The majority agreed with the argument that structural 
changes in relation to the Turkish accession to the EU will threaten the cohesion of 
the EU. Even if Turkey's economic, military, political and cultural contribution affects 
the EU in a positive manner, such a development does not necessarily ensure that 
the EU will be spared problems of cohesion (Chapter 5.7; 5.8; 5.9.1). This is true for 
two reasons: 1) what one has to examine is not only the extent and the size of the 
contribution but at the same time, the political consequences of such a development 
in terms of balance of power. 2) Because the redistribution of power, as a result of a 
positive contribution, will bring structural changes, power-sharing, upsetting of the 
balance of power, conflict of national interests and possibly even a crisis. In such a 
case, the cohesion of the EU and the existence of the EU will be threatened. This is 
the rational political hypothesis of this research, which responds to and justifies the 
theories of Realism and Structural Realism, in particular what Gilpin argued about the 
decline of the international system (see Chapters 2.3.2; 2.3.3 & 4)      
 
 
Therefore, the key issue is not only whether Turkey does or does not have the 
political intention to fulfil the legal and political commitments undertaken in the 
framework of EU accession negotiations, but also whether the leading countries of 
the EU -or some of them- have the political intention - in accordance with their 
national interests and in the context of the 'power game' - to integrate Turkey into the 
EU.104 Acting within such a ‘power game,’ the leading countries would follow the rules 
of the 'balance of power' and seek to serve their own national interests.  
 
 
In addition, there are some other reasons contributing to this development: 
                                               
104
 The results of the survey were very clear on this question. The MEPs believe that Turkey will not 
stop, by itself, its route toward EU accession. As the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ali Babacan stated on 
May 26, 2008 before the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, the reforms are not undertaken 
only because of the Turkey’s obligations but for its own people.   
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First, European prejudice against the Turkish Muslim cultural identity has become a 
methodological tool for those who want to close the EU full-membership door to 
Turkey, only offering Ankara the status of a ‘privileged partnership’ (see Chapters 4.3 
and 4.4).   
 
Second, American support for Turkish accession to the EU, while positive both for 
Turkey and for those who support Turkish accession to the EU, has raised suspicion 
on the part of  those who view Turkish accession to the EU with scepticism . The 
American stance fuels the fear that if Turkey joins the EU, it is likely to become the 
'Fifth Phalanx' of the US within the EU (see Chapter 5.2 and Question 11- Figure 5). 
These fears are reinforced by the sceptical role that Britain plays in the EU, as well 
as by the political positions of some new member states such as Poland and the 
Czech Republic. Each, in various cases, has supported the American rather than the 
EU interests, especially on issues of security and foreign policy (see for example, 
Chapter 5.2.1 on the establishment of antiballistic missile systems on their territories 
as well as the crisis in Georgia). 
 
Third, the impression that the economic problems of the EU result from negative 
consequences of the 2004 and 2006 Enlargements (see Chapter 4.7).  In relation to 
this point, one should note the reports issued by the services of the European 
Parliament (2006a) regarding the consequences of Turkish accession to the EU: for 
example, the fact that Turkey will absorb 27, 3% of the whole package of structural 
funds, or the fact that the GDP of the EU is to be reduced by an average of 10% 
(European Parliament 2006a). 
 
 
Certainly, beyond the positive or the negative political intention of the EU member 
states regarding Turkish accession to the EU, one must also assess the reality within 
Turkey. The Turkish state is currently encountering severe problems. The 
conclusions of this project suggest that, these problems include the following:  
1) The role of the Turkish army. On the one hand, the army is the source of the 
‘democratic deficit’. On the other hand, this 'democratic deficit' is the main pillar upon 
which Kemalism is founded. Hereupon, one could mark that, whilst democracy (one 
of the main variables) constitutes a component factor upon which the cohesion of the 
EU is founded, in the case of Turkey the 'democratic deficit' constitutes a component 
factor upon which the Turkish Kemalism system is based. Democracy is considered 
a factor threatening the cohesion of Kemalism, whilst it keeps the EU in cohesion.  
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2)  'Statism' and other structural economic problems that Turkey faces, such as 
problems in the banking system, inflation and the instability of the monetary system. 
These problems compose the picture of an unhealthy economic situation (see 
Chapters 4.6.1, 4.6.2, 4.6.3). Such a situation is connected to the wider structural 
problems of the Turkish political system, which itself is still founded on the principles 
of Kemalism. This situation offers the army the opportunity for deep involvement in 
economic affairs and thereby, an important role in the reforms (see Chapter 4.8.1). In 
the past, 'statism' used to have a decisive influence on the stability of the Turkish 
system and the Turkish economy. However, nowadays, it has been surpassed by 
global economic, social and political realities and necessities. This procedure is 
employed by the Turkish army to consolidate its dominant role in the system, through 
wangles for example, thus contributing to the reinforcement of corruption (see 
Chapter 4).        
3) Social problems. These are related to: a) the ‘democratic deficit', in particular the 
lack of respect for fundamental human rights such as religion, women’s rights, 
children’s rights, property rights, and freedom of expression, and b) economic 
problems (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
 
The aforementioned reasons are not the only variables negatively affecting Turkish 
accession to the EU. There is another one: Turkish strength and especially its military 
strength, which is causally connected to Turkey's important geopolitical position. It is 
true that Turkey’s strength and size as well as its geo-strategic position constitute a 
political and diplomatic advantage. This fact is actually one of the arguments 
employed by those who support the Turkish accession to the EU. However, these 
factors are turned into disadvantages in the context of the ‘power game’ between the 
EU member states on the one hand and Turkey on the other.  Why would the leading 
countries of the EU wish to see Turkey in the EU and to see it become, at the same 
time, a leading country? If Turkey meets the criteria of Copenhagen and establishes 
a strong economy and a stable political system, it will grow stronger. This very fact, 
could make it even more undesirable for certain leading European countries to allow 
Turkey to enter the EU, and could therefore work to its disadvantage105 (Lagendijk 
2007). 
                                               
105
 Joost Lagendijk ascertained that if Turkey joins the EU it will be a dominant country. In terms of the 
'power game', why should the leading countries want to share the power they now enjoy in the EU with 
Turkey? However, what argument could they put forward for rejecting Turkish membership if it fulfils the 
Copenhagen criteria and its other EU obligations? In such a situation, the leading EU countries, or any 
other country which does not wish Turkey to enter the EU as a full member-state, will find themselves in 
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Certainly, the situation will improve if both sides achieve a code of common interests. 
If this code of common interests is combined with positive structural changes and a 
rational redistribution and share of power, guaranteed by the functionality of the 
relevant Institutions, then both Turkey and the EU will be able to create a fertile 
ground for Turkey's accession to the EU as a full member-state. Based on the results 
of the survey as well as the data already collected for this project, one may come to 
the conclusion that under certain circumstances Turkey has no chance of joining the 
EU with the status of a full member state. Such circumstances include an absence of 
adequate reforms in the areas of human rights, the role of the army in the political 
system, corruption, economic problems and political instability (see Chapter 4 and 5). 
However, if Turkey successfully completes proposed reforms, not only does 
accession become more possible, but in addition we will have a new Turkey, not the 
one we have now.  
 
 
 
6.3.1 The Main Pillars of EU Cohesion   
 
In response to the second aim of Chapter 6.3, a definition on EU cohesion must be 
given, or better, on internal EU cohesion. In other words, I refer to the following: How 
the EU constructs its own cohesion and what are the factors-variables upon which 
such an internal cohesion can be founded. This internal EU cohesion and the factors-
variables which is consisted of, are affected by factors-variables which result from 
Turkish accession to the EU or/and from other accession processes in the context of 
Enlargement. All these factors-variables deriving from the findings of this project are 
listed above (Chapter 6.3). 
 
 
To avoid any confusion, I reiterate the difference between EU cohesion policy – the 
strategy by which the end goal of cohesion may be reached - and cohesion itself. 
Therefore, the cohesion policy of the EU is one of the main pillars upon which EU 
cohesion relies. This policy aims at filling gaps and overcoming disparities within the 
EU, as well as at bringing about economic, social, territorial, cultural and political 
stability (see Chapter 2.3.5).  It is, also, related to the EU absorption capacity and the 
                                                                                                                                       
a predicament. Certainly, such a difficult position will depend on the general political situation and on the 
alliances that will be formed in favour of or against Turkey's full membership. Moreover, issues of 
national interest will play a significant role in the decision-making. 
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structural changes, which must be enacted within the EU should it wish to be 
enlarged in a smooth way.  This is why cohesion policy constitutes an indispensable 
component factor-variable of EU cohesion. In this respect, a short definition of 
internal EU cohesion may be articulated as follows: internal EU cohesion is 
composed of a set of factors-variables that when they come together can hold EU in 
economic, social, political, territorial and institutional stability, i.e. in cohesion.   
 
 
Taking into account the results of this Project, the EU cohesion is based on of the 
following variables:  
1) Cohesion policy. 
2) Economic factors. This is not only a specific area of concern within cohesion 
policy, but is also related to social, political and institutional stability.  
3) Democracy and respect for human rights, the rule of law and other areas of 
concern outlined in the Copenhagen criteria (Europa Glossary).  
4) Social stability. This is related to economic, political and institutional stability.  
5) Culture. This is connected to issues of both national identity and a broader 
'European' identity. Culture is usually presumed to be consistent with a system of 
values and principles as well as with tradition, and to reflect both the past and the 
future.  If EU cohesion depends among others, on a European cultural identity, then 
the question of how 'European' Turkish Muslim culture actually is or could be, 
becomes an area of debate. This issue is further complicated by the existence of 
negative stereotypes of and prejudice against Turkish Muslim culture and Turkey 
itself. 
6) Institutional stability. The stability and functionality of Institutions is related to 
democratic values and principles as well as to the structure of the Institutions. This 
stability and functionality is negatively affected by the ''democratic deficit'' which 
exists between the EU and its EU member-states.  It is also positively or negatively 
affected by the quality of the treaties upon which the Institutions of the EU are 
founded.        
 
 
Given the above factors as well as the factors presented in Chapter 6.3, one can see 
that a model for EU cohesion depends on two sets of variables: circumstances 
favouring cohesion and circumstances which threaten it. Therefore, the model of EU 
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cohesion that I establish in relation to Turkish accession to the EU includes all 
factors-variables listed in Chapters 6.3 and 6.3.1. Based on this model, I elaborate in 
Chapter 6.4 nine scenarios on EU cohesion in connection to Turkish accession to the 
EU in order to examine whether such accession will threaten EU cohesion -or not- 
and whether the hypothesis of this project is justified or not.  
 
 
 
6.4 Recommendations 
 
Taking into consideration the variables of EU cohesion and the impact, positive or 
negative, on this cohesion of Turkish accession to the EU, I present the following 
possible scenarios, upon which recommendations may be based. Through this 
exercise, one can also assess the circumstances under which theories of 
International Relations, such as Realism, Structural Realism, Functionalism and Neo-
Functionalism, constitute descriptions of reality.  
 
 
 
6.4.1 First Scenario: Negative 
 
The first scenario draws on and justifies theories of Realism and Structural Realism. 
As previously noted, theories of Realism and Structural Realism posit that military 
power, economic and social factors, the redistribution and balance of power can 
either keep the international system in cohesion or lead to its decline and/or collapse.  
The scenario proposed here is based on the theory of 'domino effect'106. That is,  if 
Turkey enters the EU and its contribution107 to the EU (see Chapter 5.9, Question 18) 
will bring negative redistribution of power and negative structural changes, what will 
follow will upset the existing balance of power, create a new balance of power, 
produce conflicting national interests, and lead to a situation of crisis. Furthermore, 
such structural changes will negatively affect EU Institutions and their decision-
making processes, as well as increasing the 'democratic deficit'. The results of these 
effects will be to threaten EU cohesion.    
                                               
106
 Domino effect: when an action causes a sequence of other actions. 'Domino effect' was the 
prevailing doctrine of international system during the Cold War. 
107
 I have already analysed under what circumstances the Turkish contribution to the EU may negatively 
affect  the redistribution of power in favouring Turkey and putting the national interests of the leading 
member – states  at stake (see chapter5.6).   
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Figure 1 
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6.4.2 Second Scenario: Positive 
 
The second scenario draws on the theories of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism. 
In this scenario, Turkey will meet its obligations, thereby showing its readiness to join 
the EU as a full member state.  Its positive contributions to the EU will result in a 
normal redistribution of power, and the structural changes that occur will be the result 
of reforms implemented to facilitate Turkey's integration into the EU.   In this scenario 
the EU as well will be ready to promote and fulfil new reforms and structural changes 
(Böge 2007; Chapter 4).  
 
 
If the following factors-variables are implemented with positive effects, then the risk 
of upsetting the balance of power and giving rise to conflicting national interests will 
be reduced: 1)Turkey's economic, social, cultural, or militarily contribution, 2)the 
redistribution of power and 3) structural changes. In addition, common interests could 
restrain conflicting national interests. At the same time, such a scenario would have a 
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positive affect on EU Institutions and on the decisions of the EU, thereby maintaining 
EU cohesion. In this case, in the context of a normal Enlargement we may take a 
step further towards European regional integration, as suggested by the theories of 
Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism. However, this result is not certain. Why? 
Because whether or not this step towards regional integration will occur depend on 
the structural changes which will take place on the institutional level in particular - the 
level at which the relations and the power games of the EU member-states are most 
evident. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Cohesion of the EU in Relation
to Turkish Accession to the EU
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Therefore, one of the main preconditions of achieving regional integration is the 
progressive limitation -or even full conference- of state sovereignty to supranational 
Institutions.  Consequently, if the EU member-states, in the context of their power 
games, have no political intention of undertaking such structural changes which will 
eventually lead to less state sovereignty, then, how can one allege that an enlarged 
Europe moves towards regional integration? How can one allege that state's role in 
the international system will be replaced by enhanced supranational Institutions? At 
the same time, the EU Enlargements depend on successful structural changes upon 
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which the absorption capacity can be constructed. Otherwise, the EU can not 
proceed towards normal and successful Enlargements.      
 
 
In case of a normal Enlargement, the scenario of having a new Turkey acting in the 
context of a democratic political system may become a reality. In light of this, Turkey 
will not only be a full member state of the EU but will also be:  
1) A leading country of the EU due to its territorial size, its young and large 
population, its military power, its economy and its pivotal geopolitical and geo-
strategic position situating it as a bridge between Asia and Europe as well as 
one of the main energy crossroads (see Chapters 4.4 and 4.9.2). 
2) A democratic country playing a dominant role within the EU, with extensive 
political and institutional power within the Institutions of the EU. If this occurs 
Turkey will play a regional or even global role of high importance (see 
Chapter 4.9.2 and 4.10). 
3) A centre of attraction for Muslims living in Europe and elsewhere. Muslim 
European citizens will turn to Turkey, as a powerful member state of the EU, 
for protection and promotion of their interests. As Muslims, they feel close to 
Ankara or Istanbul, which will be turned into their second unofficial capital of 
the EU, after the official one, i.e. Brussels. They will have more confidence in 
Turkey unless their interests impose them a different reaction.  However, it is 
not certain whether the other European countries will feel comfortable with 
such a development. 
 
 
 
6.4.3 Third Scenario: the Two Capitals of the EU and the Historical Circle     
 
A third scenario illustrates how Turkey’s geo-strategic and political position might 
function within the EU.  The more powerful Turkey is – especially if this power stems 
from its Muslim character – the more likely it is that it will upset the existing balance 
of power, leading to the creation of a new balance or imbalance of power, to a 
conflict of national interests, and possibly to a crisis. Certainly, this crisis would 
threaten the cohesion of the EU.  The first stage of such a scenario would be the 
establishment of two European capitals, one Western and one Eastern, as occurred 
with the separation of the Roman Empire, which led to the rise of the Byzantine 
Empire. In the event of a severe crisis, even one that does not lead to a military 
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confrontation but rather to a 'velvet divorce' between the EU and Turkey, we will have 
come full circle, historically speaking. To avoid such an evolution, the EU, its member 
states and Turkey must eliminate all those factors- variables –that stand in the way of 
Turkish accession to the EU and that threaten EU cohesion.  
 
 
These factors -variables, which have been analysed in previous Chapters, are 
summed as follows: 1) Prejudice 2) Historical stereotypes such as reflected in the 
Vienna syndrome. 3) Religion as a political, social and economic tool as a means of 
achieving national interests. 4) Redistribution of power. 5) Upsetting of the balance of 
power, cost and conflicting national interests.  The latter are included in the context of 
the 'power game' (Chapter 2.3.3; Chapter 4 and 5). 
 
 
Therefore, even if Turkey finally joins the EU as full member-state, it is likely that the 
cohesion of the EU will come under threat. This could happen under the following 
circumstances: The combination of a powerful Turkey within the EU on the one hand, 
and the action, either separately or accumulatively, of those variables which 
negatively affect the cohesion of the EU on the other. The conflict of vital national 
interests could be an adequate reason to spark a political, economic or even military 
crisis. On this point, if one takes for granted that before any decision, the actors of 
the international system think rationally, then, most probably, the results of their 
decisions and actions will bring higher benefit than cost. Or their decisions will seek 
to minimise the cost even as prevent the crisis (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 
168 and Gilpin 1981, pp. 10, 42). As we recall, according to Realism and Structural 
Realism, one of the main causes of conflict is the following: when the cost which 
occurs from the redistribution and the upsetting of the balance of power is high and 
irrevocable. In other words, such a cost will not be marginal. In this context it will be 
difficult for the actors of the International system to avoid the crisis (Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff 1992a, pp.167-169).  
 
 
 
6.4.4 Fourth Scenario: Worst Case Scenario and Crisis 
 
Bearing in mind everything mentioned above, Ι focus on the worst case scenario 
which is the based on the combination of two hypotheses. The first is that Turkey will 
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meet its obligations and will fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. The second is that the EU, 
guided by the interests of its member states, will say ‘no’ to full Turkish membership. 
Under such circumstances we must examine the political stance of the US, a stance 
defined by American national interests.  A possible 'no' to the Turkish full 
membership would be motivated by the national interests of a) a strong member 
state, b) a club of strong member states, c) a club of strong member states and other 
states. It would be difficult -although not impossible- for a small member state to stop 
full Turkish membership by veto or through a referendum, because the political cost 
would be too high, unless it has the backing in the context of secret coalitions, of 
strong member states or of a combination of leading and medium or even small 
European countries.108 
 
     
If a negative decision on Turkey's full-membership is taken unanimously or by the 
majority of the member states then a minimum code of national interests will be met. 
That is, the European ‘no’ would stem from common EU interests. However, if this 
decision results from the serving of the national interests of a leading country alone 
or of a block of leading countries and others, then it is likely that an internal EU crisis 
would occur, especially if the US, as a super power and an important external EU 
actor, fully supports the Turkish accession as full member state . The crisis may 
develop in the following manner:   
1) Between the EU on the one hand and the US and Turkey on the other. 
2) Between the member- states who will impose their decision on the EU -or form a 
majority- on the one hand and the US and Turkey on the other.  
3) Among the member- states of the EU. In this case, we will have an internal crisis 
within the EU, due to conflicting national interests resulting from disagreement on 
Turkey's status in the EU; for instance, whether Turkey is to join the EU as full 
member state or in the form of a ‘privileged partnership’, or whether it is to be 
completely left out.      
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
108
 This is the scenario most likely to occur if the Cyprus issue remains unsolved and/or the French 
government or any other government do not want to see Turkey joining the EU as a full member state, 
each for its own reasons and interests.     
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Figure 3 
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The US and NATO play a significant role in the European affairs.  It has already been 
explained that the EU is a subsystem of the global international system. The data we 
gathered from Chapters 4 and 5 shows that it is believed that the US influences EU 
decisions and especially those concerning the Turkish accession to the EU (see 
Chapter 5.2 and Questions 8, 9, 10 of the Questionnaire). Such influence is a matter 
of serving national interests. However, if the American intervention in European 
affairs is not in line with common European interests or with those of the leading 
countries, then there will be a conflict of interests. Such a conflict of interests is part 
of the ‘power game’. If US interests are in line with common European interests and 
with those of the leading countries, then all sides will have the most possible benefit 
and the least possible cost. Thus, there is no need for any kind of conflict. Regarding 
this point, we should also take into consideration the worst case scenario. What will 
happen if the EU offers Turkey only the status of a ‘privileged partnership’? A crisis! 
When? In the event that the EU does not offer Turkey ‘full membership’, the US may 
seize the opportunity as a pretext in order to create a crisis and harm EU common 
Evaluation of the Turkish accession to the EU, the structural changes and EU cohesion 
 
200                                                                                         Ioannis Charalambides    
interests. The areas most likely to be affected by that crisis are the Balkan Peninsula, 
Greece and Cyprus.   
 
 
In parallel, if Turkish accession to the EU upsets the existing balance of power within 
the EU system by putting national interests at stake, especially those of the leading 
countries, then a crisis is likely to burst out. This may occur in the event that Turkey 
serves US national interests more than those of the EU as well those of the 
European traditional leading countries. The realization of this scenario is to be 
reinforced in the event that US and EU national interests or the interests of some 
leading EU countries are in conflict. Such a scenario is fuelled by the argument that 
in the context of globalisation, the EU and the US are not only allies but also 
competitors, and that the US uses Turkey as another geo-strategic wedge in the soft 
European 'belly' of the Balkan Peninsula, thereby targeting Europe in its south-
eastern wing (With regard to this, it should be remembered that the US already has 
allies elsewhere in Europe: Great Britain in the north and the new EU member-states 
in Central and Eastern Europe). Such a possibility reinforces the allegation that 
Turkey will become the ‘Fifth Phalanx’ of the US in the EU.  
 
 
Taking into account the principles of Realism, which are justified by the results of this 
research, one could note the following: If all the factors-variables mentioned above 
come into play, either separately or accumulatively, and if the EU member states do 
not show positive political intention by giving Turkey the green light to join the EU as 
a full member state, then the threat of a crisis will constitute a continuous `Damocles 
sword' over the EU109. This is also a justification of the hypothesis of this project: 'if 
structural changes occur in the component actors of the international system and 
result to redistribution of power, then the international system or sub-systems may be 
led to decline or even to conflict'.  
 
                                               
109
 The crisis in Caucasus after the Russian invasion in August, 8 2008 reveals the US as an external 
yet prevailing actor in the European affairs. The conflicting and converging national interests were the 
criteria according to which the member states of the EU defined their position. The principles of the EU 
and International Law were the minimum code of converging principles according to which the member 
states shaped their position on the level of the European Council and the European Parliament. (Council 
of the EU 2008; European Parliament 2008) The Caucasus crisis demonstrated that the Americans and 
the Europeans are not only allies but also competitors in the International and European political field. 
Therefore, the US foreign and defence policy influences, either negatively or positively, the interests of 
member states. This game of military, political and economic interest between the US and the member 
states of the EU reflects on the EU and its decisions.  
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6.4.5 Fifth Scenario: Democracy in Relation to Turkish Accession to the EU  
 
Beyond the worst case scenario mentioned above, other scenarios are also possible 
which focus on the democratic, economic, social and institutional aspects of the EU 
cohesion. The presentation of these scenarios will lead us step by step to the last 
scenario of what may transpire regarding EU cohesion in the context of Turkish 
accession to the EU (see Paragraph 6.1).  
 
 
The examination of democracy and its role in the cohesion of the EU in relation to the 
Turkish accession to the EU leads us to the following conclusions:  
As shown by the survey, opinion is strong that Turkish accession to the EU will 
negatively affect the European code of respect for human rights, including religion, 
minority, children's, women's and property rights as well as freedom of expression. 
(See Questions 20, 21 and 22 of the Questionnaire). At the same time, problems in 
the sector of human rights fuel the role of the army in the Turkish system, as the role 
of the army negatively affects respect for human rights as well as judicial power, 
thereby negatively affecting the possibility of Turkish accession to the EU. The 
'democratic deficit' characterizing Turkish judicial power leads to corruption and 
corruption helps the Kemalist system to be kept in cohesion.  
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Figure 4 
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Within the context of a democratic political system such as that of the EU, Turkey’s 
internal problems, such as the lack of respect for human rights as well as the role of 
the army and the deficiency of the Turkish judiciary power, threaten to lead to social 
and political instability. This political instability threatens the functionality of the 
Institutions and at the same time puts the democracy and the cohesion of the EU at 
risk. All these variables act as a threat to the EU cohesion. On this point, the 
following contradiction must be noted: Whilst democracy is a main factor-variable in 
the cohesion of the EU, at the same time it negatively affects the cohesion of the 
Kemalist system.   
 
 
 
6.4.6 Sixth Scenario: the EU Institutions and Turkish Accession to the EU  
 
In accordance with the results of this project, the following conclusions can be 
reached regarding the Institutions of the EU in relation to Turkish accession to the 
EU. The role and the say of a member-state within the EU Institutions are 
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proportional to five variables (see Chapter 4.9.2): geopolitical and geostrategic role, 
demographic size, military power, and military contribution to the EU. The 
combination of the large size of the Turkish population, its geopolitical, geostrategic 
position, its military power and its military contribution to the EU affect the role of 
Turkey in the ESDP. The population factor also defines the role of Turkey and its 
political power within the three main Institutions of the EU: the European Council, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. The size of the population is 
related to the political power of a member state in the decision-making process and 
to its qualified majority (Treaty of Lisbon 2007; Treaty of Nice 2001). It is also one of 
the main elements defining the number of MEPs that each member state can 
possess.  
 
 
Turkey's military contribution to the EU and to UN missions as well as to Turkish 
military power in general will bring about a redistribution of power, structural changes, 
new power-sharing, and a conflict of national interests between the member states of 
the EU and Turkey.  
 
 
These factors: 
1) Affect the status of the leading countries of the EU and define the power of their 
political say within the EU Institutions (see Chapter 4.9.2). This reality also concerns 
the political saying that Turkey will have if it joins the EU, and it is connected with the 
establishment of a new balance of power and a new share of power between the 
leading countries of the EU and Turkey.   
2) Lead to the upsetting of the balance of power and to a threat to EU cohesion. 
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Figure 5 
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The US influences EU decisions and European political-power games. Therefore, 
one cannot ignore the US as an important external actor affecting European affairs, 
whether positively or negatively. It has already been shown throughout this project 
that the US holds a positive political stance toward the Turkish accession to the EU 
(Chapter 5.2, Question 10). What will happen if the EU does not wish to offer Turkey 
full membership, and the US does want to see it in the EU? By definition, we will 
witness the existence of conflicting national interests, with two main results. The first 
will be the negative reaction of the Europeans toward the US. This occurred even 
before the decisions of the European Council on December 16, 2004 (Lagendijk 
2007; Chapter 5.2)110. The second will be the emergence of a political perception that 
Turkey is playing the role of a US Fifth Phalanx in the EU (Chapter 5.2; Question 11).  
  
                                               
110
 During an interview given to me for the purposes of this project, Joost Lagendijk testified to the 
reactions of the Spanish government to the huge pressure that the US tried to exercise on the European 
governments in 2004, in order to prejudge a positive decision of the European Council on the 
commencement of Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU.   
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 6.4.7 Seventh Scenario: Cohesion Policy and Turkish Accession to the EU  
 
In this scenario, I examine the cohesion policy of the EU in relation to the Turkish 
accession to the EU. More specifically, Turkish economy (whose problems include 
inflation, the role of the army in the Turkish political system, unemployment, 
competitiveness, corruption, banking, fluctuations in the monetary system, and 
'statism'111), the great disparities between large cities and rural regions, and the 
redistribution of structural funds due to the large size of the Turkish population all 
come together to create a negative effect on the GDP of the EU and the GDP per 
capita, as well as on other areas belonging to Objective 1 of the Structural Funds 
(see Chapter 2.3.5). Such an evolution may spark negative reactions within the EU 
towards Turkish accession as full member state. In addition, in this scenario the 
combination of great disparities, large population, a negative economy and negative 
structural changes will lead to conflicting national interests. As a result, both the 
cohesion policy of the EU and the cohesion of the EU will be under threat (Chapter 
2.3.5; 5.9.1). 
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In the framework of this scenario, if redistribution of the structural funds occurs both 
the EU and Turkey should undertake positive structural changes. Such a 
development would help the EU serve its common national interests and maintain its 
cohesion. 
 
 
 
6.4.8 Eighth Scenario: Economy and Turkish Accession to the EU   
 
 In this scenario, the structural problems of the Turkish system, the phenomenon of 
immigration, and a series of factors and variables - including the role of the army 
within the Turkish political system, 'statism' as a Kemalist principle upon which the 
Turkish economic system is based, economic problems as they have been described 
in Chapter 4, and corruption - lead the EU towards economic and social instability 
and thereby put its cohesion at stake.   
 
 
In analysing this scenario, one should stress the significant role that the army plays in 
Turkey's economic system. This role is related to 'statism' as a Kemalist principle, 
and is employed by the army to consolidate its status politically and socially (Chapter 
4.6.1 & 4.8.1). In this context, the way the Turkish army acts within the Turkish 
economic, political and social systems produces corruption (Chapters 4.8.2.3 & 
5.10.6 Question 21). At the same time, the army controls a chain of companies and 
has already involved itself in reforms (Chapter 4.8.1). All these factors cause 
problems within a democratic society. They also create problems within the context 
of the free market. Respect for the rules of the free market constitutes one of the 
main pillars of the functionality of the Single European Market. The combination of 
the factors-variables mentioned above, the structural problems of the Turkish system, 
and the phenomenon of immigration could lead the EU towards economic and social 
instability and thereby put its cohesion at stake.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
111
 These problems constitute factors-variables, which affect the cohesion of the EU.  
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Figure 7 
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6.4.9 Ninth Scenario: Society and Turkish Accession to the EU 
 
 In this scenario, society is examined in relation to economy and politics: each one 
affects the others. In the case of this project, one observes that Turkish accession to 
the EU will bring changes to EU society (this conclusion is based on Q17 as 
discussed in Chapter 5.7). The results of this project show that Turkish accession to 
the EU is connected to prejudice against Turkey due to its Muslim identity and 
character (see Chapter 4.4 & Question 11 in Chapter 5.3). Such prejudice is related 
to the phenomenon of immigration. Data regarding this issue shows that about 4 
million Turks will immigrate to EU countries after Turkish accession to the EU (Group 
of EPP 2004), a result of Turkey’s large, young population looking for economic 
opportunities (see Chapter 4.4).The aforementioned factors-variables, such as 
prejudice, immigration and Turkey's large population size, affect and are affected by 
the economy. Therefore, economy is another important variable which affects and is 
affected by the factor-variable of society.   
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Figure 8 
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There is a rational chain of interaction among all these factors-variables, which also 
includes:   
1) The factor-variable of unemployment. This affects and is affected by the factors-
variables of prejudice, immigration, population and economy. Economy includes and 
is comprised of some other factors, such as: Inflation, role of the army, 
competitiveness, corruption, banking and monetary system and 'statism'.   
2) The factor of prejudice and other issues closely related to prejudice such as: a) 
religion, including Islamism and Christianism, which are also connected to racism 
and b) negative stereotypes. The combination of these factors -variables may lead to 
a threat to social cohesion, political and economic instability as well as to a threat to 
the whole cohesion of the EU.       
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6.5 Conclusions 
6.5.1 The Model of EU Cohesion   
 
The scenarios already mentioned lead to the construction of the whole model of EU 
cohesion. Certainly, the coin has two sides. On the one side are the variables leading 
to the threatening the cohesion of the EU and on the other side is the question of 
how the EU could maintain cohesion in the context of Turkish accession to the EU. 
According to the conclusions of this research, in the case of Turkish accession to the 
EU there are five main factors-variables contributing to the cohesion of the EU. 
These factors – variables are evident in the literature and are justified by the survey. 
They are summarized as follows:  economic, political, military cultural and social 
factors (see Chapters 4 and 5). Each one affects others and all of them affect the 
redistribution of power, which will also, if Turkey joins the EU as full member state,  
leads to structural changes and new power-sharing within the EU. In Chapter 5.12, I 
note the interrelation between the various factor-variables affecting the cohesion of 
the EU. In this context, we have already explained the role of independent, 
dependent and intermediate variables and how one affects the other, either positively 
or negatively (Van Evera 2001). This process has two dimensions, one positive and 
one negative. The positive leads to the cohesion of the EU and the negative to the 
threatening of EU cohesion.  
 
 
-First dimension: Threat to the EU cohesion  
 According to this research, this is the prevailing scenario as justified by literature 
(see Realism, Classical Realism and Structural Realism), Chapter 4 and the results 
of the Survey (see Chapter 5.9.1- Question 18). The results of the survey show that 
the Turkish accession to the EU will bring about structural changes that will threaten 
EU cohesion. What the survey demonstrates can justify and be justified by theories 
of Realism and Structural Realism on the redistribution of power, structural changes, 
power-sharing, conflicting national interests and the decline of a system. 
Furthermore, the analysis of all data, literature and secondary sources gathered for 
this research lead us to the same conclusions, due to the peculiar characteristics of 
Turkey. If power-sharing is combined with negative instead of positive structural 
changes, either in Turkey or the EU, then we will have an upsetting of the existing EU 
balance of power. This upsetting of balance of power will harm national interests and 
result in causing military, economic, social and even cultural cost. Such a 
combination of factors-variables can lead to conflicting national interests and then to 
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crisis. Thereby, this chain of combined factors–variables will threaten the cohesion of 
the EU (see Chapter 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).  
 
 
Quite apart from what is mentioned above, there are other factors which negatively 
affect the cohesion of the EU. These include the 'democratic deficit' upon which the 
Turkish Kemalist political system is based.  Such a political system is stigmatised by 
the lack of respect for human rights. This 'democratic deficit' affects the structural 
changes and the decisions of the EU either positively or negatively. At the same time, 
the decisions of the EU are negatively or positively affected by the negative or 
positive nature and action of economic, political, military, cultural and social factors – 
variables. On this point, one should mark that the decisions of the EU are negatively 
or positively affected by external actors such as the US and NATO. The US stance, 
negative or  positive, toward EU decisions, and its influence on these decisions, is 
related to and affected by the conflicting and converging national interests between 
the member states of the EU, the EU as such and the US (see Figures 1 and 3). The 
negative contribution of these factors – variables leads to the threatening of the EU 
cohesion. On the other hand, the positive contribution of these factors and variables 
would lead to the cohesion of the EU.   
 
 
-Second dimension: Cohesion of the EU 
In this case, one takes Turkey's positive contribution to the EU for granted. On this 
point, I add the following: If power sharing is affected by common interests and 
positive structural changes, then a balance of power will exist that will have a positive 
influence on the cohesion policy of the EU and on the cohesion of the EU as such112 
(see Chapter 2.3.4). The cohesion of the EU will be under a positive influence if, 
instead of ''democratic deficit',' we have respect for human rights, and if economic, 
political, social, cultural and military variables come together to enact a positive 
contribution to the EU. In this case, EU decisions, including on Turkish accession, will 
be favourably affected. An important factor in this process will be the positive stance 
of the US and NATO, a stance connected to and affected by converging and 
common interests of the US, the member states of the EU, the EU as such and 
Turkey (see Figure 2).     
                                               
112
 Through analysis of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism, we can also see in practice how the 
common interest contributes to the maintaining of a system in cohesion by also assisting the efforts 
towards regional integration, whose major precondition is successful structural change. 
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Figure 9 
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This 'mind map' (Figure 9 above) comprises all previous scenarios, including both dimensions 
of threat and of maintenance of the EU cohesion in relation to Turkish accession to the EU. 
 
 
 
In order to complete the picture of this model, the following must be stressed:    
1. Democracy is, on the one hand, negatively affected by the lack of respect for 
human rights and by a 'democratic deficit' in general (see Figure 4). On the other 
hand, it functions normally in the context of full respect for human rights.  Building on 
this concept, we note that whilst 'democratic deficit' keeps the Turkish Kemalist 
system in cohesion, at the same time, it threatens the cohesion of the EU. 
2. Both Turkey and the EU must enact structural changes.  Turkey must meet 
Copenhagen Criteria and successfully fulfil its legal economic and political 
obligations.  At the same time, the EU must conclude the reforms, which are 
necessary for new normal Enlargements.    
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6.5.2 Third Road and Unpredictable Development  
 
-The Third Road 
The two aforementioned dimensions focus on the model of EU cohesion and 
Turkey's full EU-membership. Beyond these dimensions there is another possible 
outcome regarding the final status of Turkish accession to the EU. This is what a 
large part of European politicians maintain (especially the rightists of the EPP); the 
possibility of a 'privileged partnership' (see Chapter 4.3). This is an alternative option 
to Turkey's full EU-membership. In this respect, at the end of Turkey's course to the 
EU, in order to prevent the worst-case scenario and in the concept of a win - win 
game, the common interest may compel all involving parties, and especially Turkey, 
to accept the status of 'privileged partnership' instead of full membership.  This is an 
unprecedented, sui generis status. What the legal and political content of such a 
status might be no one knows yet.    
 
 
-Unpredictable Development 
The Turkish accession to the EU presents a great challenge not only to Turkey but 
also to the EU.  In the context of the 'power game,' the question is whether Turkey 
will threaten the cohesion of the EU or not, and whether we will have a European 
Turkey or a Turkish Europe. If Turkey joins the EU as full member-state but does not 
enact democratic reforms, and attempts to prevail over the others as a leading 
country, the worst case scenario will most probably occur113 (Gilpin 1981, pp. 10-15; 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1992a, p. 167). In contrast, a European and democratic 
Turkey will reduce the risk of threatening the cohesion of the EU. 
 
 
Certainly, in addition to the above-mentioned, there are two more factors one should 
take into consideration:  
a) External developments, such as the crisis in the Caucasus of August 8-12, 2008114 
and the current international economic crisis.  
b) Internal developments, such as internal political situation in Turkey. 
                                               
113
 This is a phenomenon observed in the context of the struggle for power (Morgenthau 1978). This 
struggle for power was explained by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1992a) as "the states´s struggle to 
increase their influence over other states by using threats, imposition, alliances and sphere of influence" 
(p. 167). States always want to acquire more and more power in the International system.  If a state 
disrupts the existing 'equilibrium', thereby causing high cost to other countries´ national interest, the 
political situation may be put into crisis. The possibility of such a crisis is augmented if the cost is 
extremely high and irrevocable (Thucydides, cited in Gilpin 1981, pp. 90-93). 
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It is possible that internal political decisions will halt the Turkish accession to the EU. 
This is likely to occur if a combination of negative variables comes into play, such as 
the role of the army in the system and the 'democratic deficit'. According to the 
results of the Survey in Chapter 5, it is less likely that Turkey will stop, of its own 
accord, the accession negotiation with the EU (see Chapter 5.11, Question 25).  
 
 
However, if forces acting within the Turkish political system attempt to cause troubles 
and political instability, then under these circumstances, Turkey may risk losing 
control and the EU may even decide to freeze or halt its accession negotiations with 
Turkey. Such a scenario was evident in the so-called 'judiciary coup d´état' which 
took place in Turkey, through which the public prosecutor expects to dissolve the 
AKP and ban Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gül from politics (Abramowitz & 
Barkey 2008). The EU reacted to this decision through oral and written statements 
issued by Commissioner Oli Rehn (2008). During the May Plenary Session of the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg, Commissioner Rehn (May 21, 2088, personal 
notes) flatly stated the following: 1) The decision of the Turkish Court to ban the AKP 
and 71 of its members from politics, including President Gül and Prime Minister 
Erdogan on trial, would have been against the decisions of the European Court of 
Justice, and against the European Council definitions of when and how a political 
party can be outlawed. 2) If the Constitutional Court of Turkey had dissolved AKP 
and bans its 71 officials from politics, this would have negative consequences for 
Turkish accession to the EU (Kuru 2008, pp. 101-110).   
 
 
Finally, on July 30, 2008, Constitutional Court took a rational decision.  On the one 
hand, it imposed financial sanctions on AKP, due to the latter's call for lifting the ban 
on wearing the Islamic headscarf at the universities, but on the other hand it did not 
deprive the party's officials of their political rights (Hooper 2008). The conflict 
between the army and the AKP is still alive. Nobody can exclude similar problems in 
the future which may trigger obstacles to Turkish accession to the EU. What must be 
pointed out is that both sides play a rational game, using the Constitution and the 
Institutions of Turkey while also bearing in mind that any fallacious or irrational action 
will result in a high cost to themselves and to the country. At the same time, this 
                                                                                                                                       
114
 See Footnote 18 Chapter 5 
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incident, and similar ones in the past show that Turkey's EU accession process is 
always at risk of unpredictable political developments.  
 
 
 
6.5.3 Epilogue and Impact  
 
Only a prophet can predict the future. In the context of this project, what I have done 
is to establish a model of EU cohesion through variables taken from literature, from 
the analysis presented in Chapter 4 and from the answers to the survey questions 
(see Chapter 5). Through these variables, I have presented and elaborated on 
scenarios regarding the potential for EU cohesion in the context of Turkish accession 
to the EU. Certainly, the model I have established may be used in the coming years 
by politicians, EU and other technocrats as well as academics to monitor the 
progress and development of Turkey's (or any other country's) accession to the EU 
and to examine whether such accessions will threaten EU cohesion. The positive 
impact of this project is mainly reflected in the great interest that both MEPs, and 
Peter Lang GmbH (Publishing House) have demonstrated in publishing this research. 
I have already signed a contract for the publishing of my DProf with Peter Lang 
GmbH. Paragraph 7 of the contract states that  'the publisher shall be responsible for 
worldwide announcement, for enlistment in the most important national 
bibliographies, and shall endeavour to have the works reviewed in scientific 
periodicals'  (see Appendix 8). 
 
 
Last but not least, I note the following: the model of EU cohesion I establish in this 
project can serve as a source of evidence for future studies and researches on 
Enlargement. The set of variables, which the model consists of, will continue to be 
supplied, renewed and reinforced by current data so that it will always be up to date. 
More importantly, this research will provide us with a tool by which to answer (among 
others) this central question: will we have a European Turkey, or a Turkish Europe?  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Interview with MEP Joost Lagendijk 
 
 
Brussels, 9 October 2007 
 
 
 
Question 1:  
What is the role of the US on the decisions of the EU and especially on the 
Turkish accession to the EU? 
 
 
Answer 
It is clear to everybody that over the last couple of years the US is strongly in favour 
of Turkey’s entry as a member state of the EU. I think that in the years of 2002 -2003, 
the US was very explicitly pushing for the Turkish membership. They made 
comments, they made statements, and they made phone calls. Then, if I remember 
well, in 2002, before the European summit on the decision on Turkey in 2004, Prime 
Ministers like Berlusconi and Aznar said publicly that they did not like this pressure 
from the US side. They said in public that it is up to us, the Europeans to decide, 
whether Turkey will be member and not to the US. It was a good lesson to the US, 
not to push too much on the EU to do what they think would be good. So, I think after 
2002, we have seen that the US is still in favour of the Turkish accession to the EU, 
but without pushing the Europeans too much because it was counterproductive. I 
have talked to a lot of US diplomats and they got the message from 2004. So in 
general, everybody knows that the US is in favour but it is not pushing too much as 
this could backfire on them because the Europeans say, "look, this is a matter of our 
club and it is up to us to decide". Even the pro-American Prime Ministers like Aznar 
and Berlusconi said so. So, I think that we know, of course, that the Americans are in 
favour, but I think the EU, the EU member states, also the Commission and the 
Parliament, they are well able to make up their own mind. And they had made it clear 
to the Americans: don’t push us too much because it is counterproductive. 
 
 
 
Question 2 
What are the reasons for the US favouring the Turkish accession to the EU? 
 
 
Answer 
From the US perspective, they compare EU membership with membership of NATO. 
They say Turkey has always been member state of NATO, so why not member of the 
EU? And of course, for more strategic reasons for the US, for the Middle East 
policies especially... They want to see a democratic and stable Turkey in the EU and 
not a sort of Turkey floating around in a very heated region. I think for those two 
reasons, NATO and strategic long-term interests in the Middle east, the US would 
like to see Turkey becoming more democratic and more stable.  
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Question 3 
We often hear that Turkey wishes to establish a model for the other Muslim 
countries. 
 
 
Answer 
That is of the last couple of years. On top of those arguments that I mentioned, there 
has come the argument to promote democracy in the Middle East and that Turkey 
could be some sort of model there. To a large extent, I subscribe to that thesis, but 
the problem is that Turkey has totally shot itself on the foot by invading Iraq. So 
nobody believes the Americans, when they say that we want to promote democracy 
and Turkey is a good model. For Europe, for the European Union thought that this 
could be the way of showing to all sceptics (who say) that democracy and Islam do 
not go together, that Turkey is an example where this could work out. I do not believe 
so much in models. This is the American way of thinking. The differences between 
the Arab world and Turkey are very big. But it is an example, I am sure, for Egypt and 
Morocco...Turkey is definitely an example closely watched in the Arab world, in 
Lebanon, in Syria, in Egypt, in Morocco... In Morocco you have a party, which is 
called AKP party that won the last elections. So, there is an influence of Turkey on 
the region but it is not, I think, a model you could copy in other countries because of 
the differences.    
 
 
 
Question 4 
Which are the problems that Turkey faces in the context of its accession to the 
EU? 
 
 
Answer 
There are many but the most basic ones are the very concrete problems of human 
rights and minority rights. Both on the level of ideas, minority rights are a highly 
controversial issue. Also because some of the groups that we would call minorities, in 
Turkey they don't want to be called minorities because they think that minority is 
something inferior. While in Europe, minorities have their own rights and status. So 
sometimes it is difficult the discussion between the EU and the Turks because we do 
not have the same language. The Turks understand differently the term 'minority' 
from us. This is a point of discussion in Turkey as well. Reports by academicians give 
now emphasis to a new constitution which, I think would solve this problem 
concerning minority language and minority status. This is one thing on the level of 
concepts and ideas. 
 
Very practically of course, there is the problem with the large Kurdish minority in the 
South East, which is a cultural problem, but also a social and economic problem. 
There is a big challenge for Turkey to get that region develop as the rest part of the 
country has been doing over the last couple of years. 
 
Another problem is the role of the army...totally different in Turkey than in the other 
countries of the European Union...There is a whole debate on how to change it, to 
what direction; this is really a challenge for Turkey. 
 
Also, Turkey has to change its Cyprus policy....    
 
Changing the role of the army can only be a gradual process. What is unacceptable 
from the European point of view is the political role of the army in the system, the 
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intervention of the army in the political life, in education and the Media. Again, I think 
the new Constitution could clean parts of the problem. Still, the army will be a long 
running issue. This also has to do with Turkey's surroundings, the fact that Turkey's 
neighbours are not Denmark or Luxembourg but Iran, Iraq and Syria. Anyhow, the 
role of the army in politics has to be gradually diminished to the level we know from 
other European countries.  So this is one of the big challenges. 
 
But when you look at this, the whole issue of minorities -religious and ethnic- the 
Kurdish problem, the role of the army, all this is going to the roots of the society. So 
we are talking about a society in transition. A society that faces strong changes -also 
economic, especially with the pressure of globalisation. So this is why so many things 
are happening at the same time. It is a process that in other European countries took 
many more years and was sometimes separated. But in Turkey, everything is 
happening at the same moment and at a high speed.   
 
 
 
Question 5 
Does the role of the army in the political system influence the Turkish 
accession to the EU? 
 
 
Answer 
Definitely, it influences Turkey's chances to become member. It is very clear that the 
political role of the army has to come to an end. I think this is one of the things that 
Europe will be watching very carefully in the coming years during the negotiations. 
Whether, step by step, the role of the army in Turkey will become that of armies in 
European countries. There is a whole tradition and libraries full of books to explain 
why the army became such an important player in Turkey. In the past, it had to do 
with the weakness of politics et cetera, et cetera...It is all understandable, but now, 
this has to change. Together with the minority issues and the Cyprus issue, it is one 
of the key issues that will determine whether Turkey will make it to the EU.  
 
 
 
Question 6 
Will the Turkish accession to the EU cause a redistribution of power? 
 
 
Answer 
Inside the EU, it definitely will. When Turkey becomes a member, it will probably be 
the biggest member regarding size and population. This means that in the new 
system that we will have, Turkey, in the Council and also among the member states, 
will be a big player, one of the big players. Having said that, also in the present EU, 
we have big players and small players. So when you compare the size of Turkey in 
an EU of 30 or 30 + members, it is more or less the same as Germany in the present 
EU of 25 and 27 members. So we have been here before. With the new rules it is not 
one, two or three member states that could block a policy or push through policies, 
but it is clear that in an EU with Turkey, Turkey will be a dominant player. And I think 
this is one of the reasons why especially France is not very happy. France is one of 
the one or two big players and then, if Turkey joins the EU, France will loose 
influence in the EU.  In the European Parliament of course, it is one reason why 
colleagues say we will loose votes, we will loose seats if Turkey becomes member. It 
is true. Like we did when Poland and Romania became members. It is something 
that cannot be neglected. It is true but it is part of the process as we have seen it 
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over the years that the old member states, by sharing sovereignty with Turkey, will 
loose some of their power that they have now. 
 
 
 
Question 7 
Do the leading member states of the EU wish to share power with Turkey? 
 
 
Answer 
It depends on your vision of Europe. I think we see clear differences between the UK 
and France.  I think that in the long run, not only with the Turkish accession but also 
with the accession of ten member states in 2004, the model of Europe is changing. It 
is changing from the French model, a very integrated, centralised harmonised EU 
and what the French thought of a 'big France'.  French thought of Europe as an 
extension of France. This is not any longer possible. Not because of Turkey, but 
because of the UK and because of Poland. So Europe has expanded to 25 and now 
27, which means that differences within the European Union have room. This is also 
part of the new Treaty and it was part of the Constitution.  We go to a different 
Europe.  A Europe that does some things on European level, like foreign trade, 
environment, security and foreign policy etc, but also leaves a lot of other thinks to 
the member states because the differences among the member states are very big. 
This is more or less the British model. The French do not like this. This is why the 
French were not very happy with the Enlargement of 2004, they are not very happy 
with the Balkans entry, they are not very happy with Turkey's entry for several 
reasons. One being that the old idea of Europe as a coherent body that does 
everything together is disappearing - and I think has already disappeared. So, in a 
Europe that the differences are big culturally, but also economically, this is the 
reason why there is room for Turkey. In a Europe that should become a 'big France', 
Turkey would be outside. Like Romania or Poland or Sweden would be outside. They 
do not want to be like France. So, it is the development we have seen and we are still 
experiencing whereby Europe gradually changes. The model of Europe is changing 
and in the new Europe where we accept differences, where we leave a lot of things 
to the member-states, in such a model, Turkey fits. In the old model, the very 
centralised, Turkey would not fit. Because Turkey would not accept it and because 
Turkey is simply too big and too different to fit to that.  
 
 
 
Question 8 
Why are some Europeans afraid of Turkey's full membership to the EU? 
 
 
Answer 
The two basic reasons for citizens and party politicians to be afraid of Turkey's 
membership are the fear of Islam and the fear of migration. And these two fears, 
which in my country, but I think in many European countries, are the biggest fears, 
coincide in Turkey. Because most of the people in Turkey are Muslims, the European 
citizens ask themselves: Can we fit them in? People are not sure about that, they 
have their doubts. There are a lot of negative things in their minds about Islam. Not 
so much in Turkey but still, for a lot of people, Islam in Turkey is the same as in 
Saudi Arabia, in Iran or in Northern Africa. This is a difficult thing to discuss because 
if you do not make the difference between the Islam in Turkey and the Islam in other 
countries you are into problems.  
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Secondly, there is the fear that after accession, millions of Turks will come to the 
Netherlands or Germany to get a job. Nobody can predict what will happen, we are 
talking about 2025 or after, but still, these two fears make people doubt.... I still think 
that inside the EU, there is more than 25% of the people and also of the politicians 
who are against Turkey because of immigration, Islam and for other reasons, 25% 
who is in favour and 50% who is in between. Sometimes when things go well in 
Turkey like in 2004, there is optimism in the EU and they say lets do it. When they 
are sceptical about the EU and when things do not progress in Turkey, they say let's 
not do it. So, there is this 50% that is open to arguments, and sometimes they say 
yes, sometimes they say no. But Islam and migration are fears that will be with us for 
long, long time. These are the basic things that the people are afraid of.   
 
 
 
Question 9 
Why are they afraid of these things? 
 
 
Answer 
Most of the people believe that Muslims are fundamentalists, terrorists. So when 
there are terrorist attacks in Iraq people think, they are Muslims, people in Turkey are 
Muslims, so get them out or keep them out. It is lack of knowledge and the 
impression that being Muslim is a problem. And because we have already 18 million 
Muslims in Europe, we should not make them 80 million.  It is almost an irrational 
fear based on culture and religion. But that is the way it is.  
 
 
 
Question 10 
Which are the factors defining the cohesion of the EU? 
 
 
Answer 
That is a difficult question. We are in the middle of the shift. In the past, it used to be 
the economic cohesion, all the financial instruments for cohesion, which were very 
important for Spain, Ireland, Italy etc. The basic idea was that these people are like 
us.  So we belong together (culturally, religiously, same sort of societies etc). This 
already changed when Eastern Europe came in, because culturally, there are 
differences in these societies and economies. But we said "ok we promised them in 
the past, we should do it".  
 
Now with the Balkans and with Turkey, you see that these people are different 
religiously, culturally, historically. To defend the accession of those countries, you 
have to say that it is in our self-interest to have them in and for them to be democratic 
and stable instead of excluding them. So now, we have reached the borders of 
whether you can defend membership on the basis of the old arguments that "they are 
socially and culturally like us". But they are not always like us. Still, I think there is a 
new paradigm around and it is in our interests to have them in if we want to be major 
players in the Global scene. If we want to be strong against the Chinese, the 
Americans, the Indians.... It is in our interest to be united and also to be united on a 
largest scale including Turkey. There is a shift from the old arguments, which were 
more cultural and social, to interest. It is in our interest. If we want to be players it is 
good to have Turkey because we will be stronger on the Global scene. There is a 
shift in the arguments and in the reasons that keep the Union together. These 
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reasons now are different than in 1957 because Europe has changed and the 
European Union, the world has also changed.  
 
 
 
Question 11 
What are the factors that can keep the EU in cohesion? 
  
 
Answer 
From an economic point of view, a strong internal market keeps the economies 
together and makes it easier for companies to work together. That is a good basis. 
But it is not enough. So we will have an ongoing debate for the next 10 -20 years on 
how big are the differences that we can accept within the European Union on culture 
and religion. I think that we can go quite far in accepting these differences. But the 
differences within the European Union are growing and there are all kinds of new 
discussions taking place saying that the old cohesion can not work any more. It is 
more than economy. But what is on the top of them? Is it also culture? Yes, but then 
we have to accept the differences within the EU. Can we cope with that? Yes, I think 
we can. Nothing is fixed yet, it is still under debate. And some people say that 
because of cohesion we should not include another religion in the EU. I think that 
Europe can cope with that. It is partly a matter of a political debate, how far can you 
go and when cohesion is under threat. Some people say that with Turkey (the 
cohesion of the EU will be under threat). I will not agree. But it is a political debate 
now taking place. 
 
 
 
Question 12 
What do the Europeans means when they are talking about absorption 
capacity, the capacity of the EU to absorb new member states?  
 
 
Answer 
It is partly this...There are different factors. Do the internal rules of the EU allow for 
new member states to come in? This is why I always agree with those who support 
that we need a new Treaty, we need new rules, which will make the taking of the 
decisions easier and less easy for one country to block the decisions. This is the 
institutional capacity to integrate new members. When the new Treaty will be 
adopted -and it looks quite good at the moment- the EU would at least have the 
rules, and the structures to include a big country like Turkey.  
 
Then there is the financial capacity. Turkey is a poor country (the same applies for 
Ukraine by the way) so, do we have the money to pay for the cohesion funds or the 
agriculture policy? So there we have to look closely at the present policies and at the 
budget. I do not believe those who say that the EU will go broke or will have a 
financial disaster if Turkey comes in. We decide for ourselves how much we want to 
spent for Turkey. It is as blunt as it is. I think that Turkey realises too that the golden 
days of the past, as for the Spanish and the Irish are over. The EU is never going to 
pay this amount of money again. The Polish already get less and the Turkish will get 
less. In Turkey, they know that.  
 
The third aspect of integration capacity is public opinion. We cannot push such an 
important Enlargement of the EU against the big majority in society. The most 
challenging aspect of this whole integration capacity debate is neither the Institutions 
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nor the finances, but to convince the 50% of the people, who are in doubt, that it 
would be good for Europe, it would be good for Turkey, that Turkey is changing and 
therefore it can accede. This is the big challenge for us, the politicians and for the 
Media and the journalists; to convince the majority of our people, that it is a good 
thing. Because we know that for the moment a lot of people are against or have their 
doubts. That is the most important part of the integration capacity that I think we 
should be working on.  
 
 
 
Question 13 
Will the Turkish accession to the EU bring structural changes? 
 
 
Answer 
When the new Treaty will be accepted, we can integrate Turkey with those rules. It 
will be clear how the votes will take place, how the veto is distributed... So 
institutionally the EU does need to change. On the budget, we have strong budget 
implications but we can decide on this by ourselves.  
 
Also, with the EU bordering Iraq, Iran and Syria... that would be a great difference 
comparing to now. 
 
The Turkish accession will definitely change the EU. I see a lot of positive things that 
will allow the EU to be player in the Middle East. It (the Turkish accession) will make 
the EU stronger but it will also make the EU more vulnerable because we will border 
countries which for the moment are politically unstable. I can understand the fears of 
the people who say "why should we want to border Iraq? Let's have a state in 
between". So Turkey is a sort of buffer between the Middle East and the EU. I think 
that in the long term, it does not work like that. If there are problems in Iraq, they will 
come to us anyway, even if Turkey is not a member. These are the issues we have 
to convince our citizens about.  The first reaction of the people is that the European 
Union is safe, we are civilised people and we do not want to border these very 
dangerous lands. It will definitely change the perceptions of Europe, where Europe 
ends, what is European or not.  That's why it is good to take a longer period of time 
to take in Turkey. We should not overdo it or rush Turkey into the EU. Ten years is a 
long period to get used to the fact that Turkey will be with us. We need that time.      
 
 
 
Question 14 
Will the Turkish accession to the EU threaten the cohesion of EU or not?     
 
 
Answer 
No, I don't think so. But we have to work institutionally, financially but especially to 
the heads of the people.  People have to realise and accept that Europe has different 
chambers and different rooms and the rooms are not all the same, like Poland. And I 
think in that respect it is good, because now people say, "yes ok the Polish are 
European" and nobody discusses about that, "they are Catholics, ok, no problem", 
but they act differently than the Portuguese or the Irish. So it is good to get used to 
the fact that now we have extended EU to include countries that for historical reasons 
or others, they act differently than we do, like the Dutch or Germans. And this is good 
because it gets the Europeans used to the fact that the European house has different 
rooms and some of the rooms we do not know very well. And Turkey could be one of 
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the rooms and that is definitely the way forward. And therefore, it does not threaten 
the cohesion of the EU.  I mean, you know I am in favour of the Turkish accession, 
but do not rush into it, get people used to the fact that they (the Turks) will be 
eventually with us but not tomorrow and not the day after.  
 
 
 
Question 15 
Will Turkey end by itself its course to the EU? 
 
 
Answer 
Theoretically, I can really imagine that there will be moments during the negotiations 
when people will be frustrated with Europe and want to leave. However, it is really 
difficult to tell whether Turkey will decide to stop its course towards the EU.  
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APPENDIX 2 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
EVALUATION OF THE TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE 
STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND THE EUROPEAN COHESION  
 
Dear Member of the European Parliament, 
 
Your perceptions, opinions and attitudes with regards to the issues addressed in this 
questionnaire are very important for the purpose of this project. Your responses are important in 
order to evaluate the opinions and attitudes of European MEPs towards the accession of Turkey 
to the EU. The information that you provide will be kept completely confidential and the final 
results of the research will not reveal the respondent's identity.  
 
Please, fill out the questions below and sent it back either by fax at +32 22849128, by email at  
yiannakis.matsis@europarl.europa.eu or in person at ASP 8E254. Additionally, should you wish 
we can also pass by your office and collect it. 
 
Thank you for your time and help. 
 
Yiannos Charalampidis 
tel. +32 22847128 / GSM: +32 494621100 
 
 
PERSONAL INFORMATION (OPTIONAL) 
Q.1 Which age category do you belong to? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
  20 - 24 YEARS  25 - 34 YEARS      35 - 44 YEARS 
 
  45 - 54 YEARS  55 - 59 YEARS       60 YEARS OR OLDER 
 
Q.2 What is your gender? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
   MALE            FEMALE 
 
Q.3 Nationality (Please specify):  ______________________ 
 
Q.4 Country (Please specify):   ______________________ 
 
Q.5 Political party (Please specify):   ______________________ 
 
Q.6 Years of experience in the European Parliament (Please specify): ______________________ 
 
Q.7 Have you ever visited Turkey?  (tick the box of your choice) 
   
 YES   NO  
 
If yes: 
 
 OFFICIAL VISIT   PERSONAL BUSINESS 
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EVALUATION OF THE TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE E.U 
 
Q.8 Do you believe that the US influences the decisions of the EU? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 
Q.8a If yes, to what extent? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE        VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW 
 
 
Q.9   Do you believe that the US influences or not the Turkish accession to the EU? (tick the box of your choice)  
 
 YES (PLEASE, GO TO QUESTION 10)    NO   (PLEASE, GO TO QUESTION 11)    DO NOT KNOW  
 
 
Q.10  In what way does the US influence the Turkish accession to the EU? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
 POSITIVELY    NEGATIVELY    DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
Q10a If positively, to what extent? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW  
 
Q10b If negatively, to what extent? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW  
 
 
Q.11 According to your opinion, which are the reasons behind the stance of some Europeans, who do 
not wish to see Turkey joining the EU as a full member state? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers 
possible) 
 
 
 TURKEY'S MUSLIM CHARACTER.  
 THE LEADING COUNTRIES WITHIN THE EU ARE NOT READY TO SHARE THEIR POWER WITH TURKEY.  (SEE QUESTION 6) 
 FEAR OF FLOW OF IMMIGRANTS FROM TURKEY.  
 FEAR OF STRENGTHENING THE STATUS OF TURKISH MIGRANTS ALREADY RESIDING IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 PREJUDICE AGAINST TURKEY 
 ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES 
 EXTRA BURDEN ON EU COHESION POLICY AND STRUCTURAL FUNDS 
 POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
 ROLE OF THE ARMY IN THE SYSTEM  
 CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
 NEGATIVE HISTORICAL  STEREOTYPES AND GEOGRAPHICAL REASONS  
 TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY. 
 TURKEY WILL BECOME THE 'FIFTH PHALANX' OF THE US WITHIN THE EU 
 THE UNRESOLVED CYPRUS ISSUE  
 NONE OF THE ABOVE 
 OTHER REASONS: (PLEASE MENTION)  A)………………………………………………………… 
 
B)………………………………………………………… 
 
C)………………………………………………………… 
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Q.12  If in Question 11 option 2 is chosen (i.e. that the leading countries within the EU are not ready to 
share their power with Turkey) please specify, which kind of power. (tick the box of your choice-Multiple 
answers possible) 
 
 ECONOMIC    INSTITUTIONAL    POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC 
 
 
Q.13 According to your opinion, which are the reasons behind the stance of some Europeans to 
support that Turkey should join the EU as a full member state? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple 
answers possible) 
 
 TURKEY'S GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION IN EURASIA. 
 TURKEY'S BIG SIZE SEEN AS A BIG MARKET 
 TURKEY'S CHEAP LABOUR 
 CULTURAL ENRICHMENT OF THE EU 
 TURKEY WILL BECOME A MODEL OF A DEMOCRATIC MUSLIM COUNTRY FOR OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND FOR THE ARAB 
WORLD  
 EU MEMBERSHIP WOULD BRING ABOUT POLITICAL STABILITY WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND THE REGION 
 NONE OF THE ABOVE 
 OTHER REASONS: (PLEASE MENTION)  A)………………………………………………………… 
 
B)………………………………………………………… 
 
C)………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
Q.14  Will the accession of Turkey to the EU contribute to the strengthening of the EU position on the 
global system? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 
Q.15 If yes, in which area and to what extent? (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible) 
 
Q.15a  Economics 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.15b  Politics/Diplomacy 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.15c  Military 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.15d  Culturally 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.16 Will the Turkish accession of the EU bring a redistribution of power within the EU?  
                   (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible) 
 
Q.16a   Economic power  
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
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Q.16b  Political/ Diplomatic power 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.16c  Military power 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.16d  Institutional power 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.17  According to your opinion, would the Turkish accession to the EU lead or not to structural 
changes?  
                   (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible) 
 
Q.17a  Military 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
 
  Q.17b  Political 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER 
 
 
 
Q.17c  Institutional 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.17d  Cultural 
 
 YES                NO         DO NOT KNOW  NO ANSWER 
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 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.17e  Social 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.17f  Economic 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.18 Taking into consideration your response to question 17, will such changes potentially threaten or 
strengthen the cohesion of the EU? To what extent? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
 THREATEN (GO TO Q.18A)   STRENGTHEN (GO TO Q.18B)  DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 
Q.18a  Threaten  
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.18b  Strengthen  
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.19 The decisions of the EU are taken:  (tick the box of your choice-Multiple answers possible)  
 
 ACCORDING TO NATIONAL INTERESTS (GO TO Q.19A) 
 ACCORDING TO COMMON INTERESTS (GO TO Q.19B) 
 ON THE BASIS OF BOTH (GO TO Q.19C) 
 OTHER (GO TO Q.19D) 
   DO NOT KNOW (GO TO Q.20) 
 NO ANSWER (GO TO Q.20) 
 
Q.19a  According to national interests. 
 
To what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q19b  According to common interests 
 
To what extent? 
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 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.19c  On the basis of both 
 
To what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.19d  Other (please specify)    
 
1)_________________________________________________________ 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
2)_________________________________________________________ 
                     
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
                      
3)_________________________________________________________ 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.20  According to your opinion, to what extent are human rights respected in Turkey?  
                  (tick the box of your  choice -Multiple answers possible) 
  
 
Q.20a  Political rights 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.20b  Women rights 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.20c  Religious rights 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.20d  Minority rights 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
Q.20e Freedom of expression 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.21 Is there corruption in Turkey? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
 YES (GO TO Q.21A)    NO (GO TO Q.22)  DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
Q.21a  If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.21b  If no, to what extent? 
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 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.22 Is the Turkish army involved within Turkey's political system? (tick the box of your choice) 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
If yes, to what extent? 
 
 TO A LARGE EXTENT   TO SOME EXTENT   LITTLE   VERY LITTLE   DO NOT KNOW NO ANSWER  
 
 
Q.23 According to your opinion, for what reasons is Turkey undertaking reforms? (tick the box of your choice-
Multiple answers possible): 
 
 FULFIL EU OBLIGATIONS  
 ESTABLISH A MODERATE STATE 
 STABILISE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 STABILISE ECONOMY 
 STRENGTHEN SOCIAL COHESION 
 DO NOT KNOW  
 NO ANSWER 
 OTHER REASONS: (PLEASE SPECIFY)   A)………………………………………………………… 
 
B)………………………………………………………… 
 
C)………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
Q.24 Regardless of EU requirements, should Turkey continue with the reforms? (tick the box of your  
choice) 
 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
 
Q.25 Do you believe that Turkey will by itself put an end to its course to the EU? (tick the box of your  
choice) 
 
 
 YES    NO   DO NOT KNOW   NO ANSWER 
 
If yes, for what reasons? ( tick the box of your  choice- Multiple answers possible) 
 
 POSSIBILITY OF A "PRIVILEGE REGIME" INSTEAD OF FULL MEMBERSHIP 
 POLITICAL FORCES IN TURKEY DO NOT WISH TO SEE TURKEY IN THE EU 
 TURKEY CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY RESPOND TO REFORMS REQUIRED BY THE EU 
 FEAR THAT TURKEY'S "EUROPEANISATION" WILL THREATEN ITS TERRITORIAL COHESION 
 FEAR THAT TURKEY'S "EUROPEANISATION" WILL THREATEN ITS SOCIAL COHESION 
 FEAR THAT TURKEY'S "EUROPEANISATION" WILL THREATEN STATE'S COHESION. 
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ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO SHARE. 
 
If you would like to comment on anything else, please use the space below. We welcome your comments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. We anticipate that your input will assist us in evaluating the opinions 
and attitudes of European MEPs towards the accession of Turkey to the EU 
 
 
For  processing only: 
 
DATE RECEIVED: ______________________ ENTERED BY:__________    SURVEY NUMBER___________________ 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Ethics Release Form 
 
 
All candidates planning to undertake research are required to complete this Ethics 
Release Form and to submit along with their Programme Planning documentation 
(DPS4541). Please note the following: 
 
 It is essential that you have an understanding of ethical considerations central to 
planning and conducting research. 
 Approval to carry out research does not exempt you from Ethics Committee 
approval from Institutions within which you may be planning to conduct the 
research, e.g. Hospitals, NHS Trusts, Local Education Authorities, HM Prisons 
Service, etc. 
 
Please answer all of the following questions: 
1
. 
Has the project proposal and ethical considerations in draft 
been completed and submitted to the advisor or 
consultant? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
2
. 
Will the research involve an intervention or change to an 
existing situation that may affect people and/or an 
evaluation of outcomes of an intervention? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
  If yes, have participants been given information about the 
aims, procedure and possible risks involved, in easily 
understood language. (Attach a copy any information 
sheet you may have provided) 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
3
. 
Will any person’s position, treatment or care be in any way 
prejudiced if they choose not to participate in the project? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
4
. 
Can participants freely withdraw from the project at any 
stage without risk or harm of prejudice? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
5
. 
Will the project involve working with or studying minors 
(i.e. <16 years)? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
 If yes, will signed parental consent be obtained?  
 Yes 
 
No 
6
. 
Are there any questions or procedures likely to be 
considered in any way offensive or inappropriate? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
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7. Have all necessary steps been taken to protect the privacy 
of participants and the need for anonymity? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
  Is there provision for the safekeeping of written Data and 
video / audio recordings of participants? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
 8. If applicable, is there provision for de-briefing participants 
after the intervention or project? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
9. If any specialised instruments, for example psychometric 
instruments are to be employed, will their use be controlled 
and supervised by a qualified practitioner e.g. a 
psychologist? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
    
10. Will you need to put your proposal through an ethics 
committee related to your professional work? 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
 
If you have placed an X in any of the bold boxes, please provide further 
information. 
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APPENDIX 4  
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER 
STATES 
 
1. The European Community and its Member States acknowledge the signature by 
Turkey of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association 
between the European Community and its Member States on the one part and 
Turkey on the other, in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council of 
December 2004. They regret that Turkey felt it necessary to make a declaration 
regarding the Republic of Cyprus at the time of signature.  
2. The European Community and its Member States make clear that this declaration 
by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on 
Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol.  
3. The European Community and its Member States expect full, non-discriminatory 
implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all obstacles to the free 
movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. Turkey must apply 
the Protocol fully to all EU Member States. The EU will monitor this closely and 
evaluate full implementation in 2006. The European Community and its Member 
States stress that the opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on 
Turkey’s implementation of its contractual obligations to all Member States. Failure to 
implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations.  
4. The European Community and its Member States recall that the Republic of 
Cyprus became a Member State of the European Union on 1st May 2004. They 
underline that they recognise only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of 
international law. 
5. Recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession 
process. Accordingly, the EU underlines the importance it attaches to the 
normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as 
possible.  
6. The Council will ensure a follow-up on the progress made on all these issues in 
2006. 
7. In the context of this declaration, the European Community and its Member States 
agree on the importance of supporting the efforts of the UN Secretary General to 
bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in line with 
relevant UNSCRs and the principles on which the EU is founded, and that a just 
and lasting settlement will contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in 
the region.  
(Source: Council of the European Union, 21 September 2005 Declaration by the 
European Community and its Member States, 12541/05, Brussels,) 
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 APPENDIX 5  
 
 Statement by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn on the latest 
development in the prosecution case against the AKP in Turkey  
 
01/04/2008 
"I take note of the decision of the Constitutional Court to deal with the case seeking 
to ban the AKP and 71 of its members from politics. The concerns I expressed on 
this matter on Saturday remain valid: In EU Member States the kind of political 
issues referred to in this case are debated in the parliament and decided through the 
ballot box, not in court rooms.  
 
In particular, the prohibition or dissolution of political parties is a far-reaching 
measure which should be used with the utmost restraint. According to the 
guidelines of the Council of Europe's Venice Commission on best practice for 
European democracies, such a measure may only be justified in the case of parties 
which advocate the use of violence or use violence as a political means to 
overthrow the democratic constitutional order. I do not see any such justification for 
this case. The Commission has long stressed the need for Turkey to reform its law 
on political parties, including the financing of political parties. 
This case has revealed a systemic error in the Turkish Constitutional framework 
that may need to be addressed through a Constitutional amendment. I welcome the 
government's intention to conduct an overhaul of the provisions that are causing 
problems for Turkey's democracy. 
There is much at stake in the handling of this issue. Turkey's European perspective 
was the vision of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. I fully support Turkey's long-term interest 
to play its full role as a vital European democracy. 
Turkey needs to devote all its energies to undertaking long-awaited reforms that will 
benefit the Turkish people and advance Turkey's integration into the EU. This case 
should not distract attention from those reforms. 
I will inform my colleagues in the College of Commissioners about this matter on 
Wednesday." 
 
 
(Source: European Commission Press Release,  
http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/news/rehn_turkey_en.htm) 
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APPENDIX 6 
Turkey's Contributions to International Peace Keeping Activities 
 
II Turkey’s Contributions to International Peace Keeping Activities 
Turkey makes a substantial contribution to various international peace-keeping activities. Since 
the end of the Second World War, Turkish troops have served under numerous UN, NATO and 
EU (ESDP) missions:  
1. UN Operations:  
To date, Turkey has taken part in the following UN operations:  
• The Korean War, with a brigade of 4500 troops,  
• UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), between 1988-1991, with 10 personnel,  
• UN Iraq-Kuwait Military Observer Group (UNIKOM), between 1991-2003, with 75 personnel,  
• Operation “Sharp Guard”, aimed at monitoring the embargo towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
between 1992-1996, with naval assets,  
• Operation “Deny Flight”, aimed at implementing flight restriction over Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
between 1993-1996, with an F-16 squadron,  
• UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 1993-1995, with a 
mechanized regiment of 1450 troops, 
• UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), between 2000-2001, with one military advisor. 
• UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-II), between 1993-1994, with over 300 troops. For more 
than a year, this operation was under the command of a Turkish General.  
Moreover, Turkey has also played an important role in UN relief efforts for Northern Iraqi 
refugees during and after the first Gulf War. Turkey continues to be an important lifeline for Iraq 
today as well.  
Turkey’s contributions to international peace and security continue despite the cost in terms of 
loss of life in the line of duty, not to mention the heavy financial burden. To date, Turkish troops 
have the unfortunate distinction of ranking second in terms of the number of casualties 
suffered in the service of world peace under the UN flag.  
Currently Turkey has 296 police officers, 5 military observers and 993 officers serving in UN 
peace keeping operations in Europe, Asia, Africa and America. In this regard, Turkey is one of 
the leading countries in terms of contribution in police officers to such operations.  
2. NATO and EU led operations in the Balkans: 
Turkey has participated in all operations led by NATO in the Balkans since 1995. As such, it 
contributed to IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo and Essential 
Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony in Macedonia. Turkey maintained her support for 
international efforts to enhance peace and stability in Macedonia after Operation Allied 
Harmony was terminated and the EU launched a military crisis management operation under 
the name “Concordia”. Turkey provided 11 personnel to this operation, which was later 
succeeded by the EU Police Mission, “Proxima”. It is beyond doubt that these operations have 
played a key role in re-establishing security and stability, thus contributing to the restoration of 
peace in the region. In total, over 1150 Turkish troops are currently serving in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. The majority of these forces now serve in 
KFOR, NATO’s mission in Kosovo, where Turkey undertook the command of the Multinational 
Task Force-South for a year, starting from 29 May 2007. 101 Turkish police officers took part in 
the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the UN Mission in 
Kosovo. Since 1 January 2003 Turkey has also been contributing to the EU Police Mission in 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is the EU’s first civilian crisis management operation. Currently 4 
Turkish personnel are serving within this Mission. In accordance with the NATO Istanbul 
Summit decision, NATO’s SFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was terminated to be 
followed by the EU operation “EUFOR-ALTHEA.” This operation was launched on 2 December 
2004, under the “Berlin plus” arrangements, with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. 
Turkey has maintained her contributions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this time under EUFOR-
ALTHEA with around 255 personnel, including 48 gendarmerie officers in the Integrated Police 
Unit (IPU). 
3. ISAF (Afghanistan):  
On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed the leadership of the International Security Assistance 
Force in Kabul, under the existing UN mandate (UNSCR 1386), by assuming strategic 
coordination, command and control of the operation. Thus, ISAF became the first ever NATO 
operation conducted beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Being an ambitious step forward in the 
history of the Alliance, ISAF is a challenging operation with difficulties in terms of geographic 
distance and demanding human and financial requirements. Success of ISAF, in spite of the 
challenges it poses, constitutes a key priority for the Alliance as confirmed in the 2004 Istanbul 
Summit Declaration.  
The Alliance’s political objective is to assist the Government of Afghanistan in ensuring security 
in the country so that reconstruction efforts can continue without interruption. That would 
enable the government to assume full ownership of the task of maintaining peace and security 
within the country.  
With this aim, the expansion of ISAF throughout Afghanistan has been underway, supported 
by subsequent resolutions of the UNSC. The Alliance has concluded the first stage of 
expansion in the north in October 2004, the second stage of expansion in the west in August 
2005, and the third stage of expansion in southern Afghanistan in August 2006. Currently, the 
leading issues on the agenda for NATO are the challenges brought by the expansion of ISAF, 
helping the government extend its rule into the provinces, forging ahead with the 
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process, as well as the build-up of the 
Afghan National Army, and last but not least, contributing to the extent possible, to 
international efforts towards eradicating illegal drug/narcotics production and trade. Work is 
ongoing to increase synergy between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom conducted by 
the Coalition Forces.  
The Bonn-agenda was successfully completed with the holding of the presidential elections in 
October 2004, and the Parliamentary and Provincial elections in September 2005. In the 
London Conference, held on 31 December 2005-1 January 2006, the “Afghanistan Compact” 
document was adopted. The Compact, endorsed by UNSCR 1659(2006), provides the 
framework for partnership between Afghanistan and the international community. As a country 
with deep historical ties and a particular bond of friendship with Afghanistan and in line with her 
responsibilities within NATO, Turkey strongly supports and takes part in the international 
community’s efforts in Afghanistan.  
In this vein, Turkey first assumed the command of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan between June 2002 and February 2003 for a period of eight months, with 
1400 troops. Turkey maintained its support to ISAF after it became a NATO operation in 
August 2003. Between 13 February – 4 August 2005, Turkey once again assumed the 
leadership of the ISAF-VII operation, this time under the NATO banner, with over 1400 troops. 
Turkey has also assumed the responsibility to maintain Kabul International Airport during her 
leadership of ISAF-VII.  
Turkey’s role continued within ISAF. SEEBRIG (South Eastern European Brigade) assumed 
the responsibility of Kabul Multinational Brigade Headquarters between February – August 
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2006, in which Turkey has also participated actively.  
Under the new structure of ISAF with five regional commands, the leadership of the Central 
Command in Kabul (RCC) has been assumed jointly by Turkey, France and Italy, on a 
rotational basis for a two year term commencing in August 2006. Turkey commanded the RCC 
between April 2007 and December 2007 and the Turkish contingent serving there was raised 
to 1200 personnel, including the crew of the two general utility helicopters throughout this 
period. Moreover, in addition to the present Turkish contingent (consisting of 800 soldiers), 
Turkey has pledged to supply an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) to the 
201st Corps based in Kabul.  
  
Alongside its troop contribution, the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Speaker of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly, Minister Hikmet Çetin, served with distinction in Kabul as 
NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative between January 2004 – August 2006. 
4. NATO Training Mission - Iraq:  
At the 2004 İstanbul Summit NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to assist Iraq with 
the training of its security forces. Subsequently, the North Atlantic Council was tasked to 
develop the modalities to implement this decision with the Iraqi Interim Government. On 30 
July 2004 a NATO Training Implementation Mission was established. The name of the mission 
was subsequently changed to NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM).  
The Iraqi Staff College was founded in Rustamiyah, in the process. Turkey currently has 2 staff 
officers in NTM-I. Also, more than 110 Iraqi personnel have been trained in Turkey since the 
inception of the mission.  
 
(Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,  
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ii_---turkey_s-contributions-to-international-peace-keeping-
activities.en.mfa) 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
Short List of Answers to the Research Questions 
 
The research questions constitutes the basis upon which I built this Project in order 
to find out the variables upon which the cohesion of the EU can be based so as to 
arrive at the final conclusion on whether the Turkish accession is to threaten the 
cohesion of the EU.  
 
As to the first question on the main factors affecting and shaping the EU policy on the 
Turkish accession to the EU, we can enlist the following reasons resulting from the 
research:  
1) The legal and political criteria the EU imposes on the candidate states. These 
criteria are included in the 'Copenhagen criteria' and reflect on the legal, economic 
and political status of the Turkish accession to the EU. Such a status is defined in the 
Commission and European Parliament reports, the Accession Partnership between 
Turkey and the EU and the 35 Chapters that Turkey should conclude in order to fulfil 
EU requirements and become full member- state. 
2) The negative stereotypes and syndromes of the European citizens about the 
Turkish accession to the EU.  
3) The national interests of the member states of the EU and especially those of the 
leading countries. The leading countries are not ready yet to share with Turkey the 
power they now enjoy in the EU.  (As national interests one can mention, the 
economic, military, strategic and political interests).   
4) The role of the US, which constitutes an external actor of the EU, affects the 
decisions of the EU and especially those concerning the Turkish accession to the 
EU.  
 
As to question 2 on the role of the US as a major actor of the International system 
and the extent of the US influence on the decisions of the EU as well as those 
concerning the Turkish accession to the EU, the answer seems to be positive. This 
stems from the findings of the Survey Questionnaire, analysed in Chapter 5. 
According to the results, the majority of the MEPs -participating in the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament- believe that the US influences positively 
the Turkish accession to the EU. On the other hand, if we take Chapter 4 into 
consideration, the strong American pressure may give rise to negative reactions. 
MEP Joost Lagendijk was clear on this issue. In the interview given for the purposes 
of this research, he testified that Spain and other member states call the Americans 
to stop their pressure on the issue of the Turkish accession to the EU. The position of 
the leaders of some European states was that the EU can decide on its own. In fact, 
the US wishes to play a catalytic role on the Turkish accession to the EU. Because of 
this American political attitude Turkey is always under the accusation that if it joins 
the EU, it is likely to become the 'Trojan Horse' of the US within the EU.  
 
         
As to question 3 on whether the decisions are taken in accordance with the national 
or the common interests, Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that the EU takes its decisions 
on the basis of both national and common interests. However, the EU, at the end of 
the day, finds, in terms of compromise, a minimum code of common national 
interests, which constitute the common European interests.  In the case of the 
Turkish accession to the EU and in the context of the power game, the leading 
countries wish to serve their national interests. Therefore, they consider that the 
Turkish accession to the EU is related to their national interests which are at stake. If 
Turkey joins the EU, it will become a dominant European power (Lagendijk 2007). 
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Thus, the leading countries should share their European political, economic, military 
and institutional power with Turkey. However, the leading EU countries like France 
and Germany are not ready to share their power with Turkey and thereby they 
suggest that Turkey should only take the status of privileged partnership and not of 
full membership.   
 
As to the question 4 on the situation of the Turkish political system and the role of the 
army in this system, Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the following:  
1) The dominant role of the Turkish army in the political, social and economic system. 
'Statism' was employed by the Turkish Army to consolidate itself as a dominant 
power and the depository of the Turkish political system and Turkey's territorial 
integrity.   
2) The Turkish political system suffers from economic and social problems as well as 
from corruption and 'democratic deficit'. There is a lack of respect for human rights. 
Therefore, the Turkish political system needs'lifting' and structural reforms if it wishes 
to join the EU as full member state. These reforms reflect in the EU political 
economic and institutional requirements. Certainly, taking into consideration the 
political stance of the leading countries, the syndromes and the fears of the 
Europeans, one comes to the conclusion that the legal, economic and institutional 
requirements are not enough to get Turkey in the EU. Turkey also needs the political 
will of the European public opinion and the governments of the Member-States.  
 
As to question 5 on whether the Europeans are afraid of the Turkish accession, to 
what extent and why, I mark that the Europeans are afraid of the Turkish accession 
to the EU for the following reasons: 1) They suffer from negative stereotypes and 
syndromes against Turkey regarding its accession to the EU. These syndromes and 
negative stereotypes are connected with the Turkish Muslim religious character and 
historical background. The Austrians for example, suffer from the syndrome of 
Vienna having always in mind that the Turks had arrived at Vienna's doorstep in the 
16th and 17th century (Ripperton n.d.).  2) The leading countries are not ready to 
lose or/and share their power with Turkey. 3) The Europeans are afraid of a first 
wave of at least four million workers immigrating to the EU directly after Turkey's EU 
membership. For a large part of European citizens, the Turks -due to their Muslim 
identity- and Muslims in general are related to the economic and social problems that 
the EU faces, and especially unemployment.        
 
As to question 6 on whether the Turkish accession to the EU will bring redistribution 
of power, the answer is positive. This question is connected to that on whether the 
Turkish accession will bring structural changes to the EU. The answer is also 
positive. More specifically, the Turkish accession is to bring a redistribution of 
political, economic, military, institutional and social power as well as structural 
changes in the same fields. These developments will lead to a new share of power 
within the EU that the leading countries are not ready to accept. Besides, this new 
redistribution of power, the structural changes and the new share of power will result 
in conflicting national interests and may lead to crisis.  Such a crisis is to threaten the 
cohesion of the EU. However, even if there is no crisis, the cohesion of the EU is 
likely to be threatened due to the redistribution of power and the structural changes 
through which a new balance, or more precisely a new imbalance of power, will 
result. Certainly, if the theories of Realism and Structural Realism are put in practice 
then a crisis will burst out due to the conflicting national interests and the imbalance 
of power. On the other hand, the European system could be kept in cohesion if both 
Turkey and the EU proceed to relevant structural changes, especially on the 
institutional level so that the Turkish integration to the EU is to be concluded 
successfully. This procedure has as preconditions that Turkey will successfully close 
its 35 Accession Chapters and that it will fulfil all legal, political, economic, social, 
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cultural and institutional requirements imposed by the EU. On the other hand, the 
European public opinion and the European leaders -especially those of the leading 
countries- have to show political will to accept Turkey in the EU as a full member-
state. For the time being, the second scenario has much less chances to occur. 
According to the results of this research, the first scenario seems to be the prevailing 
one.  
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APPENDIX 8 
Impact of the Project 
 
The aim of this project is to establish a model of EU cohesion regarding Turkish 
accession to the EU and new Enlargements. This model addresses the main 
question; whether the Turkish accession to the EU can threaten or not the cohesion 
of the EU. It can be, also, employed by political, social and economic scientists, 
politicians and technocrats, especially those working in the EU institutions and deal 
with the Turkish accession to the EU and Enlargement issues.  
 
Even before the final approval of the project, I have received the following reactions; 
a fact which shows the positive impact of this project:   
 
1. Members of the European Parliament, especially the ones, who closely follow 
Turkish accession to the EU, such as members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and the EU -Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, have already expressed their 
positive comments, demonstrating, at the same time, their noble intention, even to 
organise a conference on my project. They have also expressed their will to 
contribute to the publishing of this research. As the Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgets of the European Parliament Reimer Böge stated:  
"This research is an excellent methodological tool for those who wish to profoundly 
examine Euro-Turkish relations and whether the Turkish accession to the EU will 
threaten EU cohesion".       
  
2. I have presented my project to the owners of Dias Publishing, which is the biggest 
complex of Mass Media in Cyprus (including TV channel 'Sigma', Radio 'Proto', 
newspaper 'Simerini' and various magazines) and maintains contacts and cooperates 
with Mass Media agencies in Greece and internationally. The owners of Dias 
Publishing gave me the green light to present my project on the TV with the 
participation of MEPs and politicians. I was also given the possibility to use Radio 
'Proto' and newspaper 'Simerini' for the promotion of my project.   
  
This is a great opportunity for the public opinion to be informed of the Turkish 
accession to the EU and of whether Turkey's full membership will threaten the 
cohesion of the EU, or not. Such a procedure falls under the efforts of covering the 
existing 'democratic deficit' by involving public opinion on an issue that dominates 
and will dominate European affairs. As Joost Langendijk (2007) stated for the 
purposes of this research, there is "lack of knowledge" about Turkey and moreover, 
about its accession to the EU. Additionally, he maintained that "this is a big challenge 
for us, the politicians and for the Media and the journalists". 
 
3. The Peter Lang GmbH (Publishing House) was very interested in my project and I 
have already signed a contract for its publishing. Paragraph 7 of the contract 
mentions that "the publisher shall be responsible for worldwide announcement, for 
enlistment in most important national bibliographies, and shall endeavour to have the 
works reviewed in scientific periodicals".  The Publishers consider that the content of 
the project is up to date and focused on an issue, which currently dominates and will 
keep dominating the EU in the next years. Therefore, they believe that the publishing 
of this project will have a positive impact on the discussion on Turkish accession to 
the EU, which already exists in academic society and on whether such an accession 
is to threaten or not the cohesion of the EU.   
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The aforementioned facts illustrate the positive impact that my project may have on 
academic society, politicians and on public opinion.                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
